TOPICS OF THE DAY.
THE MILITARY SITUATION AND THE TRANS VAAL.
T"position of affairs in the Transvaal remains as critical as ever. Since this is the case, we are compelled to deal with it again, though at the risk of wearying our readers. The most important change in the past week has been the great development of our military prepara- tions, both here, in India, and in South Africa. To begin with, Sir William Butler, who holds the command-in- chief at the Cape, is to come home, and his place is to be filled by Sir Frederick Forestier-Walker. This change was inevitable; but it does not in the least reflect either upon Sir William Butler's patriotism or military capacity. Considering the views he is known to entertain in regard to South African affairs, he would have been in an impossible position at Cape Town should hostilities prove inevitable. As long as there was no near approach to war the fact that he was out of sympathy with the policy of the Imperial Government, and so of the High Com- missioner, mattered little, for no wise Government would do anything to prevent independence of view in its officers as long, as that attitude would not clash with the efficient discharge of their duties. The fact that Sir William Butler has resigned cannot, then, but be regarded as an indication of the critical nature of the situation at the present moment. We do not think that it need be assumed that war is inevitable, but the Government are evidently taking stock most seriously of the military position, and regard an actual war as within sight.
Though the various rumours as to the numbers and nature of the troops which are being got ready are probably in many cases erroneous in detail, we do not euppose that the general lines of action described are very far wrong. For example, we do not imagine that there peed be much doubt as to the truth of the allegation made in several, papers that Sir Redvers Buller will command our forces in case of war. He . is a General of great experience and ability, and he knows the country. Again, we do not doubt that the main force will be concentrated in Natal, and will move along the line of the railway into the Transvaal, though possibly there may also be flank movements from the Bechuanaland Protectorate and even from Kimberley. Next, it is clear that the troops which will concentrate in Natal will be drawn from three different sources. To begin with, there are by this time about six thousand or more Regulars already in Natal. Next, a force of, we may suppose, about thirty thousand men in all will be despatched direct from England. There will be another force — all, of course, white troops — numbering some ten thousand, which will be sent from India. Then there will be a considerable number of local levies, consisting of the Natal Volunteers and the Natal Mounted Police (essentially a military body), numbering together at least two thousand, and also of volunteers specially enlisted in Cape Colony, who may number another thousand. Lastly, we do not doubt that the powerful squadron in South African waters would be able to provide a Naval Brigade of not less than one thousand men,—making. in all, an army of some fifty thousand men in Natal. If we add to these the irregular troops which will be collected on the other frontiers of the South African Republic, the total force to be employed will probably be close on fifty-five thousand men, in which the proportions of cavalry and artillery will be very large. In addition to these there will be the English regiments which will be left to garrison Cape Colony. That the main force, acting from Natal, assisted by movements from Bechuana- land, will be quite sufficient to deal with any resistance offered .to them, though that resistance will be conducted by a specially brave people, we cannot doubt. It is diffi- cult to say exactly .how many men the Boers will be able to put in the field. Of, course if the whole Dutch popula- tion.of the Cape and O ' f the Orange Free State threw.up work on their farms and flocked to support President Kruger in holding down the Outlanders, they might easily produce a body of 'fifty thousand men, but that this will take place is far from likely. What is probable (nay, we should say what is almost certain), is that only the younger and more adventurous of the Dutch farmers will come to the aid of the Boers. But this is not likely :Co mean a body of more than five or six thousand men. . Let us suppose that the Boers themselves can put twenty thousand men into the field. Their total force, then, is not likely to be more than twenty-five thousand men. And this, remember, will not be an organised force, but rather a mob of good marksmen. But a mob, even when each person in it provides his own transport and com- missariat for, say, a week, is not an army. That groups of Boers five hundred strong, or even a thousand, Will fight very effectively in a rough country must,_of _ course, be admitted. It is probable, indeed, that good shooting and individual resource and pluck may make an unorganised body of six or seven hundred men a more formidable force than can exact drilling and close organisation. :When however, it comes to bodies of ten thousand or fifteen thousand men, the want of organisation and of .cohesion will be very greatly felt. The Boers will, we grant, not fail for want of company or regimental organisation, but they will for want of brigade organisation. Their strength in numbers will be an actual source of weakness, asalso will be their artillery. A force of six hundred men without guns or any impedimenta, and in which each man looks out for himself, can act without confusion. A force of fifteen thousand men encumbered with gunk and neces- sarily trying to work together without knowing how, Will be in a very different. position. If, then, the Boers -in force meet us in force we do not think we need be afraid of the result. But perhaps it will be said that the Boers will not meet us in force, but will keep up ,a running war as they did last time. We do not think this likely, for it would mean the abandonment of Pretoria and of the felts at Pretoria and Johannesburg. But even if they refused to meet us in the open, and determined to .play a waiting game, we do not think it would be successful. And for this reason. In the old war, the majority, nay, practically the whole, of the people of the Trans- vaal were against us. Now the majority are on our side, and would welcome us as deliverers, not as enemies. For example, there are even in Pretoria some thirty thousand Outlanders. If, then, the Boers were to allow us to enter the Transvaal and to occupy Pretoria and Johannesburg, and to rely upon dilatory tactics, we should find ourselves at once Welcomed and strengthened by a great friendly population, which we should at once proceed to arm and organise. The occupa- tion of Johannesburg and the Rand district would e.t once add ten thousand, or even fifteen thousand, men'to Our forces. Again, we should not be holding isolated posts, but a great city in railway communication with the coast.. The railways and the deep hostility of the majority of the population to the Boers have, in fact, entirely altered the local conditions — we say " local " advisedty, because we do not forget the importance of the general race problem in South Africa—and have made them favourable to us instead of most unfavourable, as 'they were in 1881. It would seem, then, certain that the Boers cannot afford to play a waiting game, and -must resist the advance of our troops in the open. We do not say that necessarily this means an immediate Victory for the British troops, but it would hardly be presumptuous to say so. Sir Redvers Buller is not Dr. Jameson, and a brigade of British cavalry is a very different thing from the young gentlemen in picturesque hats who lost their way and their heads at Krugersdorp.
We have dwelt so long upon the strength of our-forces in case of war not out of any feeling of arrogance, but solely with the hope that President Kruger and the Boers may even now see the madness of insisting on war. [We say " insisting " advisedly, because the Transvaal Executive know that they have only to grant Sir Alfred Milner's terms fully and fairly and without any "clever." drawbacks to make peace absolutely certain.1 Let the Boers remember that if it comes to war there will be no second Majuba Hill. When once we are engaged the struggle will be fought out to the .bitter. end, even if the whole of South Africa becomes involved. and we have the whole Dutch population ranged against the British. That is an event terrible in -the extreme to contemplate, but even that would he faced rather than another act of feebleness. As we have said, cost what it will in men and money, the British people, if war ensues, will see it through to the end, for they are not now as in 1881, but realise that the whole future of the Empire depends upon their steadfastness in this quarrel. President Kruger and his Boers are in no sense objects of hatred to our people, but this fact must not mislead them into thinking that, even if we go to war, we shall soon weary of it, and be ready on the first little reverse to make terms. Our people make plenty of mistakes, but they do not knowingly make them twice over. They know that the peace made in 1881 after Majuba was a hideous blunder, and that blunder they will not repeat, come what may.
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