THE AMERICAN ANNEXATION OF HAWAII.
THE United States stand %t the parting of the ways. The annexation of Hawaii, if accomplished, means an end to the historic policy of the Republic since its foundation, and the venture on a new quest fraught with difficulties and dangers not a few. Hitherto the general doctrines with regard to foreign policy laid down in Washington's memorable Farewell Address have governed the conduct of the United States. Washington advised the citizens of the infant Republic to have as large com- mercial associations with foreign nations as was possible, but at the same time as few direct political relations. Washington's ideal was a kind of self-contained world, as it was the ideal of Jefferson, of Clay, of Webster, and of Lincoln. The one strong opposition to that policy came from a section of the slaveholding South, which, seeing the rapid growth of the Free States of the North, per- ceived that the "peculiar institution" was doomed unless, by annexation, it could be extended. The Mexican War was waged for that purpose, but it scarcely, perhaps, contravened the settled policy, because the new terri- tory was conterminous with the existing territory of the Republic. In the case of Cuba, however, it was different. Pierce and Buchanan were both actively favourable to Cuban annexation, for, being both tools of the South, they were prepared to carry out Southern designs for extending the area of slavery. It was sheer economic necessity which led to that policy; for, as Cairnes showed, in one of the most luminous books ever written by any human being, the exhaustion caused by slavery compelled some kind of artificial renewal, which could only come from outside. The Civil War was pro- bably a blessing in disguise, as it effectually prevented the slave power from acquiring a farther lease of life by fresh annexations, and so becoming the dominating power in the Republic. Another Administration like Buchanan's might in all probability have brought about that result.
The war had not, however, been long over when re- newed attempts were made to secure territory beyond the sea. Mr. Seward, when Secretary of State under President Johnson, attempted to purchase the island of St. Thomas from Denmark. This scheme proved abortive, but the next effort at annexation was of a more serious character. President Grant himself sent to the Senate a treaty for the annexation of St. Domingo, and there at once sprung up a vigorous agitation. Mr. Sumner led the opposition in the Senate to Grant's project, and his speech of four hours' duration is still spoken of by the few survivors who knew about it, as one of the chief efforts of his life. Of course, speeches in executive session of the Senate are not reported, but Sumner's biographer says. that his position was that " no greed of land should pre- vail against the rights of the people." After prolonged. debates the treaty was rejected, since there was a tie, and the needed two-thirds majority was not secured. Grant was ill-advised enough to wreak a petty vengeance on Sumner by removing from his post as Minister to England 3 Mr. Motley, who had been Sumner's nominee. There can be no question that the bulk of the American people approved, at the time, of the attitude which Sumner had taken. As Secretary of State in Garfield's Cabinet, it was we have reason to believe, the design of Mr. Blaine to take some step for brin ging about the closer union of Canada. with the United States, with a view to ultimate annexa- tion. Garfield's death, however, nipped this project in the bud, and the Administration of General Arthur took a quiet and peaceful line, as did that of Mr. Cleveland. It was reserved for Mr. Harrison to open once more the question of extra territorial acquisitions by encouraging the revolution which a- few American traders had effected in Hawaii, and by recommending the annexation of those islands to the United States. Mr. Cleveland, in his second term of office, denounced this policy, and advised that the dethroned native Queen be reinstated. This course was unpopular, for there were two currents of feeling setting against Mr. Cleveland. On the one hand, there were large commercial interests in Hawaii, and on the other hand, a considerable body of religious feeling had been roused. The late Queen had not been a pattern of all the virtues, and the new Republic was represented as- American, civilised, Christian, and. moral, as contrasted with one which had been Pagan, vicious, and corrupt. The Senate debated the question long and eagerly, with the result that the policy of Mr. Cleveland was rejected,. his own side partly voting and speaking against him. Thus, so far as the Senate was concerned, the old idea of non-intervention was abandoned, and either annexation or protectorate was rendered inevitable.
