TOPICS OF THE DAY.
THE NICARAGUA CANAL. THE Government have as yet given no sign in regard to the action which they mean to take in view of the Senate's amendments to the Hay-Pa.uncefote Treaty. Meantime the New York correspondent of the Times sends every few days a passionate appeal to the British people not to be so weak, so foolish, and so unpatriotic as to accept the amendments. He tells us in effect that to accept the amendments would in reality be to produce, not good, but ill feeling between the two countries, and thus those who are inclined to do all they can to bring about a condition of friendship between the two branches of the Anglo-Saxon race are recruited as opponents to the Bill. But though these and other equally ingenious arguments are brought forward to prejudice the amended Treaty in the eyes of Englishmen, the main argument upon which the Times correspondent relies is the unmannerly be- haviour of the Senate. With passionate reiteration he dwells upon the truculence and ill-bred action of the Senators. Their insolence is to be punished at all costs. That is the essential thing, and the rejection of the Treaty is a convenient stick with which to chastise them. Practically he does not trouble about the merits of the question. Though they are, of course, alluded to, it is in a more or less perfunctory manner; it is evident that the real thing advocated is, in vulgar language, the blacking of the Senate's eye. We are to teach the Senate manners, and make them understand what is and what is not behaviour befitting the management of diplomatic problems. Now, with all due deference to the New York correspondent of the Times, this seems to U8 an utterly futile way of approaching the question. We are quite willing to admit that the action of the Senate has been, from the point of view of international good manners, quits deplorable. Members of that historic assembly —a body once as eminent for dignity of tone as for lofty eloquence—have adopted in many of their speeches on the Nicaragua question a lack of taste and good feeling which has afforded very painful reading for the friends of America. The Hay-Pauncefote Treaty is, however, a matter of business, not of manners, and the British Government cannot afford to turn themselves into instructors in good breeding, even for the Senate of the United States. That is work for the American people, not for us. If they like to see the public business of their nation conducted on the lines adopted by the Senate in the case in issue, they must have their way. Our Government cannot, as we have said, afford to adopt the philanthropic attitude of a master in international deport.. ment. They must think solely about the merits, and ask whether it is, or is not, to the interest of this country that the Nicaragua Canal should be made. If it is to the interest of this country that the canal should be made, then the want of suavity on the part of the Senate should not be allowed to prejudice the issue for a single moment.
We hold that it is to the interest of the British Empire that the canal should be made,—provided, of course, that it is a canal which shall be used on equal terms by all ships. And for this reason. We are the greatest maritime nation, and any and every increase in the waterways of the world must be to our profit. Whenever and wherever you facilitate ocean carriage, you confer a benefit on the Rritish carrying trade. Take the case of the Suez Canal. Plenty of able men believed that it would ruin British trade. Instead, it greatly benefited it. S.3 it will be with the Nicaragua Canal. When once that canal is made, we, the carriers of the world, shall obtain a con- siderable part of the benefit. But it seems pretty certain that the canal will never be made on a commercial basis. The cost is too great, and the failure of the Panama Canal too p trent, to al I ow of the canal being constructed by ordinary speculators. But the American Government is prepared, for political and trade reasons, to make the canal, provided that America is allowed to control the waterway which is created at her cost. And by control America means the right not only of policing the canal but also of fortifying it. Now the question for us is, shall we allow this military control, or shall we, as we have no doubt a perfect right to do under the Clayton-Bulwer Treaty, refuse to allow it ? We hold that we should allow military control on two grounds. In the first place, if we do not allow it the canal will probably not be made, and it is to our interest that the canal should be made. Next, even if the canal were to be made in any case, it would, we believe, be to our interest that America should have military control. Our reason is as follows, a reason which we hold entirely meets the contentions made in a letter published by us to-day. We hold that neutrality could not be enforced in war unless there is some one in effective military control. Take the case of the Suez Canal, which we have twice already quoted in these columns. The Spanish, when their fleet was intending to go to Manila tsiii the Suez Canal, began to commit a breach of neutrality. For this they were called to account by the British autho- rities in Egypt, and were obliged to stop their intended action. But what stopped them was not any paper regu- lations, but the strong arm of the British military control over Egypt. If we had not been in a position to insist on the observation of neutral conditions at the month of the canal, Spain probably, and most certainly a stronger Power, would have disregarded them. In the same way, if the Nicaragua Canal were only neutral on paper, and we were at war with a first-class naval Power, we may be sure that if that Power strongly desired to take action violating the neutrality of the canal, the neutrality of the canal would be disregarded. She might apologise after- wards to America or to the other Powers guaranteeing the paper neutrality, but she would first do what she thought needful as an act of war,—such as blowing up the canal to prevent the passage of our ships, or blockading the mouth of the canal inside the three-mile limit. But if America were in actual military control of the canal and the canal were fortified, there would be no fear of any such sudden action. The Americans would be on the spot and in force to see that no one tampered with the ca,nal. In truth neutrality is a thing which at moments of stress can only be defended by force, as the Swiss found in 1870.
