George Brown's Burden

FOREIGN POLICY

By MALCOLM RUTHERFORD

MR GEORGE BROWN has declared himself elated at being given the office of Foreign Secretary; apart from understandable reasons of

personal achievement, it is difficult to see why. Few recent Foreign Secretaries are now remem- bered with distinction, and some, like Lord Butler, though distinguished enough in other fields, are scarcely remembered as having held the office at all. Mr Michael Stewart, whose brief reign was actually longer than that of his two immediate predecessors, is recalled chiefly as 'our man at the Oxford teach-in.' His function was to apply his considerable skill in public debate to defend the department from 'uninformed' outside critics. It is difficult to believe that he made many major policy decisions of his own, and impossible to recall him making any major diplomatic in- itiative.

British foreign policy in recent years has be- come extremely skilled in one respect : its architects have a notable ability to put up a

brilliant intellectual defence of the stalus quo in virtually every area of the globe. Though they

will accept that change is going on all about us, their principal reaction is that Britain must always sit tight, and the change in the end will be shown to have worked to our advantage. For example, while it is acknowledged that the scene in Eastern Europe is changing beyond recognition, no point is seen in our moving very fast to exploit it. To take a diplomatic initiative is to risk making a mistake, and mistakes are better left to others.

Thus at the last NATO meeting of Foreign Ministers in Brussels, the only notable British pro- posal (already forgotten) was for an innocuous East-West charter which recalled a plan put for- ward by Selwyn Lloyd several years before, and was hardly radical even then. This too is wholly within the rules of British foreign policy : if an initiative finally becomes unavoidable, it will take the form of a detailed set of proposals for dis- cussion, the more impractical the better. Their Purpose is to divert the discussion from sup- posedly risky issues, and the classic example of this is the British plan for an Atlantic Nuclear Force. Few initiates ever claimed that the plan seriously intended to get off the ground, but it certainly had the merit of persuading our allies that issues like West Germany's access to nuclear weapons were better left dormant.

Nor is this attitude to policy-making confined to European affairs. One of the outstanding suc- cesses of recent British policy in the Middle East was the refusal four years ago to recognise the revolutionary regime in the Yemen. It left Britain free, if she so chose, to allow aid to go through to the Royalists in the Yemeni civil war, while the intervention of Cairo on the side of the Repub- licans effectively crippled President Nasser's Egypt as a revolutionary force, at least in the short term.

Yet this technique of inactivity should not be blamed on the Foreign Office, only on Foreign Secretaries and the Cabinets to which they have belonged. The proper business of permanent officials is not to make policy, only to carry it out. And if the political leadership is lacking, what can the Foreign Office do?

From the point of view of officials, the guide- lines for British policy have scarcely changed since 1945: to maintain the special relationship with the United States, to protect the Empire or Commonwealth and to seek close (but not too close) relations with the countries of Western Europe. No Foreign Secretary has ever suggested that these aims are now beyond us, although they have acknowledged that they can only be achieved through alliances. And none has ever begun to hint that the three guidelines might now be mutually contradictory. Not one of the major international developments since the war has been allowed to change this happy picture. The destalinisation of Russia, the rapid recovery of Western Europe, the emergence of a politically active and neutral third world, the shift of American interests to the Pacific have all left the basic definition of British policy almost com- pletely unaffected.

Even when there has been some change of emphasis at home the old guidelines have re- mained sacrosanct. We are getting out of Aden in 1968, but we shall remain a power East of Suez. We have recognised that our future lies in Europe, but nothing must be done to harm the special relationship. We are not sending troops to Vietnam or to Thailand, but our commitment to SEATO will be honoured and we are deter- mined to help keep the peace in South-East Asia. The only way we can seek to redefine our defence policy turns out to be to try to tailor it to a wholly arbitrary financial ceiling. The contra- dictions arc endless.

And, of course, catastrophe is not yet upon us. The illusions and contradictions could probably be maintained for some time to come. But the future is not a very enviable one, and nor, in these circumstances, is the post of Foreign Secretary, unless he is to behave with far more decisiveness than his predecessors.

At the present time, for Mr Brown, the imme- diate issue is Europe and here perhaps more than anywhere else the lack of decision prevails. If he wants seriously to lead Britain in, he will have to begin not in Paris or in Brussels but in Downing Street. Europe's terms for entry are roughly known; whether Britain is prepared to take the plunge is not. Even if it is argued that the French are insincere and would find any excuse to keep us out, some time their sincerity will have to be put to the test. We cannot hang on indefinitely hoping that maybe the General will die, that French policy might then be different, and at the same time becoming more and more dependent on the United States.

Nor, with entry into Europe one way or another the common talk of all three political parties, can the idea be simply shelved. The Americans are as ardent advocates of British entry into Europe as we are ourselves. The alter- native policy for Britain of seeking a closer association with the United States cannot be tried, and hardly even talked about, until something is finally done about Europe. Either we get in, or we are again decisively rejected; whatever hap- pens, the issue must be faced.

The issue. of course, is still Britain's role; the words have become a cliche, but they are still no nearer definition. Mr Brown could begin to pro- vide it by wringing a decision from the Cabinet about Europe. The rest of British policy could then be fitted into place. But if Mr Brown fails, policies based on illusions and contradictions seem bound to continue, with the illusions getting bigger all the time and both the power and the influence slipping from our grasp.