MOROCCO
By The Rt. Hon. Sir Cu:um-Es HonnotrsE.
THE veil which the French and Spanish authorities have drawn across events in Morocco conceals a realm of mingled shams and stern realities. The Sultan's territories are, like Ancient Gaul, divided into three parts, each of which is in fact something other than itpretends to- be. The enclave of Tangier, international- ized by the Declaration of 1904 which was itself confirmed by the Act of Algeciras in -1906, should be controlled by representatives of all the thirteen Powers whose nationals are resident in the city. As a matter of fact only three of the signatories have ratified the subsequent agreement of 1923, and in order to obtain the necessary quorum required to legalize certain of the ordinances of the Legislative Assembly, that body has to assume the presence of representatives, who are not and may not be present, and whose nationals cannot, therefore, be bound by the regulations thus enacted. The situation is only to be done full justice to by the pen of a Lewis Carroll or a Gilbert.
Again, over the rest of Morocco the Sultan is suzerain and all enactments run in his name. Yet; in fact, he is confined by the- French Resident to the neighbourhood of Marakesh, and the French military authorities enlist for him in the Moroccan forces. American and Rumanian airmen who bomb- his Killian subjects. The Sultan, perhaps prudently, has not yet expressed his full apprecia- tion of such international efforts against .native patriots. As these alien heroes have now been disbanded in Paris, he will probably remain silent.
Yet, again, the greater portion of the zone assigned to Spain to administer is within the limits of the Riff. But in this, and in the adjoining country of the Jebalas, no person would be so much in danger as a Spanish official, and no authority would he so disregarded as a pronounce- ment of the Spanish Government. In these highlands the only law which counts is that. given by Abd-el-Krim, who is the one definite result of the war which for twenty years Spain has waged against the Rillis and their allies. The son of a petty notable, in that period he has imposed by his courage and his talents, his unlimited personal authority on an agglomeration of independent, turbulent, yet traditionally patriotic clans. It is even possible, so successful and fortunate has he been, that this authority would survive a declaration of peace and autonomy, and that for the first time the Riffis might recognize a chosen centralizing ruler.
It is extraordinarily difficult for anyone, even for those who like myself have been in the Riff, to understand how a local guerrilla force of some 20,000 to 30,000 actual combatants can sustain, and either wholly or partially repel, the attack of two European armies, of which one at least is in the front rank, and whose united forces must number over 250,000 men. AVIien early in last September Marklial Main, the head of the active army, took the field to recover for France her lost territory and her shaken reputation, he commenced operations with somethingover 30,000 European and 120,000 native tmons. The Spanish leader, the Marquis de Estella, officially declared shortly after the Spanish landing at Alhucemas, that he was proud to have been in eommand of an armada of 100,000 men and 100 ships. There is some detailed confirmation of these figures. Ali-el-Krim publicly estimated the forces actually in the field against him at 200,000 men and his own force at 25,000.
• When on September 11th the French moved northwards in two columns, correspondents in Paris estimated a strength of 50,000 for each column. The Spaniards besides the forces at Ceuta, Tetuan, and Melilla, had 12,000 to 16,000 men at Allnieemas Bay, and a further force at Cebadilla, and perhaps at Quillates. Whatever the actual disparity of numbers, which (-pilot be put at • less than seven or eight to one, the fact remains that in an area strictly limited in size, a native force of vastly inferior strength, and composed of infantry supported by the most meagre artillery has held up two great armies, directed and led by some of the best soldiers in Europe and freely supplied with all the auxiliary services of tanks, aeroplanes, and artillery which complete the equipment of a modern army.
