TOPICS OF THE DAY.
THE HOUSE OF LORDS PROBLEM.
ri 111E confusion of the public mind over the problem _L of the House of Lords increases, and with it the difficulty of finding a clear issue to put before the nation for its decision. If we probe to the root of the matter, we find that this lack of a clear issue is due to the fact that the question is being approached by the Government and the Liberal Party in the spirit, not of those who desire to give the nation a sounder Constitution, but of those who wish to obtain a party advantage. When we say this we must not be supposed to mean that the desire for a party advantage is a piece of conscious cynicism. The Liberals who want a change in the Constitution which will give the Liberal Party complete control over the Upper House have no doubt persuaded. themselves that this is the great need of the hour. They are convinced that the welfare of the nation is bound up with the ability of the Liberal Party to make its wishes—or rather the wishes of the majority of the party—rapidly effective by legis- lation. Thus, though they would not of course put it so crudely, the Liberals want, not an improved House of Lords nor an ideal Second Chamber, but an Upper House which, as they would say, will not be an obstacle to Liberal reforms. But this is an aspiration which, when translated into plain language, means a single-Chamber system,—a fact recognised by the Labour Party, who, very much to their credit, plainly tell the country that they want no Upper House, but hold that when the House of Commons has expressed its will a change in the law should at once be the result. If they, and the considerable body of Radical opinion which believes as they do, could have their way, the country would no doubt be asked plainly and squarely to consent to single-Chamber government. It is clear, however, that this issue will not be placed before the country. Has not Sir Edward Grey, who represents a great many more than himself in this matter, expressed the belief that the result of any attempt of this sort would be " disaster, death, and damnation " to the Liberal Party ? He not only abhors the idea of single- Chamber government himself, but he holds that the country as a whole will never agree to it. We believe Sir Edward Grey speaks the truth. But unfortunately this bold, and, we are sure, perfectly sincere, declaration does not carry us very far. Though Sir Edward Grey detests single-Chamber government, and believes that the country detests it also, he is so much disgusted. with the effects of the present system on the Liberal Party that he is apparently prepared to assent to the establishment of single-Chamber government, provided that it is set up under the alias of the abolition of the veto. That, at any rate, is how we read his speech. The House of Lords is to be deprived of the power to prevent the will of the House of Commons_ from being carried into law. The fact that Sir Edward Grey balances this surrender to the single- Chamber men by the assertion that the Second Chamber is ultimately to be reformed and improved as regards its membership leaves us cold. If you begin by taking the boiler out of a locomotive, the promise to have every other part of the machine thoroughly repaired and improved next year is a matter of very small account. We have no use for a locomotive which cannot move. When even so sincere and clear a -thinker as Sir Edward Grey allows party feeling to cloud his mind in this way, can we be surprised that the country is groping in the dark ? In truth, the Liberal Party desires to find a formula akin to that immortalised in the apophthegm " Killing no murder." If we cannot devise such a formula, we may at any rate recommend to its notice an incident in the life of the hive. We believe that when bees are incommoded by the intrusion of a large insect, such as a beetle, they sting it in such a way as not absolutely to kill it, but only to paralyse it, and then proceed to embalm it alive. Their object is not so much to destroy the beetle outright as to prevent their own operations being interrupted by its unpleasant activity. Out of this muddle and confusion one clear fact emerges. The House of Lords contains elements which make it a deliberative Assembly unsurpassed in the civilised world. It has long been a. political commonplace that if the country wants to hear a question of importance discussed with a maximum of dry light, the best way of seeming such discussion is a debate in the House of Lords. The truth of this commonplace has this week been proved up to the hilt. Lord Rosebery's speech in introducing his Resolutions showed a comprehensive grasp of the whole situation which rendered it a masterpiece of political oratory. But when we say this we must not be supposed to be merely complimenting Lord Rosebery on his wit, his eloquence, and his felicity of phrase. No doubt all these qualities were conspicuous in the speech, but, what was far more important, the speech was shot through and through with true statesmanship, with moderation, and with common-sense. It was the speech of a practical politician quite as much as of a political philosopher. , ven if Lord Rosebery's speech had stood alone, it would have been an event of importance ; but it did. not stand alone. High as was the note struck by , him, the other speakers, Lord Morley, the Archbishop of Canterbury, Lord Lansdowne, Lord Cuizon, Lord Cromer, Lord Newton, Lord Crewe, fully maintained the level of the debate, and proved that the House of Lords even as at present constituted can play, and does play, an altogether worthy part in the Constitution. But the debate showed something beyond this. It showed also that the Lords are a great deal more than a body of able and high-minded men who perform their function in the State in the spirit of noblesse oblige. The Peers proved to the nation that they take no unreasonable or romantic view of their privileges, and make no attempt to insist that they have rights in the Constitution outside the will of the people. Their general attitude is essentially democratic. If it is the will of the people that the Upper House should be abolished, or that they should make way for another House, they will yield. All that they are determined to do is to ascertain that it is the authentic voice of the people to which they are asked to yield and not the whisper of a faction. Lord Onslow put the matter quite plainly and clearly when he declared that the Lords did not sit there for their own benefit, but