SIR JOHN KATE'S SEPOY WAR.*
Sin- JOHN KAYE'S third volume, recounting the story of the Sepoy Mutiny and its wide-stretching consequences, does not advance the narrative further than the fall of Delhi, in September, 1857, four months after the fatal outbreak at Meerut. The time • A History of the ftoy War in Indio, 1857-55. By John William Kaye, F.E.S. Val. ILL London: W. H. Allen end 0o. is brief, measured by weeks and days, but crowded as it was with heart-rending tragedies and "moving accidents by flood and field," the period to which the historian has devoted three thick volumes seems like a series of years rather than months. "Every man," he says, "must write his books in his own way," an in- dubitable proposition ; but we may regret that the modern way should tend to expansion ratherthan condensation, chiefly, perhaps, because big books have a lesser chance of being read in an age when printed matter is so abundant. At the same time, it must be admitted that, if ever there was a historical theme which justified detailed narrative, it is the huge military revolt which shook for a moment, but consolidated for a century, that amazing phenomenon, English rule in India, which has no parallel in modern annals. For there was not one grand theatre, either of revolt or warfare, presenting a series of events follow- ing the one from the other, like, for example, the Peninsular war or the recent campaigns in France. The earlier months brought forth a large crop of episodes on points remote from each other, occurring at different moments, and for a time, only connected by the common tie of rebellion against the dominant power ; so that the skill of the historian is necessarily taxed to do justice to the sufferings and heroism of his countrymen, and yet preserve unity and continuity in his narrative. The area of disturbance was vast, and although it was occupied by the regiments of a single army, yet the special fields of violence were distinct and almost isolated. Thus in the present volume we have four great centres of conflict,—the struggle in the Ganges Valley below Allahabad, whereof the principal incidents are in Dinapore, Arrah, and Patna ; the strife in and around Agra, including the Jhansi and Rohilcund episodes ; Sir Henry Lawrence's wrestle with the chiefs and soldiery of Oude, his death, and the first chapter of the famous siege ; finally, the last hours of Delhi, ending with its capture by assault, and the death of John Nicholson. In a rough way, each of these large events was con- nected with the others ; but practically, for the time, the fields of action were distinct, and the little knots of Englishmen and faith- ful natives had to solve their own problems, and uphold the imperial flag as best they could. Communication between them, always precarious, was frequently and for long intervals impossi- ble, and they stood out amid circumambient revolt like cities in a raging flood. It will not be until a later period that Sir John Kaye will reach a stage in his huge history enabling him to de- scribe the opening and development of those extensive combined operations which, conducted by Sir Colin Campbell and Sir Hugh Rose, brought the warfare to an end. Yet to the last an episode will mark its course, for the adventures of Tantia Tepee should constitute not the least interesting chapter in this narrative.
The period described in the present volume deals, it will be seen, with that early stage when the Supreme Government was uncertain respecting the extent to which mutiny would spread, and still more as to how far it would be backed up by the outcome of lurking disaffection. Looking back upon the scene from the vantage-ground occupied by the historian, it is plain that Lord Canning and his colleagues did not fully comprehend the magni- tude of the peril, or see that a great military institution had utterly collapsed. Sir John Kaye says the misconceptions of Government were not occasioned by defective sagacity, but want of informa- tion; but of course, when facts, trumpet-tongued, dictate policy, insight is not needed. It seems to us that an accurate picture of head-quarters at Calcutta in June, 1857, would represent the Government, not only as imperfectly informed—a misfortune in- evitable under the circumstances—but also as basing its plans and hopes upon a narrow conception of a calamity colossal in its pro- portions. Nothing shows this more effectually than a despatch, quoted by the historian, which Lord Canning wrote in the middle of June, calling upon Sir Henry Barnard, then with a disproportionate body of troops before Delhi, ".to push down an European force immediately" to Cawnpore. That Lord Canning did not leap to the conclusion that the whole Bengal Army, together with its offshoots, the Native Contingents, had escaped from the bonds of discipline, is not surprising. New to India, and unacquainted with the rottenness of our Native Army, he could not be expected to see more deeply into its nature than the soldiers and civilians who surrounded him. Nevertheless, neither he nor they did so see, and no picture of the time is accurate which does not paint the Governor-General as bravely confronting an enemy whose force he did not and could not appreciate. No doubt it was fortunate for England that she was represented at that time by a man so insensible to fear that, for weeks after the outburst at Meerut, he trusted his personal safety to a native body-guard. But the same boundless
