CORRESPONDENCE.
Berlin, January. Szn,—To judge from telegrams in the English papers, there should be sufficient interest in England about the so-called poli- tical crisis in this country to render acceptable a short statement .as to what is really in course of preparation. As far as I have been able to form an opinion, what has appeared in English journals is partly fanciful and partly, to say the least, premature in its exposition.
That there is something under consideration is an admitted fact, and that this something is of more than trifling importance for the tone and internal organisation of the German (not merely the Prussian) Government is also a fact few here question. What is involved in that which at this moment is occupying the minds of certain German statesmen would not be comprised in the mere substitution of one or two new men for some old office- holders—in the mere expulsion of particular Ministers to make room for others—what is being mooted amounts to modification in principle of the existing system, the transformation of an Ad- ministration hitherto composed like a piece of mosaic into one fused by the action of party cement ; and moreover, the impart- ing to the Imperial authorities such means of executive force as will make of them in their respective Departments the effective, Instead of, as hitherto they have for the most part been, the merely nominal agents in administration of the Germanic Empire. In two Imperial Departments—no doubt, the moot important ones—alone have the individuals at the head been invested with that range of authority which has made official utterance a word of real command, and not more or less a wave of mere sound. Military organisation, symbolised in the Emperor as Commander- in-Chief, has been in active operation throughout the Fatherland, according to an uniform system, through the medium of the Im- perial War Office situate in Berlin. Similarly, the foreign policy of Germany at large has been firmly taken in hand by one whose strength of grip has long become proverbial,—the Prince-Chancel- lor Bismarck. But outside these two Departments—the War .Office and the Foreign Office—everything is in a condition of imperfect formation, which has an unpleasant likeness to the notorious incompetency of the so-called German Executive en- throned at Frankfort in 1848, in the shape of a mock Vicar, and of a Legislature which had as much effective power as the Oxford Union has in England. Neither the Imperial Ministry of Finance, nor the Imperial Board for Railways, nor any single of the various Imperial Administrative Boards created, possesses virtual autho- rity, such as appertains to the same Departments in the dif- ferent component States forming the so-called Empire. This fact has long attracted the notice of those German politicians who snake it a capital article of their creed to render the unity a reality in administrative, as well as in international and military mat- ters. Indeed, for many reasons, the men of this school -attach the greatest possible importance to this point, and not the least is that they have had reason to become sensible of a revival of Particularist forces, which are being put in play with the view of paralysing the still infant growth of the Imperial unity. It is a recognised fact that the Princes have for some time been showing an increasing disposition to baulk the action of the central authority—to assist autonomy on every possible occasion, with undisguised pertinacity—and that the work of practical fusion has been greatly impeded by a determined, though not unfre- quently underhanded spirit of resistance. Now of this no one is more sensible than the Chancellor himself, who has often fumed at the opposition he has felt checking and thwarting that thorough- ness of action which is so congenial to his temperament. He is, -and has been for some time, keenly alive to the desirability of -breaking down this obstructive force, and his prolonged absence in his country retreat is not wholly unconnected with irritation at its existence, and an angry sense that he cannot satisfactorily administer until he finds himself able to sweep away the impedi- ment that is blocking the way. It is in the nature of such a situation that unless dealt with sharply, it grows until it reaches a point that cries for remedy. This is what has happened. The disarray and disorganisation of the Unitarian Administration have only increased during Prince Bismarck's retirement, so that now things have come to a pass which plainly necessitates speedy alterations. But these are possible only by an effective strengthen- ing of the Imperial Administration,—and such strengthening again cannot be secured by the appointment of a new head of a depart- ment, but only by making the Administration the organ of a homogeneous system, and the embodiment of the party which has advocated the principles of that reform which is contem- plated. It must be remembered, however, that to get such an Administration accepted by the Emperor, is to effect a revolution in the system on which ministers have been hitherto nominated in Prussia, and that such revolution in long-established custom is no easy matter in the Prussian Court. I am of opinion that whatever difficulties have to be encountered do not come from the Chancellor. There have been many, and all of them premature, statements about nominations decided upon at Var- zin, during the interviews there between the Chancellor and Herr von Bennigsen, a leader of the National Liberals. The matter has not come as yet to this concrete point. What is in question is not the nomination of Bennigsen, or of Forcken- beck, by themselves, but the coming into office of the National Liberals as a party ; and the inference must not be drawn, because Bennigsen has again gone home, that therefore the idea of the party being admitted to power has been discarded. I have reason to believe this would be a grave misapprehen- sion. If I can trust my informants, there is no opposition in principle by the Chancellor to the view that Bennigsen can accept office only in conjunction with political associates. The two did not part in disagreement. If it is asked, then, why has nothing yet been done, the explanation of the delay will be found in the recollection how long it took with us, even after Parliamentary government had become a decided reality, before the Crown ceased to insist on intruding particular individuals into a Cabinet. Certainly leading members of the National Liberal party are still of opinion that a great modification in the character of the Administration is not far off, and that this will happen in co- operation with the Chancellor.