for the benefit of the people of this country. Though it may suit Radical newspapers in the heat of controversy to pretend otherwise, the House of Lords makes no claim to exercise any powers that are not in the last resort based on popular authority. There was a characteristic story told of the late Duke of Devonshire at the time when the Education Bill was under discussion in the House of Lords. Some one pointed out to the Duke that one of his speeches was inconsistent with a former and quite recent utterance. " Yes, I know," the Duke is reported to have replied, " but I've changed my view about this Bill two or three times in the course of the last fortnight." Though we do not say that we haie changed our view of the House of Lords question during the past fortnight, we make no apology for declaring that the discussion both inside the House of Lords and outside has somewhat modified our views in one or two details concerning the reconstruction of the Second Chamber, and especially as to the best way of maintain- ing the hereditary principle in the House of Lords. At first we were inclined to think that some plan of internal election would be the best method of what we have before called distilling from the existing House of Lords an element worthy to import into the new House the traditions of the old. Fuller discussion, however, has inclined us to the belief that the best system of distillation is that to be obtained by conferring seats in the reformed House on those Members of the old House who have held special offices and positions of trust. Our ground for adopting this view can be expressed very simply. What is most wanted in Members of an Upper and revising House is independence of view. But if a man is chosen by no matter how small or how select an electorate there must of necessity be a certain forfeiture of independence. Let us say at once that this is by no means necessarily an evil. Many men will act more -wisely under the inspiration of a master than they will if they are acting solely on their own impulse. But though we do not wish to lay under any sort of ban the men with a mandate received from those who choose them, we do desire to give due weight in the Constitution to men who act simply and solely from a sense of personal duty and personal respon- sibility. The difficulty, of course, is how to select such persons of independence, persons who will never be tempted to say to themselves : " If I take this or that step it will be disliked or misunderstood by the people who sent me here, and I shall therefore never come here again, a fate which I confess I am anxious to avoid."
The hereditary principle does, however imperfectly it may act in other ways, secure men of independence of view. But, unfortunately, men chosen simply on the hereditary principle may often be men who, from want of ability or on other grounds, are not well fitted to exercise the very great powers that go with absolute independence of status. If, however, the hereditary principle is linked to what we have before called the Senatorial principle— the principle that a man must have shown not only his personal capacity but the willingness of his countrymen to trust his capacity by having chosen him to hold high offices and trusts of various kinds—then we get an extremely powerful combination. A man who can say : " I am a Member of the Upper House, not because I have been elected. by my fellow-Peers, or by any other body of men, but because I was entrusted with the work of governing India, because I held a seat in the Cabinet, because I was sworn of the Privy Council, or because before I became a Peer I was chosen by this or that con- stituency to sit in the Commons," has his position as a Member of the Upper House enormously strengthened. The Peer who sits by mere hereditary right feels that this qualification is not enough to justify him in strong action. Heredity plus the status conferred by high office will give him the required strength. We believe, indeed, that if the process of distillation were applied by itself, with the possible addition of a certain number of life-peerages, a House of Lords might be created which would possess the confidence of the country. We must never forget, however, that such a body would be externally too like the present House of Lords to act as a check upon the House of Commons. The tradition of giving way under pressure, which, in spite of all that is said to the contrary, constitutes the real case against the Lords, would overshadow the new body. In order to obtain a really strong Second Chamber it will, in our opinion, be necessary to introduce another element. This other element can be best supplied by election from the County Councils and the Councils of the great towns. A body composed half of Senatorial Peers, half of men elected for a long term of years, and numbering not more than four hundred and fifty, could be entrusted with powers in the Constitution, not merely nominally co- ordinate with those of the House of Commons, but of real equality. Remember, too, that such a body would be by no means overwhelmingly anti-Liberal. The Liberals appoint Peers to high offices quite as freely as the Unionists. Hence the Senatorial Peers would not be of one political colour. The County and Town Councils would presumably send up as large a quota of Liberals as of Unionists.
But though we should like to see such a body come into existence, we are bound to confess that there are many obstacles in the way. The greatest of all is the determina- tion of the Commons not to submit to any check upon themselves. Yet, after all, the Commons do not possess the sovereignty of Britain. That power in the last resort is vested in the people. It is the people who should decide whether we are to be governed by one or by two Houses. The difficulty, of course, is to be sure that the people get the issue properly put before them. Hence we can only end as we began, by pointing out the extreme importance of presenting the issue fairly. In the first place, the country must come to a decision upon the point which Lord Morley tells us the Committee of Cabinet some sixteen years ago found itself incapable of deciding,—the question whether they want to make the House of Lords stronger or weaker. Nothing can be done till that point is settled. When it is, then the problem will, we believe, be found to be wholly manageable, and unclouded by the doubts and perplexities which now surround it.
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