THE MEETING OF GASTEIN.
r MIE world has been on tiptoe this week to hear what is
arranged at the meeting of the Emperors of Germany and Austria at Gastein on the 17th inst., and we cannot wonder at the general curiosity. Emperors might meet with- out a purpose, though it is improbable, or might meet for minor ends ; but Prince Bismarck is human, and is tired, and he does not leave the pleasant woods of Varzin, with his able adlatus, Herr Lothar Bucher, by his side, in the midst of his autumn holiday, without grave reason for his sacrifice. And unfortunately there is visible reason for his anxiety and his efforts. The Roumanian affair may involve war, and war on the very largest scale, war including Powers which are not to be vanquished or to be victorious in a single year's campaign. The " Eastern question," as we call it, that is by far the most serious latent quarrel existing among the civilized Powers, is fairly upon the carpet once more, and it may tax all Prince Bismarck's audacity as well as all his diplomatic knowledge to attain his object, and yet to prevent an immediate renewal of the European struggle. The facts, as we read them, are in this wise. The Parliament of the Principalities, a kingdom independent in all but name, but protected by the Treaty of 1856, recently borrowed ten millions sterling, but finding the payment of interest inconvenient, formally repudiated its obligtion. That would matter little, being strictly in accord- ance ,vith the modern precedents, which permit States of the third'rank to swindle creditors with no other consequence than loss of credit ; but the Hospodar of Roumania is a Hohen- zollern, the majority of the lenders are North-Germans, among whose foibles extravagance cannot be reckoned, and repudiation has accidentally involved a distinct and terrible insult to German nationality. The Hohenzollerns dislike breaches of faith, and the signature of the Hospodar to the Act cancelling the debt was only obtained by a threat that if it were refused the Germans within the Principalities should be massacred, a threat we neither expect nor wish that the new masters of the world should endure with equanimity. It was indispensable for the Emperor of Germany to act, not only to protect his subjects' pockets, but to maintain the place of his people in the world, and he applied therefore to the Porte, as Suzerain of the repudiating Provinces, to enforce the laws of honesty and of international fair-play. The Porte declined, alleging, what is true enough, that it had no right to interfere in the internal affairs of the Principalities, and Prince Bismarck had therefore to obtain redress for his own people through other means than diplomatic remonstrance. That might be easy enough, neither Roumania nor Turkey being in a position to resist a formal demand from Berlin, but for the general situation in Europe produced by the in- judicious severity of the German Treaty with France. To fight any power whatever is for Germany to encounter the risk or rather the certainty of having to fight France again, and it is very doubtful if Roumania can be coerced without a general war. The Russian Government, to begin with, has every interest in protecting a power which is weak, which is new, and which lies stretched right across her only road by land to the conquest of Constantinople. The Austrian Govern- ment has every interest in protecting a State which holds, as against all stronger powers, the mouths of the Danube, that is, a position which Austria cannot surrender to any first-class power without immediate extinction. And finally, England has some interest, and thinks she has much, in main- taining the validity of the Treaty of Paris, under which Roumania cannot be coerced nor conquered without the con- sent of the whole European Pentarchy. It is absolutely necessary, if anything is to be done without Europe being wrapped in flames, that one of these Powers should be de- tached from the Roumanian cause, and Prince Bismarck, with his accustomed skill, has pitched upon Austria as the one. If the Hapsburgs can be induced to agree heartily in his• plans, the opposition of the remainder of Europe may be prevented by alarm ; or if it should become active, may be defeated by force, Europe in arms, that is Russia and France in combination, being scarcely equal to a campaign with Germany and Austria united upon their own selected grounds. Unless England joined the alliance, and joined it with a re- solution to take the sword in both hands, there does not, exist in Europe the force which could resist the combined decision of the two German Raisers, or arrest the action of the million and a half of soldiers at their immediate disposal.
