Mr. Chamberlain's speech was much abler and more relevant to
the occasion. He said very happily that the present Govern- ment is unfortunate, for when it does nothing, the country is un- easy; and when it does anything, the country is alarmed. Lord Beaconsfield's policy, he said, is not a spirited foreign policy, but is one which weighs in the same balance the oppressor and the oppressed, "and would even bail a peace purchased at the price of handing back vast populations to the tyranny and misgovern- ment from which they had escaped." It yet remained to see whether the English Prime Minister would consent "either to submit, or to resign." At present, his policy seemed to be to invent risky situations, some one of which would before long lead to war with Russia,—to bring the candle step by step a little nearer to the powder,—and then a spark would do the rest. He (Mr. Chamberlain) was not a peace-at-any-price man. If he thought our Indian Empire really in danger, he would fight to preserve it. He saw in it a guarantee for the good government and improvement of a vast population, and the promise of a glorious future. But if there were any danger to that Empire, we ought to husband our resources to meet it, and not go to war in order to prevent a war. If we wished to enforce the neutrality of the Sum Canal, we ought to have insisted on Egypt's maintaining its 'neutrality, instead of sending its troops to the aid of Turkey. Russia, tie doubt, had committed great crimes in Poland, but he could net see how Poland was to be assisted by keeping Bulgaria in servitude. For himself, he desired to see Greece enlarged by Thessaly and Epirus and Crete, and encouraged by the hope at least of returning era long to the old capital of the Greek empire, 'Constantinople. A more weighty and pithy, as well as a more telling 'speech than Mr. Chamberlain's it would be difficult to find -among all the orations-of the Long Vacation.