One word, now, in regard to the views of such politicians about the great pending international question,—the Russo-Turkish war. The old Ministers are more or less mere registering clerks, but these men have political opinions. Now, in the first place, there exists on their part an implicit confidence in Prince Bismarck, and especi- ally on this score, that they thoroughly rely on his being wholly exempt from any political combination not strictly German. This is a cardinal article with them. If, again, it is asked, what not strictly German combinations are understood to mean, I answer emphatically, every thought and scheme aiming at conquest or annexation ; and in doing so I distinctly understand the Chan- cellor himself to be quite sincerely of the same mind. There is only one thing in regard to foreign relations which is weighing on his brain, and that is the belief that France will some day take its revenge, and will on the first opportunity fall upon Germany. It is this thought which has so much to do with his feverish desire to complete the Unitarian organisation, as a means to strengthen Germany. It is this thought which makes him and Germans generally willing to see Russia fairly satisfied in the East, for to baulk her there would be, according to their idea, to throw her perforce into alliance with France. Primarily, in the Chancellor's mind, Germany has no interest in Turkey, it is only secondarily she has any through her ties with Austria. He will never plunge Germany into war for the purpose of stopping Russia, but to consider him plotting to promote Russian advances at the cost of English interests is to misinterpret wholly the Chancellor's policy and the feelings of Germany. The mistake largely made in England has been to credit Germany with in- terests she has no more had at heart, than England has those which the heated fancy of Continental politicians is often ready to ascribe to her. It is not according to fact to say that the Chancellor has throughout shown himself disposed to be the out and-out partisan of Russia. Ile certainly, in common with every German politician I have come across, has no feeling for the integrity of the Ottoman Empire ; he has felt that the condition of Turkey was rotten, and he has been desirous of events calculated at once to effect a settlement offering prospects of peace in those regions for a course of years, and to give such satisfaction to Russia as would yet not render her absolute master in those quarters. If matters do go further in the end, it will not be his fav%, but the fault of those who declined to co-operate in combinations calculated to secure limi- tations on Russian action. Things have now reached a point when it is rash to prognosticate, but this much I will venture to affirm, namely,—that Germany will never mobilise any troops to check Russia, for she will not embark in war for any interest in Turkey. But though determined on this head, it is a grievous mistake to say that she desires to see Russia push her successes to the extreme. I am confident of the correctness of my statement, when I say that what is desired is that England should clearly define her interests, instead of shrouding herself in ambiguous utterances, for if those interests are really reasonable—if their substance is confined to material points, such as the non-annexation of Constantinople, and above all, is not spoilt by irritating punctiliousness—then Germany would undoubtedly support them in Conference. But the complaint made against the English Cabinet is that on all occasions it has been obscure and ambiguous in its language ; that it has never acted in concert, and yet never taken an openly definite line of its own ; and that the single practical steps it ever took were always those precisely calculated to disconcert combina- tions which might have offered means for effecting a settlement by mutual understanding.
I have often felt that in England there exists as much misappre- hension of Continental politicians, as the latter often have of those in our country. At this moment, there is amongst our countrymen a morbid suspicion of the three Emperors' compact, and an unbounded distrust of Prince Bismarck. It is not my object to write a panegyric on him. He is a statesman who has had to do much queer work, and has handled with consummate self-possession questionable means. It is not to extol him I have written this letter, but to make certain statements through your columns which I have good reason to believe true, and which, as information may not be inopportune at this moment, when all the world is speculating on the forces which are at work upon that pending bit of history,—the Turkish Question.
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