It is to secure an alliance of this kind, an alliance between, Germany and Austria for defence against Russia and France,. that Prince Bismarck is accompanying his master to Gastein, and he has so much to offer that it is possible he may succeed.. A guarantee from Germany would protect the Hapsburgs from, half the evils which threaten them, from the disaffection of their German subjects, from the exigencies of their Magyar' supporters, from the threats more or less avowed of the nationalists in Bohemia. Neither German, nor Magyar, nor Czech could move a step against Austria supported by Prince• Bismarck, unless aided by a Russian alliance which neither Magyar nor German could under any extremity be induced in such a cause to invoke, while the Czech friendship for Russia. is like the Irish friendship for France, a sentiment to be taken into account, but not to be seriously feared. Russia would' hardly intervene, even with hope of aid from France, merely to prevent the Roumanian boyars from paying a moderate- income-tax ; and if she did, Prince Bismarck has a grand card. in reserve. He may offer the Principalities to the Austrian. Government, which not only covets, but needs the control of the entire Valley of the Danube, and so inflict upon Austria the task which naturally belongs to her, under circumstances which would compel her for years to come, from a. mere regard to her own existence, to be the humble ally- of Berlin, from which alone she could obtain security in her new dominion. That the Government of St. Petersburg would resist such a final defeat of her secular ambition, and would obtain the alliance of France, eager for vengeance upon Ger- many, may be taken as certain ; but Prince Bismarck may believe that the struggle must come ; that it could not come under more favourable auspices, and that it is better to run the risk than allow the new Empire to pose before its subjects as a power unable to recover a just debt from an almost powerless neighbour. It is part of his policy to secure the Valley of the Danube to Germany, whether through the inter- vention of the Hapsburgs or otherwise ; part of his policy to secure the good-will of Hungary, whose interests are directly threatened by Russian influence in the Principalities; and part of his policy to attract Austria into an alliance which would turn all Central Europe into one impregnable camp of defence..
It is difficult to doubt that this, or something like this, is the offer which Prince Bismarck will make at Gastein, and if' it is accepted, war in Europe may be considered certain within, two years. Russia would, in her own estimation, be throttled. by such an arrangement, would be driven, willing or unwilling,. to offer France the alliance, in the hope, or, as he thought, in the certainty of which Jules Fevre refused any territorial cession, after Sedan ; and of course, if France is to fight, she will fight,. if she can on good grounds and with a fair chance, before the- indemnity is paid. All this talk in demi-official telegrams. of French insolence and negotiations being broken off points. to some new hope at Versailles, which is making the tone of French statesmen once more independent. The point of interest therefore is to ascertain what is agreed upon at Gastein, and upon this the probabilities are conflicting. It is. certain that the preliminary interview between the two Emperors at Ischl has been satisfactory, or Prince Bismarck would not be needed ; but the difficulties in the way of a cordial alliance must be almost insuperable. The Hapsburgs throughout their history have, when needful, postponed their pride to their policy—as witness the conduct of the House after the desertion of Maximilian—and they may do so once more, but nothing short of a distinct and unmistakable guarantee of their German territories conld tempt them into an enterprise in which failure would be ruin, while success would involve an immense addition to their non-German responsibilities. Ruling from Bavaria to the Black Sea over
millions of Germans, Hungarians, Poles, Czechs, Croats, and Roumanians, they must federalize their Empire, and although the present Government is not indisposed to that course, and has oven proposed a kind of autonomy for Bohemia, the Emperor would never carry out such a policy at the risk of a German insurrection. He must be guaranteed from that, and the guarantee would cost the new Kaiser of Germany much of his esteem, if not of his loyalty, among his North-German subjects. The war, too, although if the prize were Roumania it would not be unpopular in the Austrian Empire, would be a most formidable one to a Government but just escaped from the imminent risk of bankruptcy, while success would leave the Court of Vienna detached from France and dependent for years to come upon the good-will of Berlin. Still the hazard may be risked, under a belief that Germany will neither sur- render her reversionary right to the Danube, nor undertake the task of civilizing South-Eastern Europe for herself, under the sense of accumulating difficulties which the alliance would solve, and under a conviction that the hatred of the Russian Court, as explained by General Fadayeff, will not stop short of the dismemberment of the Austrian Empire. If these con- siderations govern, and they are very likely to govern, there will be war.
It may be asked what part England would take, or would be expected to take, in such an affray. Probably none at all. The Treaty of Paris binds us to support the integrity of Turkey, but it is only by a stretch of language that this in- tegrity can be said to be involved in the retention of a nominal suzerainty over two Principalities in which no Turk is per- mitted to set his foot. Her integrity would, indeed, be directly protected by the transfer of Roumania to the Austrian Government. With their dominions extended right across the road from Russia to European Turkey, it 'would become the direct interest as well as the duty of the Viennese states- men to arrest the march of Russia to the South, and allow the Government of Constantinople to transmute itself into some new form at its leisure and without interference from the North. A new and most formidable barrier would be erected against Russia, one which it would be almost impossi- ble for her to pass, one which at all events could not be passed without a long and most exhaustive war. We might protect Prance if France suffered too greatly in the war, but to throw our little army into those Danubian swamps in order to prevent our best ally from performing a great service to mankind, is scarcely an enterprise which will tempt our states- men to abandon their declared policy of non-interference. The Treaty of Paris was intended to limit the ambition of Russia, and no limitation could be so effective as the extension of Austrian power along the whole of the Valley of the Danube.
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