THE RETENTION OF CANDAHAR.
(To TIM EDITOR OF THE " EPROTATOR.")
IS ili,—After a careful perusal of the Indian papers, I cannot help thinking that on the question of the expediency of retain- ing or abandoning Candahar the public have entirely mistaken the true grounds on which it rests. Putting aside for the moment all consideration of the policy or justice of the late Avar, and accepting the fact that we have determined on giving up any idea of annexing Afghanistan, it is quite clear that the retention of Candahar will be a standing grievance in the eyes of the natives, and a fertile source of discontent. It seems to me also clear that whoever possesses Candahar must have pre- ponderating influence in Afghanistan, and that it will be im- possible for a native Sovereign to rule at Cabul while Candahar is in the hands of England, or ;is ruled by a nominee of Inig- land. If you give up that district, it will undoubtedly fall into the possession of Ayoub, because Abdarahman is not strong enough to prevent it doing so ; and if it does, good-bye to Abdarahman's rule in Afghanistan. Ayoub, at present, is the 'hero of the Afghans, and principally because he has given us a severe thrashing ; and although Abdarahman has the best right, and would probably be the best ruler of the country, he has not only not thrashed us, but he is supposed to be friendly to us. Moreover, Ayoub has the custody of Ya.koub's son. If,
therefore, we are anxious that Abdaralunan should succeed to the throne, it is expedient that we should retain Caudahar until, and only until, he has firmly secured his position, and then hand it over to him ; and if we let it be known that this is our intention, it would tend to strengthen that position materially, by convincing the chiefs that the only chance of Caudahar again forming part of the realm of Afghanistan lieu in loyally recognising Abdarahman as their Sovereign, and it will al the same time lessen the prestige which Ayoub has undoubtedly obtained by his success over our troops.
The scientific boundary being now a proved delusion, tho retention of Candahar would only entail a considerable ex- penditure, out of all proportion to any commercial advantages which might arise out of it, yet, inasmuch as by retaining it for a time we should prevent Ayoub turning his prestige to account, and also prevent him from successfully competing with Abdara'hman for the throne, we shall, on the presumption that the latter is most likely to make his interests square with ours, most effectually and most speedily secure the pacification and settlement of the country. To abandon at the present moment Candahar would be in effect to support Ayoub against A.bdarahman, because the former would undoubtedly obtain possession of it, as, if ever given over by us to Abdarahman, he is not yet sufficiently firmly seated on the throne to hold it against Ayoub ; and if the latter wrested it from him, the former's position at Cabul would be untenable. If, however, Ayoub is in our eyes as acceptable a Sovereign for Afghanistan as A.bdarahman, the sooner we quit Candahar, the better. This, however, is certain, that no one can rule at Cabul who is not also the acknowledged Sovereign at Candahar. Thus the question of the retention or retrocession of Candahar has nothing to do with the scientific boundary, nor with com- mercial benefits, nor with our prestige in India, but depends simply on whether it is expedient to allow a man who has gained the enthusiastic support of a large section of his countrymen, by the thrashing he gave to General Burrowes, to seat himself on the throne, or to declare that we will only give it to the man who in our eyes has the best claim to it, when he is sufficiently strong to hold it. To me it is evident that the chiefs, rather than see Candahar remain in our possession, will declare in favour of Abdarahman and ignore Ayoub, when the former brings with him as a portion of the dowry of his crown so
valued a section of the old empire.—I am, Sir, &c., E. H.