courage, combined with an inadequate judgment upon the great event, led him to look with something like contempt upon the ap- prehensions of non-official Europeans, and to refuse disdainfully their first high-spirited offer to enrol themselves as Volunteers. And when, yielding to the earnest entreaties of Mr. Grant, he accepted their services, he still spoke of his concession as "a sedative to the fears of Calcutta," and talked, in his correspondence, rather contemptuously of "amateur soldiers," who, nevertheless, assured the absolute safety of the capital. Probably the verdict of his- tory will approve, as measures required by a dire emergency, the famous "Black Acts." The Anglo-Indian public and the Press, native and English, are apt to speak out very freely, and in June, 1857, their language was both loud and deep. Restraint, especi- ally in regard to the publication of so-called "news," was impera- tively needful, in the interests of Imperial safety, and Lord Canning would have been open to severe animadversion had he not drawn a remedy from the arsenal of arbitrary power. Where he was wrong was in placing the property of journalists in great jeopardy ; and the same results might have been secured by a. rigorous censorship. The excuse that he would have had to play the part of censor himself is a terrible reflection on the discreticfn of the Bengal Civil Service. At this period also he was opposed to the demand that the Sepoy regiments in Ben- gal shoulds be at once disarmed ; he reluctantly consented to disarm the Barrackpore regiments, even when General Hearsey advised the step ; and "he was never satisfied that the measure was necessary." Yet in a few days he had to take the strong step of arresting the King of Oude, and to admit that "the mutinies" had "grown into a more formidable revolt than was anticipated." The truth came out more glaringly when the Dinapore regiments, although confronted by the 10th Foot, suc- ceeded in breaking away with their arms ; and when, but for the vigorous, self-reliant action of Major Vincent Eyre in marching with a small, improvised force to relieve Arrah, the whole pro- vince would have passed into the hands of the mutineers. No candid critic would blame Lord Canning because he erred on the side of confidence and caution, yet it may be held that a less intellectually deliberative, though equally wise and brave man might not only have seen instinctively the full scope of the Mutiny, but throughout the region immediately within his reach have adopted a bolder, more far-seeing, and effective policy. Such men are the greatest of rarities, and if Lord Canning was not one, he approximated very closely to the ideal standard.
Passing beyond the boundaries of Behar and Bengal, Sir John Kaye narrates in great detail, and with admirable clearness, the astounding scenes of violence which lit up Central India, Oude, and the North-West. The reader will find in the central chap- ters of this volume a most interesting account of what befell in G-walior, Indore, Agra, and Lucknow, all the more attractive because the writer throughout alms at holding the balance, and runs into no excessive attacks. He does ample justice to Scindia and Holkar, and exempts the latter from those suspicions of disloyalty which have clouded his reputation. It is easy to see that several bones of contention are provided by Sir John's treatment of the subject, but we have not at our disposal the space which would enable UB to state the subjects of probable controversy, much less enter into details. In so wide a field, including the political action of men like Sir Henry, then Colonel; Durand, Mr. Colvin, and Sir Henry Lawrence, not to speak of lesser functionaries, points of comment abound which would require many columns of print to themselves, if they were adequately discussed. We need only say that the accomplished historian has drawn an animated and careful pic- ture, portraying not only the frightful atrocities committed by the enemies of the English, but those appalling difficulties sur- rounding each agent of British power, which were so vast that our wonder is how they could be so fearlessly fronted and over- come. Whether Colonel Durand was mistaken respecting Holkart how far Mr. Colvin misjudged the emergency and the means whereby it should have been met, and what judgment shall be passed upon Sir Henry Lawrence, these are matters which the reader must determine for himself, after he has perused the whole story. Few will retain any other impression than this, —that whatever may be the errors and shortcomings discernible in that excited time, when looked at by the cold eye of criticism from a chair of absolute safety, they were all obliterated by the courage and endurance so universally displayed. The two last chapters in the volume faithfully describe the closing scenes before Delhi, and produce some matters, especially in the shape of extracts from documents, which will be certainly new to the general reader. The siege of Delhi is undoubtedly one of the
most remarkable exploits recorded in military annals, and has not yet even received the attention it merits. It may be doubted, however, despite Sir John Kaye's kind-hearted apologies for 'General Archdale Wilson, whether storming columns would have - ever been sent against the walls, had not John Nicholson rein- forced the army by his presence, and furnished such an over- whelming support to Baird Smith and Alexander Taylor. The dnbitations, and we are bound to say, the reasons thereof, not altogether baseless, which governed the conduct of the late Sir Archdale Wilson are duly set forth ; and while we are disposed to make every allowance for them, we must say that India was won and will be retained by men of a wholly different stamp. Were we asked who captured Delhi, we should say no officer at any time holding the chief command. The merit belongs to John Lawrence, -the fiery Nicholson, Baird Smith, Alexander Taylor, and even to Hodson, who falls under the historian's most unsparing lash. At the same time, it is only fair that conscientious labourers like 'Wilson should have their due, and none will say that Sir John has not heaped up full measure. His last chapter ends abruptly, much that he wished to say having been "unavoidably left unsaid ;" and we may close our brief remarks by observing, that perhaps the proper time for framing a critical judgment on this work will be when it has been completed.
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