B 0 0 K S.

NAVAL POLICY.*

THIS volume contains a number of articles which have been published during the last two years, principally in Blackwood's Magazine. These articles were anonymous, and the author still prefers the nom de guerre of "Barlieur " ; but as he includes in the collection an article contributed to the Nasal Annual for 1905 by Vice-Admiral Sir Reginald Custance, there is an acknowledgment of authorship. Admiral Custance has had a long and distinguished career in the Royal Navy, combining considerable sea-experience with important service on shore at the Admiralty and elsewhere. He saw active service as a Midshipman in the Far East more than forty years ago ; passed through all grades with credit; die- tinguished himself at the Royal Naval College; has commanded cruisers and a battleship ; has served as Naval Attach6 in Washington and Paris ; and from 1899-1902 occupied the important post of Director of Naval Intelli- gence. Then appointed Rear-Admiral in the Mediterranean Fleet, he served in that great school with distinction ; has since passed a period on half-pay ; and is about to resume active service as Second-in-Command of the Channel Squadron. An officer with this record is entitled to a respectful hearing when he writes on naval policy at a time when differences of opinion run high, and when radical changes have been made in systems of training naval officers, in the distribution of the Fleet, and in other matters of vital interest to our continued supremacy at sea. It is indeed a fortunate circumstance that the period of comparative leisure between two important commands afloat should have enabled the author to produce and publish the articles now collected. No one who desires the continued welfare of the Naval Service can doubt the importance. and value of this frank and reasoned utterance of opinion, even if there may not be—as there will not be—universal agree-. ment with the author's conclusions and recommendations. " Barfleur " dissents strongly from most of the changes made in naval administration from 1902 onwards ; his objections ' • Naval Policy:a Plea for the Study of War. By “Barilear." London W. Blackwood mid Bons. [7S. Ed. net.] are based on arguments from history and experience. He dedicates his book, in touching language, to the late Vice- Admiral Colomb, whose labours in the study of naval warfare, its principles, strategy, and tactics, have "never received adequate recognition either from the Navy or from the Nation." " Barfleur " proclaims himself an adherent of the "historical school," whose members "appeal for guidance to the great masters of the art of war by sea and land; they bold that it is very important to study tactics and strategy by the light of history." That is the keynote of all his work ; apart from his deductions and applications to present conditions of lessons learnt from the past, the book is both interesting and valuable as a well-written summary of naval history. Certain chapters afford most notable illustrations of the historical method. Those dealing with "The Officer—Past and Future," "The Growth of the Capital Ship," "The Growth of the Cruiser," and " Invasions Over Sea " deserve special mention ; but throughout the book the historical spirit predominates. The author is so "full of matter" relating to past events that some chapters—originally magazine articles—tend to be dis- proportioned because the lessons of the past are developed to an extent which produces undue compression in their applications to present circumstances. It is indeed manifest that " Bazteur " unites with large practical experience as a seaman the qualities of a student in love with his subject, and an absolute devotion to his profession.

When the articles first appeared in Blackwood ardent supporters of recent Admiralty policy indulged in unmerited sneers and imputations of motives against the author, describing him as a " long-shore " sailor whose sea-experience was limited. He was classed as one of the members of a. "Syndicate of Discontent" whose envy and prejudice pre- vented them from recognising the greatness and value of Admiralty reforms. These attacks, from their nature, could have only a temporary effect. Now that the articles are grouped and seen as a whole, it is plain that they merit careful consideration and deliberate criticism such as have not hitherto been bestowed upon them. The writer is a convinced believer in the absolute necessity for entry at an early age, and for the sea-training of officers and men aboard ship. He ie of, opinion that College training and scholastic examinations have been overdone in the past, and that recent changes tend to accentuate the harm done. He prefers to make sea-going ships of the Fleet our schools of training, rather than to employ special training-ships, in which young officers virtually continue at school instead of being kept daily and hourly in touch with the conditions of actual practice. He believes that all past experience establishes the necessity for an executive class of officers who shall command, control, and fight their ships,— that control including the motive and other machinery. As a consequence, he recommends the absorption of engineer officers into the executive class, and the thorough training of young officers in engine-room duties on board sea-going ships. The principles of training which he recommends are summed up as follows

"Inculcating early in life a practical knowledge of working a

ship and her mechanisms by bringing the future officer into actual contact with and making him take part in the life and work of the ship.. This plan possesses the additional advantage of placing him in contact with human nature, of which a knowledge is most important in carrying out war operations."

" Barfieur " also considers that

"the resemblance of aim and intention between the mechanisms [masts, rigging, and sails] of the sailing ship and [the mechanisms] of the steamer is fundamentally so close [that] the knowledge of its working possessed by the officers of the sailing Navy may indicate in amount and extent the needs of the officers of the steam Navy in this direction."

