POLITICS

French generals admire British soldiers; French politicians are uneasy

BRUCE ANDERSON

The other day, I came across a fascinat- ing piece of small print. A session of the French National Assembly's defence com- mittee might seem unlikely to provide illumi- nation or entertainment, for in recent decades there has been much more patriotic consensus about defence in France than in Britain and much less public debate. Equally, since Algeria, the French generals have been wary of making any statement which could be interpreted as a political intervention.

But not any longer. Le Monde found the ideal headline for this controversial meeting: `Les militaires frangais envient les Brit- anniques.' The two most senior French gen- erals plus the airforce commander all made the same point: that in training, materiel and force projection, the British enjoy a signifi- cant lead. Le Monde described the armed forces' chief of staff's comments as 'a tribute from a military expert to the competence and seriousness of British soldiers acquired and maintained by sheer effort on the exercise ground'. The paper concluded that, as a result of their comments, the generals 'have pushed French political leaders up against a wall'. The generals must be relieved that Devil's Island has been decommissioned.

The French generals were, of course, invit- ing the politicians to draw a simple conclu- sion: that they need more money. But they have found a powerful way of pressing home that perennial complaint, touching on French politicians' anxieties about the lead- ership of Europe.

A wise civil servant once said that politics was the pleasure principle, administration the reality principle. But in modern French defence policy that distinction has been abol- ished. The whole exercise has been about psychological gratification, at the Americans' expense. Able to enjoy Nato's protection while evading its constraints, the French have felt free to indulge themselves. After Suez, we British drew two conclusions: that we were no longer a superpower, and that we must never again find ourselves on the oppo- site side from the Americans. That was a grown-up response, but the French retreated into geopolitical fantasies. With the force de frappe, francophonie and independent diplo- macy, the French official class set out to resist American hegemony.

That was hard enough when there were two superpowers; once there was only one hyperpower, it became absurd. But far from abandoning their ambitions, the French are now trying to graft them on to Europe. The EU has a larger population and GDP than the US, so it too could become a superpower — under French leadership, naturally.

From the outset, the French have seen the European defence identity as a means of hol- lowing out Nato and displacing the Ameri- cans. But there is a problem. What defence identity? It is easy for politicians to make grandiose speeches. The difficulties start when the generals are called in. 'Bien stir, Ministre,' they will reply when invited to cre- ate a European defence policy, 'but it will cost you.' Worse still, les rosbifs have got there already.

Rapid reaction is the essence of modern warfare. But as one general told the defence committee, the planned European corps could not act as a rapid-reaction force; it would neither have the resources nor the command structure. There was one force in Europe that did have rapid-reaction capabil- ity, said the general: Nato's ARRC (Allied Rapid Reaction Corps). This has crucial British components and is usually under British command (currently General Sir Christopher Drewry, one of the army's com- ing men).

The French politicians claim that they would like Britain to be part of Europe's defence identity. The French generals were pointing out to their politicians that if we were to join such a force, we would make such an important contribution that we would be entitled to insist on commanding it.

For the French, that would be a terrifying prospect, but their fears may never be realised. Tony Blair may rescue them. The PM and Robin Cook have recently been attacking the Eurosceptic press. In Mr Cook's case, this was unwise, for it provoked the Sun into informing its readers that when Robin Cook was having his marital prob- lems, he had begged the paper to lay off him, because his was a crucial Eurosceptic voice in Cabinet: a piquant piece of mendacity.

There is an obvious conclusion to be drawn from all this. Mr Blair is planning a huge swath of surrender at the Nice summit, knows that he will be denounced by the press, and wants to get his retaliation in first. But the actual outcome may be more compli- cated. There are signs from No. 10 that the PM has still not made up his mind how to handle Nice.

He will come under enormous pressure on all fronts. The French are insisting on a huge extension of the EU's power, over the econo- my, taxation, legal matters, immigration and defence. Mr Blair knows that on some of those areas he dare not yield. To give Europe powers over tax and immigration would be electoral suicide. But he is not psychological- ly prepared to stand alone. He never expect- ed to be in such a position.

In private, he has always assured the Con- tinental leaders that he was a good Euro- pean, and he meant it. He may never have been much of a left-winger, but in any dis- agreement between Britain and another country, he was the type of leftist who auto- matically assumed that the foreigners were right. His experiences as PM may have led him to modify those views and to decide that there are arguments for British self-govern- ment, and yet he will not want to be an isolat- ed, vetoing voice at Nice. So he will be searching for compromises; matters that will play well with his fellow heads of government without alarming the voters.

A few months ago, there were signs that defence was on that agenda: a possible area British flexibility. But that might have changed. It is not only French generals who have noticed that the British are good at high-intensity warfare. So has Tony Blair. To his own surprise, he has enjoyed sending men into battle, and he too has come to appreciate the professionalism and training which the French so admire: 'hard training makes easy fighting'. The hostage rescue in Sierra Leone was a superb feat of arms, which only the Israelis could have emulated — and these days, perhaps, not even them.

Mr Blair is also aware of the gap between British forces and Continental ones, let alone those from some of the ragtag and bobtail states which turn up on UN peace-keeping operations. The defence secretary, Geoff Hoon, has gone public with criticisms of European defence weakness. Mr Hoon, a cautious fellow, would never have done that without No. 10's approval.

According to one general, Tony Blair has recently been 'drawing red lines in the sand' on European defence issues. Any anxieties which senior officers had that men and resources were about to be diverted to some Euro-nonsense seem to have evaporated. Since 1918, French generals and British pre- miers have rarely found themselves in agree- ment. They may now be, and if so, that agreement has not been purchased by British concessions.