Letters to the Editor
[ecrrespondents are requested to keep their letters as brief as is reasonably possible. The most suitable length is that of one of our News of the Week" paragraphs.—Ed. THE SPECTATOR.]
IMPRISONMENT FOR INTENT
[To the Editor of THE SPECTATOR.] am grateful to Mr. Coppersmith for keeping this subject under discussion, even at the expense of my letter, which was worded as provocatively as possible without being,
I hope, positively offensive. May I take the points one by one ?
" People in this country may be imprisoned—for doing nothing whatever against the law on nothing which can be called reasonable evidence." Let me explain this. Take the case of an innocent man who is sent to prison because he is thought to have been loitering with intent. Presumably he must have been doing something ; shall we say he has been loitering ? He has not had any evil intent, but he is sent to prison. In the mind of the Bench he has been sent for loitering with intent ; in actual fact he has been sent because a police officer has seen him loitering. That is what I call being sent to prison for doing nothing whatever against the law. Mr. Coppersmith rightly points out that this is really equivalent to saying that courts make mistakes. The peculiar feature in this sort of case is the evidence on which the decision is made. There is only one witness who can give first-hand evidence of a man's state of mind, and that is the man himself. If he denies an intent I cannot conceive how it is humanly possible to refuse to believe his evidence "beyond the possibility of reasonable doubt." It seems to me that the average person in this country, not to say on the juries and the Bench, accepts as convincing proof what seems to me to be entirely insufficient evidence. The absence of reason- able doubt suggests an absence of reason. A perfect example of this is the case quoted by Mr. Coppersmith himself, pre, sumably as an example of what would really be very reasonable evidence on which to base a conviction had it been admitted. Is it impossible for Mr. Coppersmith to frame an alternative hypothesis as to the cause of a man's loitering ? Supposing, for the sake of example, the man had been converted from his evil ways, and was paying a visit to the scene of a possible crime for penitential reflection. It may be unlikely, but it cannot be ruled out as an impossible hypothesis in theory, though no doubt this was not the defence in this particular case. But to quote the man's past record as if that was now convincing evidence of the rightness of the decision seems to me to be the work of a man who cannot have spent much time in considering the extreme uncertainty of all human know- ledge. That man may be innocent to this day, and Mr. Coppersmith has still adduced no evidence as to his state of mind. That is what I mean by " nothing which can be called reasonable evidence."
2. Resistance to the police. Here as elsewhere in his letter Mr. Coppersmith seems to me to be out of touch with human feelings in a poor district where the behaviour of the police is not always courteous. To start with, a man is some- times taken to the police station without being asked what he is doing ; then, if he is asked, his explanation is not necessarily accepted. I have had personal experience of the language and manner of the police which would provoke the normal person to anger, if not to expression of it. But if Mr. Copper- smith were to be marched off to the police station without any explanation of any sort being offered, it is possible that he also might show signs of resistance. Anyhow it is conceivable that some people might. Personally I have no wish to be protected by the police at the expense of a loss of fairness and decency towards Mr. Coppersmith.
3. Remands.—I said a remand is usually granted. I am aware that the case can be dealt with at once. But if it is more often so dealt with I accept the correction. I should of course have said, " a remand in custody," for at the first hearing the defendant does not often secure bail. And once again the Court generally has no evidence before it other than that of the police and the defendant ; naturally the police command the greater respect, and that is the reason for the state of mind which Mr. Coppersmith sees in me of confusing the functions of police and court." I hope that this reading of my mind is as inaccurate as the reading of the loiterer's mind may be ; but what I do feel is that once the police have set a case in motion, the defendant has small chance of getting off.
4. Assizes.—I did not infer any irregularity whatever. I " understand "—perhaps wrongly—that evidence of past record is not produced before the verdict in a court of Assize. This seems to me rational and logical. I gather that it is often produced in a court of summary jurisdiction ; this seems to me irrational and illogical, and the fact that it is a perfectly regular proceeding does not make it less so.
5. Defence in a police court.—I have had a very interesting letter from a magistrate which I think I had better quote verbatim, without giving the author's name :
" Absence of legal defence is a nuisance ; again and again a wit- ness gives an account of the accitied's criminal and incomprehen- sible behaviour ; then the accused k asked, do you wish to ask the witness any questions ? ' then the accused says; ' he has told you quite wrong ; what really happened was . . . ' and he starts his yarn. We would like to know what his defence is going to be ; but we tell him to wait, and that we will listen to him later on. But we usually fail to convey to him the idea of cross-examining hostile witnesses before setting up his full defence ; we are lucky if we have not left him in doubt whether his turn to talk will ever come."
Add to this that in a police court in a poor district the accused is often ignorant, inexperienced, frightened, in dis- grace, and without supporting witnesses ; the police who are the prosecutors are knowledgeable, experienced, cool, undisgraced, and back up each other. Which is likely to impress the court most ? And if the accused has a past criminal record, is not suspicion readily commuted into " absence of all reasonable doubt " ?
I do not wish to claim to be a " welfare worker." But I note with interest that Mr. Coppersmith seems to assume that " clarity of vision " is equivalent to " vision " of the intentions of another man's mind, with the further tacit assumption that such vision will always find him guilty. We are all familiar with those people who tell us that they know our own minds better than we do ourselves ; it is alarming to find that they can send us to prison for six months on the strength of it.--
I am, Sir, &-c., P. M. GEDGE. Charlerhouse in Southwark, The Clergy House, 40 Tabard Street, S.E.1.
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