Chinese Strategy in Korea
Late news, suggesting the. renewal of the Chinese offensive in Korea, leaves the situation still vague. There has been no relaxation of pressure by the North Koreans in the east, and the American, French and Dutch troops in the Wonju area have fallen back on the Sobaek mountains, after fighting an aggressive rearguard action. Though the Chinese loss of impetus is almost certainly only tem- porary, it seems just possible that their declared intention of driving the " Imperialists " into the sea may not represent their true military aims in Korea. There must be at least some doubt in their minds as to whether this feat of arms is feasible ; and, even if it were feasible, is it really what they want to do ? Leaving out the ques- tion—which may not be of overriding importance in their counsels— of what Russia conceives to be their duty, the Chinese must reckon that the extrusion of the United Nations from Korea would make possible, and indeed very probable, the redeployment of large air and naval forces in defence of Formosa ; and this may not suit their book. If their object is simply to contain us in Korea, it is at least arguable that there is not much point in chasing the 8th Army right down to the easily defended perimeter of Pusan, and that it would be sounder to keep it spread-eagled over a wide and guerrilla-ridden territory, without further extending the already precarious Chinese communications with their bases in Manchuria. These are, however, strictly conjectural hypotheses. A natural arrogance, and the heady, unaccustomed taste of victory, are likely to prove stronger factors at this stage than either common sense or cunning ; a further advance will in all probability be attempted.
