THE ALARMIST RUMOURS.
WE trust that the leaders of the Unionist Party, weary as they must be of this protracted Session, will not allow it to end without at least one serious debate as to the exact condition of our naval force in European waters. We are not alarmists, and little given to believe in " coalitions " directed against England, which could hardly be organised without premonitions that would wake up our Government to the most strenuous exertion. Eyes, for example, that can hardly be blinded are watch- ing the movements of coal throughout the world. We do, however, profoundly distrust the optimism which once before, under so keen a Foreign Secretary as Lord Gran- ville, blinded a Liberal Government to the imminence of war ; and we cannot altogether exclude the idea that in their dread. of commencing the Great War, the French and Russian Governments together might attempt to gratify their peoples by snatching some advantage from the sup- posed weakness of Great Britain. We have such an awful quantity to lose. The Russians never can lose sight of their grand necessity, free access to open water ; and the control- ling parties in France will never, till they have secured com- pensation, rest content with the British occupation of Egypt. If it were possible by a brief maritime war to secure Egypt for France, and a permanently free passage to the Mediter- ranean for Russia, the rulers in both countries might be willing to run a serious risk, more especially as Great Britain, being unable to invade, the war would be one with limited liability. We could break up neither Russia nor France, were our victories ever so complete ; nor would either the Republic in the one country, nor the Throne in the other, be seriously at stake. We should, in auy case, have at first no aid from the Triple Alliance, which we have refused to join ; and a rush for Egypt and Constantinople at one and the same time. though most unlikely, is not beyond the limits of possibility. Certainly if, as so many observers believe, this idea floats through Russian and French heads, the two countries would hardly act otherwise than they are doing. The French were never so strong in the Mediterranean as they are now ; and all reports show that the Russians have entered. the Central Sea to stay. It is asserted, apparently on the best authority, that they are in treaty with the Greek Government. which is at its wits'-end for money, for the sale either of Faros or Milo Islands, each of which possesses an admirable harbour, a limited territory, and a population at the mercy of a small armed force. The story is angrily denied, but it probably rests on a basis of facts as yet incomplete. Once seated in the Eastern Mediterranean with her Fleet silently liberated from the Baltic, and able both to repair and coal her ships, the Russian Government, with its powerful flotilla in the Black Sea, would be exactly in the right position for attacking Constantinople from both sides at once, and dictating her own terms. The Turks have no available fleet that could be relied on to keep the sea ; and, as Mr. Gladstone once pointed out, if severed from Aiia, they would be as powerless as a head with the nerves of the neck rendered useless for the transmission of the will to the members. No one could stop such an onslaught except England ; and if England were defending Egypt against France, she would for other purposes be paralysed. The scheme is at least possible if we are weak in the Mediter- ranean; and the possibility should not be suffered to continue.
Are we weak in the Mediterranean ? It is asserted that we are ; that in spite of Mr. Goschen's execution of his programme, and of Mr. Gladstone's recent assurances, we have not the force in that sea to face the French Fleet, not to mention the French Fleet reinfor( ed by the Russian. It is also asserted that our stock of coal is insufficient, and that if war broke out, it would be drawn upon with a rapidity which, unless we were favoured with immediate victory, would render it impossible to renew the stores easily or in good time. And, finally, it is asserted that if Spain joined our enemies in the hope of regaining Gibraltar, or under temptation of the mighty bribe of Morocco, we might be shut out of the Mediter- ranean altogether. We do not believe above half of all that. We distrust civil evidence about the Navy altogether, and cannot even conceive that' our Admi- ralty are blind to any necessities of the position, though they may be trusting too much to the enormous strength which democracy, always shortsighted, develops whenever it is seriously attacked. Still, we cannot think that all this smoke is without fire ; we regard the Russian encampment in the Cyclades, if it is carried out, as a very serious incident indeed ; and we should like to know a little more exactly the grounds upon which Mr. Gladstone justifies his optimism. Tin re is cer- tainly some deficiency as to torpedo-carrying Loats ; we are certainly weak in Egypt should Atbas II. see' his opportunity, and there is certainly a want of repairing. power in the long stretch between Plymouth and Malta. It would be well, therefore, if the Unionist leaders insisted on the country being informed whether, in the judgment of experts, we could, if per impossibile we were attacked in the Mediterranean, be sure of holding our own. No secrets need be revealed in the debate ; but we want the opinion of qualified experts, and not that of men who, whatever their abilities, are intent upon internal changes, and gravely alarmed at the democratic feeling they may provoke by the increases of taxation which in April will be inevitable. There is no sign as yet of any improvement in the financial situation ; and if history does not mislead us, there is hardly any foreign risk which a Liberal Government will not run rather than present its sup- porters with an unpleasant Budget, or even one which cannot be represented as, on the whole, promising for the future. Are the best sailors as fairly content as sailors ever are with anything ? That is what we want to know.
Previous page
