BRITISH POLICY NOW VI
By J. A. SPENDER
[This is the sixth and last of a series of articles on British Foreign Policy as it must be shaped in the situation created by the Munich Agreement].
THE world, of course, is very evil, but I cannot bring my§elf , to take quite such a gloomy view about our part in its affairs as many of your contributors seem to do. They think that we ought to have prevented Japan from annexing Manchuria and attacking China, to have restrained Italy from conquering Abyssinia, to have saved Czechoslo- vakia, to have come to the rescue of the Spanish Government. I share their sympathies in most of these affairs, but I would ask them to remember that there are limits to British power, and that during most of the years from 1932 onwards our forces have been barely equal to the defence of the British Empire and Commonwealth. All these causes are said to have been our special concern and we are charged with having betrayed them. This seems to me to be an unneces- sary self-abasement, which arises out of a misunderstanding of our position and liabilities as a member of the League of Nations. Not only is it unjust to throw all these reproaches on one member and one Government among the many composing the League, but there is, in my opinion, something radically at fault with the argument which leads to this con- clusion.
It was undoubtedly part of the original League doctrine that every member of it should be concerned in anything that could be called an offence against the Covenant. But the League, as President Wilson dreamt of it, the League embrac- ing America and all the great Powers, would have been in such overwhelming force that no offender against the Covenant could have resisted its judgement with the slightest chance of success, and any who tried to resist would have been brought to his senses by economic sanctions without war. There would thus, have been security for all against war, and for each against aggression. To the question, " Am I my brother's keeper ? " all would have answered yes.
This idea may be reckoned hereafter as the dawn of an international conscience, but it was far beyond the capacity of the actual League, which never succeeded in being more than one group of Powers which had to reckon with the opposition of another group. To place upon this imperfect League the obligations proper to the perfect was to make every quarrel the possible cause of a great war. I saw some- thing of the preparatory work for the drafting of the Covenant in 1919, and I feel quite sure that if the founders of the League could have foreseen that the world would be divided into League and non-League Powers, they would never have proposed Article XVI as the solution of the aggressor problem. Nothing could have been more remote from their thoughts at this time, than that the punishment of the aggressor should involve the nations in war. A large part, we may even say the chief part, of their object was to restrain the aggressor without breaking the peace.
The imperfect League made the situation worse by its sins of omission. In the early years there was reason to hope that• it would prepare the way for a general reconciliation by pursu- ing steadily what seemed to many of us its two principal ob- jects, disarmament and Treaty revision, the fulfilment of which would have brought all the nations in. When the prospect seemed hopeless in this direction, I myself wrote (in a book published in 1934) a strong plea for the suspension of Article XVI until the League had in other ways laid the foundations of a world order which would generally be re- garded as just. But apart from that, I have repeatedly in recent years cited the case of Czechoslovakia as a dangerous makeshift which urgently needed revision, and spoken of it as one of the leading instances of a type of settlement which " required the maintenance of force to uphold it and invited the recovery of force to redress the grievances it inflicted." Now, it is of no importance to anyone but myself what I said in past times : I merely cite it as typical of the thoughts of a great many besides myself, and of the difficulty which we felt when we were asked suddenly to turn round and treat Czechoslovakia as if it were an ancient and well-established country threatened with dismemberment, or as if we had been guilty of base and dishonourable conduct because we could not make a good job of this long neglected bad one. Whether Czechoslovakia was sacrificed, or, as a large part of Europe thinks, saved from the complete destruction originally intended for it, will not be known until the secrets of many hearts are revealed. I put it no higher than to say that it was a bad job, which would probably have been a far worse one but for the Prime Minister's courageous intervention.
Now out of this history it is possible to frame a dozen indictments against as many Governments over a period of twenty years. If the object is to blame, Momus himself could scarcely have better material. But recrimination is only useful if it shows the way to better results in the future.
From this point of view I think it must be said that if we are to wait till the eleventh hour for treaty revision, and if all concessions and accommodations are to be denounced as if they were surrenders and betrayals of long-established rights and institutions, there will be no peace in the world. We must go to meet these cases and not wait for settlements in panic and wrath at the last moment. The situation in front of us needs cool heads and steady nerves. There are broadly two alternatives—one is the way of appeasement proposed by the Prime Minister, the other the old way of a combination against Germany on the pre-War pattern. The first is undoubtedly slow and difficult ; the second fits only too easily with the emotions of the moment. The savage persecution of the Jews in Germany makes the worst atmosphere ; Herr Hitler's rhetorical methods pile up obstacles for those in all the free countries who hope for reconciliation. If the German Government wished at one and the same time to offend Liberals, Tories, Socialists, and the great mass of simple people who hate persecution and cruelty, it could hardly have done better in recent weeks. Here we are up against something which defeats all argument, and takes us out of the region in which sane men pursue reasonable ends. While these passions rage, rational policy is impossible and we must not hesitate to say so to Herr Hitler and Herr Goebbels. But before we despair of appease- ment, let us bear in mind that the alternative method of a bloc against Germany is a return to pre-War politics under conditions which may easily be less favourable now than then, since Italy and Japan will be on the side of Germany, and there can be no certainty about the action of Russia. This is a course which, in my view, ought not to be accepted until all other possibilities have been exhausted, for it means an unceasing competition in armaments, and life under chronic threat of war, even if war itself is avoided.
It is political quackery for politicians to pretend that they have answers to all the questions that the world presents today. Many of therg can only be solved by time, and whatever the solutions may be, the unforeseen and the unexpected will quite certainly play a large part in them. Yet there is one fact which lightens the gloom and makes the situation a little less dangerous than it seems to be. This is the profound aversion from war in all the peoples of the world which has been revealed by the recent crisis. It is impossible to believe that this will not make statesmen more prudent in handling the dangerous weapons which science has put into their hands.
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