PEKING'S COUNTER-PROPOSALS
IT is unfortunate that Mr. Dean Acheson, the American Secretary of State, shillild have hastened so precipitately to condemn the Chinese counter-proposals as completely unaccept- able to the American Government. The Note to which they were a reply did not emanate from the United States Government, but from the United Nations, and it is at Lake Success, not at 1Vashington, that the next decisions will be taken. They must obviously be grave decisions, carrying the possibility of grave conse- quences. For that reason they can only be taken after the fullest deliberation. The Chines: reply is profoundly disappointing and in many respects highly unreasonable. But it does not, as Mr. Nehru has rightly pointed out, constitute a flat rejection of the United Nations proposals. To take minor points first, there would be no objection, and perhaps some advantage, in joining India and Egypt to the members of the proposed Peace Conference. There would be more objections to than advantages in the selection of China itself as the place of meeting ; India would be a good compromise. The offensive language of the Chinese Note was no doubt learned from Moscow, and can be ignored. The crux of the whole question is the matter of timing China and practically all members of the United Nations are agreed that all foreign troops shall be withdrawn from Korea and that country given independence after free elections ; that any American protection of Formosa and the Chinese Government there shall be withdrawn ; and that the Peking Government shall replace the obsolete Kuomintang Govern- ment at the United Nations. That is not to say that the difference on the one outstanding question—whether the troops shall be with- drawn and the other concessions made before the conference meets, or whether a cease-fire shall precede a conference and a settlement of other questions be effected at the conference—is not of capital importance. It is. But, in view particularly of the Oriental habit of arriving at an agreement after a process of bargaining, to declare (hina an aggressor forthwith and take all measures consequential on that decision would be unjustifiable, and it is to be hoped that the British Government will not yet approve such a step.
1 hat, unhappily, will mean a divergence of policy between this country, together with some members of the Commonwealth, and the United States. The dangers here arc manifest, but they can be averted if the first purpose of all concerned is to avert them. Decisions must be taken at the highest level, and it is a pity that the discussions cannot be conducted at the same level. But in Sir Gladwyn Jebb this country has a representative of outstanding ability at Lake Success. The counsel he gave when China was last under con- sideration—look before you leap—still has full validity. For the leap involves nothing less than the incalculably critical choice between evacuating Korea completely and carrying on a campaign indefinitely there to the fatal detriment of defence plans in Europe.