But it may be said How about the case of our being at war with the United States ? In case of other wars it might be an advantage to us to have her guarding the neutrality of the canal, but in case of a war with America we should be greatly handicapped by America being already in military control.' We should meet this first by saying that we are not going to war with America. But even if we were the existence of fortifications and strong military control would not injure us. In no case should we be able to use the canal, for the fact that all the employes on the canal would be Americans, and that the police would also be American, would be quite enough to make the passage of the canal by our ships an impossibility. But the Americans could use it ? ' We doubt it, for if we were stronger at sea we could block the two ends of the canal. It seems to us, then, that military control by America would be a very real advantage in wars with other Powers, and in case of war with America would do us no harm.
But it may be said that America asks for more than, or rather for something different from, mere military control and the right to fortify. The Senate's chief amendment is to this effect :—" It is agreed, however, that none of the immediately foregoing conditions and stipulations in Sections numbered one, two, three, four, and five of this article [i.e., the articles securing neutrality and the free use of the canal by all nations on equal terms] shall apply to measures which the United States may find it necessary to take for securing by its own forces the defence of the United States and the maintenance of public order." This clause has been much objected to, and is condemned even by the Daily Telegraph, which has throughout the discussion handled the whole problem with great dis- cretion and statesmanshi p, and which on Wednesday prin ted a leading article on the Hay-Pauncefote Treaty worthy of the best traditions of English journalism. For ourselves, however, we cannot see any great objection to the clause, for it seems to us to state a truism. Treaty or no treaty, it is absolutely certain that in the event of war America would take whatever measures it might " find necessary to take for securing by its own forces the defence of the United States and the maintenance of public order," and we see no very great reason for objecting to the United States proclaiming the fact, and making preparations whenever she chooses, and before war breaks out, for taking those measures. If the United States has police control (which she has under the original Hay-Pauncefote Treaty), she has already the power to take all essential measures for military control. This amendment, we therefore hold, might well be accepted as it stands. The other amend- ment, by which the Clayton-Bulwer Convention is super- seded, appears to us also unobjectionable. When once the canal is made, the material part of the Convention as far as America is concerned is gone, and what remains ties us more than it does the -United States. If the Clayton- Bulwer Treaty disappears we regain a certain freedom of action in regard to our possessions in Central America which may prove useful. The Clayton-Bulwer Treaty has not been an instrument of good omen, and we would rather see it decently interred, than left cumbering the earth,— perhaps to lead to new contentions. We do not see, there- fore, why the amendments should not be accepted as they stand, and all further need for referring the matter back to the Senate be avoided. That would be a blessing considering that the Senate would very likely make a new discussion a vehicle for more diplomatic ineptitudes, and considering how terribly the Senate's bad manners seem to affect the nerves of some of our publicists here. Let us, then, further the making of the canal as an undertaking likely to be useful to British trade, and clear our minds of the foolish notion that it behoves us to teach the Senate the methods of a courteous diplomacy.
We have dealt with this question, as is our duty in such a case, only from the point of view of Great Britain, and we • hold that the amendments will do us no harm. Whether they are equally harmless from the American point of view is another matter, but one which (though, as our readers know, our sympathies are, after we have fulfilled our duty to our own country, strongly American) we cannot 'discuss here in detail. We note, however, that there are other Powers in the world besides the United States and Great Britain, and that though the people of the United States are for the most part unaware of the fact, these other Powers claim to have a voice in all questions that they regard as international. France. for example, both by reason of French Guiana, her West Indian islands, and her millions sunk in the Panama scheme, will possibly think she ought to have some say in the matter. These considerations, however, are, as we have said, not for us, but for America. We only record the fact that from the point of view of international com- plications the original Hay-Pauncefote Treaty is far less open to objection than the amended Treaty.
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