THE UPPER HOUSE IN JAPAN.
170 THE EDITOR OF THE " SPEOTA.TOR..1 Sin,—Now that reform of the House of Lords has come within reasonable distance, any information which will help in the formation of a sane and independent judgment as to the respective merits of conflicting proposals brought forward by party politicians should be welcomed. The constitution of the House of Peers in Japan is particularly worthy of study because it is based upon a profound and eclectic study of Western institutions. It did not come into existence by accident, nor is it, like our own, a tree of slow growth, with its roots deep in a remote past. It is the product of some of the ablest brains that have ever been devoted to the regenera- tion of a people. The statesmen who evolved it, evolved it after deep and prolonged study of the Constitutions of Western countries, and especially that of Great Britain. Being bound by no traditions of their own, except such as are inherent in the feudal system which passed away in 1868, they were able to reject what was unsuitable, and choose what was adaptable to the genius of their race. The result is that in the Constitution of Japan to-day we may behold a reformed Constitution of Britain,—a Constitution shorn of its anomalies and absurdities, but at the same time preserving its gravity, its utility, and its antiquity. If the statesmen who built modern Japan thought so highly of the House of Lords as to base their own edifice upon it, it ill accords with a sense of propriety that any one in England should be found lightly to clamour for its abolition, or for its deprivation of everything that constitutes its claim to regard and utility.
The House of Peers in Japan is constructed of the following elements :—(l) Princes of the Blood. (2) Peers of the rank of Prince and Marquis. (A Prince corresponds to our Duke, and is the highest position to which a subject can attain.) (3) Counts, Viscounts, and Barons. These are elected by the members of their respective grades—i.e., the Counts are elected by the Counts, &c.—but the proportion of each may not exceed a fifth of the total number in each rank. They must have reached the age of twenty-five, and their seats are held for seven years. (4) Certain persons marked out by special ability or deeds of merit towards the State, as having qual ifications for taking part in its deliberations, and who are nominated as such by the Emperor. These hold their Beata for life. (5) One person elected in each Prefecture from the fifteen men who pay the highest direct taxes to the National Exchequer on incomes derived from landed property, industry, or commerce. Such must also be approved by the Emperor, and they hold their seats for seven years.
Now from a study of these constituent elements it will be seen, first, that the framers of the Constitution have drawn a middle line between excessive regard for the principle of heredity on the one hand, and an equally excessive regard for the principle of democratic election on the other. The principle of heredity is recognised in the case of the titled Members of the House of Peers, but it does not obtain in the ease of the lower Members. Secondly, it will be observed that the system of life-peerages has been instituted, and this in the case of men who, by their individual merits, have mani- fested their claim to the privilege, but who need not, by reason of their not possessing extensive landed estates, or not being descendants from a long line of ancestors who have held high office, be regarded as necessarily able to transmit to their children the qualities which raised themselves to eminence. Thirdly, the provision that the lower Members of the hereditary Peerage and the Prefectural representatives of the highest taxpayers should retain their membership for only seven years ensures, on the one hand, a constant infusion of new blood, and, on the other, in consideration of the fact that the Japanese Parliament lasts only four years, a reasonable element of permanence, and obviates the difficulty of having a fresh set of Members at every new Parliament who are ignorant of the forms and usages of the House.
The danger that the Government might on occasions create a large number of new Peers under the powers conferred on the Crown by Section 4 is met by the insertion of a special clause (Art. VII. of " Ordinances of the HOuse of Peers ")
which states that the number of Members nominated by his Majesty from among men of merit and ability, and those selected from the highest taxpayers in the Prefectures, shall not exceed the total number of titled Peers. And the recogni- tion of the principle of the responsibility of Ministers guards against the remote contingency that the Crown might unduly add to the number of hereditary Peers. That the King can do no wrong is, indeed, even more a theory of the Constitution than it is in England.
As the Constitution of Japan has only been in existence for twenty years, it is too soon to dogmatise as to its future ; but as far as I can ascertain, the only two criticisms that are brought against the House of Peers are, first, that the representatives of the Prefectural taxpayers are too often men of neither capacity nor judgment, and that it is a false principle to elect men on the basis of wealth alone. It is even asserted that some are quite illiterate, and there is a story going of one Pre- fectural representative who had to introduce a Bill to the House. Being unable to read, he applied to a well-known Professor of Law to be instructed in the phrases of the Bill in question, but when the occasion arrived nervousness in the presence of such an august assemblage caused him to forget everything, and he was obliged to retire to his seat in confu- sion. The second criticism passed against the House of Peers comes from the Lower House, and is the old story of infringe- ment of prerogative ; but this resolves itself into mere vexation against the rejection of measures that are reported to have passed the Lower House by improper methods. Few outside the precincts of the House itself will be found to endorse this criticism, for political life in Japan is not yet as free from corruption as it should be. But neither can alleged illiteracy on the part of country Members, nor corruption on the part of politicians, be sustained as a fair charge against the political life of Japan. Both will be remedied by time. And, after all, it is not much more than one hundred years since we had just cause to complain of both in England. It may reasonably be hoped that the high promise implicit in the political generation of Japan will find fulfilment in its development and maturity.—I am, Sir, &c.,
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