In the sailing period officers were satisfied to possess a sufficient knowledge of a ship, her armament and equipment, to ensure using her to the best advantage. This extent of knowledge " Barfleur" thinks should still suffice. " Naval officers now no more require to be skilled mechanics, and to rival the engine room artificers, than in the past [the officers required] to emulate the boatswain and the able seaman." For the officers "their raison d'elre is war." In another passage it is said :—" A practical knowledge of working the machinery is as necessary to the officer who fights the ship now, as was the knowledge of working the sails to his predecessors. Without that knowledge he will be in the hands of his subordinates, and will not be able in time of emergency to judge correctly

the extent to which he can press his ship." The author's faith is summed up in the sentence : " We hold that the division between the military and engineer branches in the sea-going Navy is a source of weakness, and should gradually cease." This result is identical with that embodied in the Admiralty Scheme 1902-5, but " Barfletir " advocates an entirely different system of training from that embodied in Admiralty Memoranda. One cannot help regretting, when reading his able criticisms of the Osborne-Dartmouth courses, and his equally able alternative proposals, that "Barfleur" and officers of equal rank and experience were not selected to serve upon and to give evidence before the Douglas Committee. The historic method may have been pushed unduly far• in the parallel between the sailing-ship with her simple armament added to a sailing equipment, and the modern battleship with complicated propelling and other machinery, varied armament, and endless mechanical and electrical appliances. After all, the most zealous naval officer must acknowledge that there is a limit to his powers of acquiring knowledge. Formerly he had only to be skilled in the management of ships under sail and of a simple armament of smooth-bore guns mounted on truck- carriages. An average naval officer could and did master these. It is by no means certain that an average naval officer, or even a genius like the great Dundonald, could similarly master all departments in a modern warship. As regards the machinery department in particular•, with its numerous ramifications, specialisation and an independent responsibility for maintenance, working, and repairs most probably will always have to be secured. The practice of the great mercantile steamships recognises that necessity; the chief engineer, not the captain, decides on the extent to which a ship can be pressed without serious risk. It does not follow, of course, that highly educated officers shall " drive " the engines. " Barfleur " by inference suggests that artificers will under- take that work. Every one who reads his chapters dealing with naval training, whether they agree with his conclusions or not, will recognise the vigour of his condemnation of recent changes, the clearness of his thought, and the desirability, in the public interest, that his suggestions should be considered seriously before the evils he dreads and depicts have overtaken our Navy.

The chapter on administration traces the history of the Board of Admiralty, and censures the latest arrangements introduced by Lord Selborne in 1904. Condemnation is based mainly on the abandonment of the principle "that political and executive control should be superior to, but separate from, administration—that those charged with the direction or con- duct of war operations should be relieved from the details involved in providing the ship's armament, stores, &c., with which to carry it on." The " scrapping " policy of 1904-5 is described, and shown to involve dangerous possibilities, particularly in its removal of small ships from the Effective List. It is demonstrated that small ships have proved most valuable adjuncts to fleets in past naval wars, including that between Russia and Japan. One most telling point is made respecting the South African War :—

"A considerable number of ships wore required to stop the supply of arms and for other services. The demand was met by transferring small ships from other stations. Had these ships not been available it would have been necessary to send larger ships. This would have weakened the British Fleet in European waters, at a time when the political situation required that force to be strong. If similar demands were made at the present time they could not be met in the same way."

"Barfleur" differs radically from the "materiel school," who "have neglected the study of tactics and strategy and have devoted their energies to the development of ships, guns, and armour." That school he considers to be " still dominant, but the historial school have been slowly advancing." In his judgment, the `Dreadnought' and `Invincible' classes—the last triumphs of the materiel school—are based on mistaken views in which the "lessons of the past" have been ignored. Armoured cruisers, as a type, " Barfleur " disapproves. He discusses the value of high speed in " the capital ship" very fully, and illustrates geometrically the comparative importance of superior speed and of great horizontal arcs of command given to the guns of battleships, in their effects on naval tactics. As to the strategic value of superior speed, he con- siders "the principles which govern the transfer• of force from area to area, and those which control its use within a given p area." Space is not available even to trace the line of ciareadon Press [35. ed.]

reasoning ; the section deserves careful study. The broad conclusions reached are that superior speed

"in tactics is less important than tactical skill, and gives very limited, control over the range. In strategy it is discounted by the demands of enduring mobility, by the conditions of war, and by the strategical ability of the Admirals. In all cases its uncertainty is such that reliance cannot be placed upon it."

Another chapter contains an admirable account of the great battle in the Korean Straits. Since its appearance in February last further information has become available, but in essentials the description still applies, and the plans of the movements of the Russian and Japanese Fleets are very interesting, although they are based on certain assumed speeds. Subse- quent Russian accounts have confirmed the conclusions reached by "Barfleur" as to the great value of six-inch and eight-inch guns in this engagement. These conclusions have been disputed, and Captain Sims, of the United States Navy, has recently published a lengthy paper taking the view that the twelve-inch or larger calibre guns must be the decisive weapons of the future. It appears, however, that in the new American battleships a number of five-inch guns are also to be carried, which favours the view that the day of the six- inch gun is by no means passed.

Lengthy as this notice is, it by no means indicates the range and variety of interest of the topics treated in this volume of three hundred and thirty pages. It is written in a clear but highly condensed style ; its preparation must have involved laborious and long-continued research. Touching as it does on highly debateable subjects, it will be viewed vely differently by different readers. All interested in naval matters may study with advantage the definite opinions expressed by " Barfleur" ; and if, as must happen, many will dissent there- from, no impartial person will doubt the good faith and high purpose of the writer, whose single aim has been to secure the continued and increasing efficiency of the great Service to which his life has been devoted.