There were, no doubt, some political and natural factors on the side of the Riffk. The prestige of the French and Spanish Government and armies demanded imperatively an early victory, and therefore an immediate oampaign. The time within which the latter could be conducted, or the former snatched, was confined to the six or seven weeks between the ends of August and October, during the first two weeks of which the heat would be tropical, and during the last two weeks the rain would be torrential. As the weather came up to expectation, the results were according to plan, but of the Riffis and not of the Allies. On paper the -Franco-Spanish plan of campaign was simple, sound and certain of 'success. A hundred thousand French troops,' led • by distinguished commanders who had proved their worth in the • Greet War, preceded by aeroplanes,. flanked- by an abundant cavalry, and supported by an adequate and skilled artillery, were to move northwards from Fez and Taza in two columns. The objective on the west was Sheshuan via Biban, and on the east was Tafersit via Taunat and Kiffane, with Dar Druis and the Kert valley. When the objectives were reached, French would be in touch with Spanish forces, who moving up from the Mediterranean by way of Tetuan from the west, and Melilla and Alhucemas on the east, would combine in shutting off the Riffis and their Allies from northern supplies of munitions and southern supplies of food. Disunion would follow fast on military disaster, the Riffi-Jebala confederation would fall to pieces, and while peace could be made at leisure, political and military laurels could be distributed at once.
The plan being simple and perhaps obvious, it became a matter of gossip in the bazaars of Tangier, and on September 7, the Riffi forces collected round Tetuan to prevent Spanish forces thereabouts from assisting the Spanish landing at Alhucemas on September 9. On this latter date the Spaniards landed at Cebadilla and Morro Nuevo, but not at Quillates, whence General Perez was deflected to Tetuan. The landing required and was effected with skill and courage, and after considerable delay the whole force involved, some 14,000 men, has established an entrenched camp, which they seem to intend permanently to occupy. But the camp appears to be not more than two or three miles from the shore, sur- rounded by Riffi levies, and unable to provide a force either to hold, if as is doubtful they ever reached, Ajclir, or to relieve Tetuan from a daily bombardment. Flushed with the success of the landing, the Marquis de Estella, the General in Chief in Morocco, telegraphed to the Spanish Directory of which he is the political head, congratulating the King, the Government, and the Nation on the results attained. No mention was made of casualties, but I personally, being in Spain, noticed the despatch of reinforcements on the following day. There has been, therefore, obviously, no possibility of a junction of forces at Sheshuan with their allies.
It is necessary to recall that in 1923-4 the French northern border was defined as being " the heights which commanded the Ouergha." To achieve these they had to advance across that river and its adjacent plain to the mountains of the Riff, and in 1924-5 were driven back by Abd-el-Krim with the loss of some 70 posts, many men, and much material, to a line south of the Ouergha. On Septem- ber 11. having already rebuilt or extended their road system, and recaptured the territory and allegiance of certain refractory tribes, the French moved to the north of Fez, and after sharp fighting cleared the important position of Biban, and on their eastern flank, starting from Taunat and Ain-Acha moved along the upper Ouergha. Great offensive movements by the combined Spanish and French forces were outlined by the French Press, and accepted as probable by the English Press, but as the Times correspondent reported at the time, the tribesmen were not broken. By September 17, the French front of 40 miles was consolidated, and though isolated parties of cavalry may have momentarily established contact the joint movement has been abandoned, and a terri- torial gain of some 8-10 miles in depth along the limited front mentioned is all that can be claimed as a result of setting a quarter of a million men in motion. Even this meagre result is put in question by the Riffi claim in November that at least half of the re-established French posts have been again abandoned, while it is certain that the Spanish cannot prevent a bombardment of Tetuan whenever the Riffi artillery choose that target at which to practise. That there is great probability of the truth of this claim is shown by the undoubted fact that the French authorities have assisted or connived at the visit of an Englishman to the Riffi headquarters. Other visitors have also reached the same locality, and if the Riffi leader is a statesman as well as a strategist, he will take a great opportunity to outline terms which can be accepted in permanent settlement of both French and Spanish relations. Nominal religious subordination and real political autonomy are easily reconcilable proposi- tions. A French stabilization at the southern bank of the Ouergha should satisfy the honour and the needs of both parties. Mining and commercial concessions play a subterranean part in the tragedy, and if only some of the actors at Geneva would suggest intervention in an essen- tially international situation, even the financial issues might be settled satisfactorily. None of the three combatants has time, men or money to spare in further strife.
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