- THE title of this book strikes one at first as

clumsy, then as possibly satirical To speak of the reality of war seems as superfluous as to mention that of the sun which shines above us. But it is only at the first glance that there appears to be anything inappropriate about this title. The book is written in English by a retired British officer, and is therefore intended to appeal to a people that has been for a longer period than any other great nation without first-hand experi- ence of a vital struggle,—the one nation of which the mass is in ignorance of the true nature of war and regards it as a sort of accident. For those who passed their lives in the Mid and Later Victorian eras and those who are nearing the allotted span of life it may have been a happy ignorance. But they belong to the past. It is the future that lies before us; and for those who are near the prime of life, for those who are still children, and for the babes yet unborn this ignorance may prove not to be quite so happy. Whatever the many imme- .diate and material advantages of the peace of the last century may have been to the Empire at large and to those then living—for Colonial wars cannot be included in the category of vital struggles—they are partially discounted by the indirect consequences which are only now beginning to be felt. Among these results are the lack of warning experience and the deterioration of national fibre engendered by the worship of material things and by the absence of the purging fires of war. If any proof of this deterioration be needed, it is sufficient to instance the general flabbiness of our policy, whether it be towards other nations or towards our own race. While this weakness masquerades under the cloak of benevo- lence and humane feeling, it is usually due to ignorance, actual cowardice, and the absence of all ideals that make for strength. It is only too necessary to impress the British nation with the fact,that war is a real thing.

Major Murray presents to us an abbreviation of Clausewitz's

monumental and comprehensive work, On War. In a series of twelve chapters, containing in all less than a hundred and twenty pages, he puts before us some of the great thinker's leading ideas. As the first small collection of extracts in English, the book is valuable enough in itself, considering the bulk of the three volumes of the original and the hurry and. stress of modern life. But the author gives us more ; he comments upon, and illustrates by.modern instances, many of the: points made. by. Clausewitz. The number of passages extra.etecl. is naturally small, but the selection_ is judicious, and should ensure that at any rate some of the thoughts of Cla.usewitz reach many who have neither the leisure nor the ineliPation to search for them in the. original. Though On War is a classic, admittedly the first of all, military works, and probably the foundation of the text-books of. strategy and. tactics in every army on the globe, it has • The Reality of Ware an Introduction to " Clausewite." By Major Stewart L. Iturrsyt late tiff ord.= Ectirblauders. London: Hugh Bees. [23. 6d. J certainly been read by a comparatively limited number of our officers. It is lengthy, and studious reading is not a marked

characteristic of any class of the British nation. On the other hand, very many of Clausewitz's dicta on the military art are accepted principles, and are familiar to all officers

through the indirect agency of the text-books. To the greater number of the rest of us, however, On War can hardly be described as being even a mere name. This is a fact

detrimental to the accuracy and sanity of our national outlook in a very important direction,—a direction which will remain important till war ceases.

The book has an introductory note from the pen of Professor Spenser Wilkinson. As whatever appears above the signature of this writer carries weight, it is a pity that he should quote Mr. Bernard Shaw on a military subject. Professor Wilkinson also seems to have quite missed the chief value of The Reality of War. He is mainly concerned in pointing out how useful a study of Clausewitz will be to our officers. Now, though this is obvious, undeniable, and important, it is not in existing circumstances what is most important. As explained above, officers already have considerable knowledge of what Clausewitz has to say with regard to their own sphere of activity. There is far more in Clausewitz than is comprised in the mere soldier's trade, and it is vital that those who are responsible for a policy which may lead to war, and for the preparation which will enable a nation to -meet war when it does come, should have at least some vague idea of what the great authority has to teach them. In Great Britain those who frame policies are not soldiers, nor are those who are responsible for preparation. No very deep knowledge of history is necessary in order to trace out cause and effect sufficiently to decide which has cost the British nation more in the past century,—the incompetence and failure of our armed forces to play their part in our many campaigns, or the 4' incompetence and failure of our statesmen or politicians to carry out theirs. Comparisons—proverbially odious—are not always unprofitable.

For us the real value of this book is that it exhibits so clearly Clausewitz's contention that it is as necessary for the statesman to possess a certain knowledge of war as it is for the soldier, the two sorts of knowledge being complementary. Military operations depend for their success very largely on the work of the statesman, and many of our troubles in the past have been due to the fact that this has never been realised. In case of failure the soldier is made the scapegoat, and by the laws of his Service he is bound to remain silent. Of the two classes, the statesman has far more need to study Clausewitz—of whose writings he knows absolutely nothing— than has the soldier, who already knows a considerable amount.

