TOPICS OF TIIE DAY.
THE WAR.
THE slowness of the Russian advance, both in Europe and Asia—a slowness in part only apparent, but in part also
real—though unfavourable in some degree to her prospects, is by no means unfavourable to the cause for which she is consciously, or unconsciously, fighting. A rapid and dramatic Russian success, a success like that which followed the German invasion of France, was not altogether to be desired. It would have greatly excited opinion in this country, have created a panic about the danger of Constantinople, and have en- abled Lord Beaconsfield to act as he pleased amid a public be- wildered by events occurring too rapidly to be thoroughly con- sidered. Moreover, it would, in all human probability, have appalled the Turks into offering terms of peace, which, though they would have settled nothing, would have greatly tempted the old statesmen of St. Petersburg, now borne forward by a popular impulse which, even while they obey it and applaud it, they dislike. This war will, we believe, be of great benefit to man- kind, but half its results will be lost if it ends too soon, or if the terms of peace leave the Turkish Empire, even though shorn of a province or two, still standing visible to the world. The delay enables England to think, to see that a small inde- pendent State has still resources,—for instance, Prince Charles of Roumania, if hostile to Russia, had only to encamp his army in his western provinces to make the Russian advance through the eastern ones extremely dangerous,—and to perceive that if the ultimate result were a Federation of the Turkish Peninsula, Russia would by no means be enabled either to "crush" or to " rush " such a Power without great preparation and a serious campaign, during which the Federation could receive material assistance from the West. That is a considerable gain at a moment when the most dangerous risk is that the British public should suddenly get into a fluster, of which an adroit Premier, intent upon leaving a conspicuous name in history, could readily avail himself. It is not so easy to shout "Constantinople in danger!" or "Up for the Euphrates Valley I" when they are being threatened by armies hundreds of miles away, and advancing at a rate which does not rise to an average of ten miles a day. At the same time, the Turks are greatly encouraged. They feared some tremendous blow, and only find an ordinary cam- paign, in which they have obtained the first successes. Their fleets, in which, not being a maritime people, they take an ex- cessive pride, have destroyed Fort Nicholas, and done some- thing or other not ascertained to Poti, and have taken Sakoum Keith, on the edge of the Caucasus, and are about, if the torpedoes do not prevent them, to bombard Odessa. All that matters absolutely nothing to the result of the war, the positions on the Black Sea being of no importance to Russia, so long as she does not lose them ; but the success naturally makes the Turks think themselves very fine fellows, disinclines them to peace on any but favourable terms, and induces them to imagine that Russian energy has been greatly overrated, which, as regards her marine, seems now as always correct. There is a want of 'go' in the Russian marine, of willingness to use ships and tor- pedo-boats like shells, and lose them if necessary, which is explicable only on the theory of a certain self-distrust at sea. The Turkish self-confidence—always great, because always based on a belief in the peculiar favour of heaven, and now excited by successes at sea—is further developed by news like that telegraphed from Batoum. Bashi-Bazouks have there beaten Russians in the field. Then, is the Turkish deduction, Turkey is unconquerable. It does not greatly matter whether the repulse was a battle or a mere skirmish, whether the de- feat was repaired or unrepaired, whether the Russians lost 4,000 killed, or only a few score,—the effect of the report at Constantinople is to increase the belief that resistance is the best policy, and to render any whisper of peace unacceptable. That, the destruction of the power of the Pashas being the end sought, is a good result ; and every message of this week has tended towards its attainment. The war is to be a war in which England will have time to abstain from intervention, and in which the despair which falls upon Orientals when struck apparently by blows out of the blue, will not fall upon the Turks.
For the rest, the news received as yet is of very little import- ance. We do not know what is happening in Asia, except that the Russians have lost a certain number of men in an attempt to carry hills above Bator= • and in Europe the Russian Army is still rolling forward to the Danube, encumbered with pon-
toons, heavy guns, and the vast commissariat which will be necessary when the Danube has once been crossed. There are stories of an attempt to cross, and a Turkish monitor has been blown up in a way instructive to English naval constructors, and there are rumours that the Turks intend to desolate their own provinces before the enemy, as Louvois desolated the Palatinate, but as yet the preparations for crossing are not ready, and the first great effort of the war is still postponed. It is not likely that it will be made for another week or ten days, the Russian Staff being obviously determined to leave nothing to chance, and till it is successful the actual campaign can hardly be said to have commenced. The war in Europe will begin when the Danube has been crossed, and as yet even the points at which the crossing will be made have not been ascertained.
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