It was clear to observers that as soon as the Republican party was again in office the project of annexation would. crystallise. That party represented, on the one hand, the great commercial Trusts, and on the other, the Pro- tective idea. Now, the chief economic result of Protection. in the United States is that there is, owing to the extra- ordinary development of machinery, constantly recurring over-production to an abnormal degree. For the products so turned out no markets are available, and thus sud- denly developed crises in trade are more prolonged and depressing in America than here, owing to the unwise policy of providing no natural outlet. Therefore, so long as the party clings to high Protection, some artificial outlet must be found, and hence the reciprocity schemes, and. the notion of " punishing " other nations which do. not offer special terms to the United States. The demand for new markets under such conditions as these easily leads to demands for annexation ; and we must expect that the Republican party will either abandon high Protection (which does not at present seem likely), or will develop a policy of annexation, under whatever name it may be dis- guised. The existence of the Trusts, though not absolutely due to Protection, is bound up with it to a great extent, and consequently, when we have said that Protection demand; some such policy as that we are discussing, it may also be said that the Trusts demand it. The most influential of these is the Sugar Trust, which has large interests. in the sugar-producing industry of Hawaii,—the chief industry there. Several millions of dollars a year pass between the Trust in New York and the growers in Hawaii. The sugar schedules of the new Tariff Bill are so arranged as to put thirty-five million dollars into the coffers of the Trust, and it is no accident that the sugar schedules are being discussed at the same time that the annexation of Hawaii is announced. Both are parts of one huge "deal," the effect of which will be to make the sugar industry of the United States one gigantic monopoly. Thus it is as true in the case of Hawaii as it was in the case of Cuba that annexation projects are determined by economic considerations. In the one case it was the State- protected slavery interests, in the other case it is the State-protected capitalist interests.
It is probable that Japanese designs on Hawaii have precipitated this action on the part of the American 'Government. It is clear that those who now administer the Hawaiian Republic believe that Japanese immigration 'would lead to Japanese annexation. So far as outward relations go, therefore, the United States have uttered the warning "Hands off ! " to Japan. It is said that no interference from any European Power will be permitted, —a needless warning, as no European Power wants to interfere. English people would certainly rather see Hawaii, or any other country, in the hands of a Christian and Aryan Power than in those of an Asiatic people. But, apart from the mixed motives which have led to the decision of President McKinley, it might well be that an enemy of the United States might rather be glad than otherwise to see the American people plunge into a line of policy utterly at variance with the genius of their institutions, foreign to the ideas of their wisest states- men, and tending to break down the barrier which, at less expense than is known in any other great State in the world, protects the Republic, saves it from military outlay, and enables it to pursue its course in peace and safety. The annexation of Hawaii is none of our busi- ness, and every one recognises the fact that the United States have interests there which are far greater than those of any other Power. The primary interest we have in the question is an intellectual one,—what will be the effect of such a step on the institutions and policy of the Republic ? At home it will mean the more complete dominance of the great capitalist in- terests, while abroad it will mean the gradual evolu- tion of the Republic into a less peaceful and possibly militant Power. If Hawaii is to be made a State of the Union or a part of the State of California, it must be defended from possible attacks, such as that of Spain, in the event of war, or that of Japan, or of China or Russia, if the long entente between Russia and the United States is ever disturbed. If the Hawaiian natives are allowed to vote in the Congressional and Presidential elections the problem of the inferior or backward races, already so difficult in the United States, will be yet farther com- plicated. If they are not allowed, Hawaii will be a close oligarchy, unfit companion of free Republican States. Besides, if Hawaii, thousands of miles away from the American continent, is to be annexed, what of Cuba close at hand ? Why should not the Sugar Trust stretch out its tentacles towards the West Indies, now in a forlorn economic condition, and wanting some special terms with the United States so as to revive their fallen fortunes ? Quite apart from the foreign complications thus suggested, what shall we say of the prospect thus looming up before the United States of millions of a dark or half-breed popula- tion either admitted to political equality with white citizens or treated as social helots, and. thus forming the materials for a possible servile war? These are the considerations which suggest themselves to the minds of all friends of the American Republic, and. which, we doubt not, are already suggesting themselves to the minds of millions of American citizens.
For it is clear that the Treaty will be vigorously -opposed even in the Senate, and. more vigorously outside. The gravity of the step must be evident. It is nothing less than a political revolution, and it is practically one taken at the bidding of a great money power. With our own experiences in South Africa, we should not affect the censorious attitude, but we do confess to some grave misgivings as to this new course in the interest of the United States, and of the peaceful evolution of Republican ,Government in that great country. Arguments drawn from the British Empire are not to the point here. Our system is so different from the American that we cannot argue from one to the other. Our Empire is separated from the governing country by the sea, and nobody proposes incorporation of distant black and brown peoples into our own home-life. But hitherto in the United States it has been -regarded as essential that complete incorporation should follow annexation, and even the old home of the Mormons has been fully incorporated. Can countries like Hawaii and Cuba be so incorporated without striking a fatal blow at the very idea of the Republic ? That is the problem which the American people have now to consider and to solve.
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