We have been accused of being an unmilitary nation; but, in view of the recent awakening to their responsibilities of Australia and New Zealand, the accusation applies less to some of the oversee branches of the Anglo-Saxon race than it does to the inhabitants of these islands. The last elections corroborate this, and an analysis of the amount of time and attention given by the orators of all shades of political opinion to the general subject of how the. Empire is to be preserved—in a military sense—will show what infinitesimal importance the speakers imagine that the electorate attach to the subject. They are practised in gauging public interest. Yet we have advanced a little since the moment, not so long ago, when by "kind" and futile proposals of disarmament we inspired distrust in other nations at the Hague Conference, and laid ourselves open to a well-deserved snub. We naturally received the snub from the nation which produced Clausewitz, and is most saturated with his logic. We have also made progress since the time when the creation of a General Staff —in other words, of a military brain for .the nation—was opposed on the ground that it might foster a spirit of militarism! But it is impossible to conceive that cases betraying such a dangerous misconception of things as they actually are could have occurred if those who were responsible for conducting national affairs had had any knowledge of the principles laid down by this great authority.

It is undoubtedly a sound principle not to be too pessimistic, and to take full credit for any good qualities that one may

possess, if only for self-encouragement. With this view, possibly,one of our leading soldiers has veryrecently, in a speech to a body of Territorials, referred to our national. Beset of initiative. -He instanced the frame of mind of the typical British recruit who joins the Army with a " Teach-your-grand-

mother-to-suck-eggs " attitude of mind towards his command- ing officer. Up to a point this tendency is a good symptom,

but it should be kept in check by a consideration of what is so well described in a recently published book, The Valor of Ignorance. For these reasons, by far the most important

chapters of Major Murray's book are :—Chap. 2, " The Influence of Clausewitz on Modern Policy and War "; chap. 5, " The Magnitude of the Effort Required in Modern National War" (it is interesting to compare what is given here with what General Kuropatkin has to say); chap. 6, " Public Opinion in War " ; chap. 7, "The Nature of War "; chap. 8, " War as Policy." The other chapters are valuable, but convey lessons chiefly to the soldier. The following, among many pregnant suggestions put forward by Major Murray in his " Reflections," seem specially worthy of notice:—

"Clausewitz wrote his book expressly for statesmen as well as soldiers. We may be sure, therefore, that the influence of Clausewitz on the Continent has penetrated the realm of policy little less widely than the realm of war. From this thought arise many reflections. It will be sufficient here to suggest one. I would suggest that we should regard every foreign statesman, especially in Germany, as, consciously or unconsciously, a disciple of Clausewitz. That is to say, we should regard him as a man who, underneath everything else, underneath the most pacific assurances for the present, considers war an unalterable part of policy. He will regard war as part of the ordinary intercourse of nations, and occasional warlike struggles as inevitable as com- mercial struggles. He will consider war also as an instrument of policy, which he himself may have to use, and to be studied accordingly. He will consider it not as a thing merely for speeches, but for practical use in furthering or defending the interests of his State. He will regard war as the means by which some day his nation shall impose its will upon another nation. He will be prepared to wait and wait, to make every imaginable preparation,' and finally to let loose war in its most absolute and ruthless character, war carried out with the utmost means, the utmost energy, and the utmost effort of a whole nation-in-arms, deter- mined to achieve its political object and compel submission to its will by force. To talk to such a man of 'the evils of war, or of the burden of armaments' ; or to propose to him disarmament' or 'reduction of armed forces,' and so forth can only appear to him as the result of imperfect knowledge: He will not say so, but he will think so, and act accordingly. To the partially instructed opponent of such a man one can only say, Let him that thinketh he standeth take heed lest he fall:"

It is of course difficult enough for a representative Govern- ment to prepare for or carry on war successfully or properly even when its individual members and the nation it serves have some knowledge of the tasks in front of them. When neither the nation nor its " leaders" have this knowledge the task appears to be almost hopeless. Some forcibly expressed ideas illustrative of how the matter strikes a professional

soldier were recently put forward in a book entitled Repre- sentative Government and War, by Captain C. R. Rose, D.S.O. (Hutchinson and Co., 1903, 10s. 6d. net).

Major Murray's book is well arranged, and the reflections are suggestive, full of thought clearly put, and to the point. The reference on p. 11 to the liability of "fellows " to be "put off " by the very sight of a formula or anything " mathematical " throws a light on a blot in our educational system. The writer is quite correct in his estimate of a common frame of mind. Be the fault where it may, far too

• many of our so-called educated men in all walks of life suffer—to their loss—from what might be called a blind "formulaphobia." It is hardly correct to refer to the maps

of foreign countries as "Ordnance maps" (p. 111). On p. 98 for Book VII. of Clausewitz should be read Book VI. ; while the date given for the Russian advance across the Danube appears to be a misprint. Not only should The Reality of War be in the possession of every military officer, but its contents should, until the arrival of the millennium, be in the mind of every thinking man who takes an intelligent interest in the future of his own country. The author is to be con- gratulated, both on his idea of producing this work, and on the way he has carried it out. He has played his part towards the common end.