MARGINAL COMMENT
By HAROLD NICOLSON
SINCE my return from North Africa I have constantly been asked two questions. The first is: " Will France, once she is liberated, relapse into civil war? " The second is: " Does General de Gaulle aim at establishing a personal dictatorship? " It would be unwise for an Englishman who has paid but a flying visit to Algeria to give any unqualified answer to such questions. It is in any case impossible for a foreigner accurately to estimate how far those Frenchmen who have recently escaped from France to Africa repre- sent the dominant tendencies and opinions in metropolitan France itself. It is difficult for the visiting Englishman, especially for one who entertains feelings of gratitude and admiration for the French mind and character, to remain unaffected by sentimental considera- tions. The emotions aroused by the sight of a resurgent France are respectable and potent ; it would indeed be inhuman not to be moved by the vision of a great country, which has suffered deep humiliation, gradually recovering its energies, its vivacity, its self- confidence and its self-respect. And there seems to be a certain indelicacy in examining the lacerated body of France as if she were some exhibit stretched upon the slab of a dissecting theatre. It is difficult, for these reasons, to isolate hopes from realities and feelings from thoughts.
I had occasion, however, when at Algiers to see all the leading figures in the National Committee, to have discussions with many
of the young men of the Resistance, and to have long conversations
with members of the Consultative Assembly. In visiting Tunis and Morocco, in visiting certain training-centres of the new French army, I had occasion to check my first impressions from angles of observation detached from the main Algiers focus. In Tunisia, the memories of German occupation, the memory of that rairry after- noon of May 7th, 1943, are still extremely vivid; for Tunisians libera- tion is a fact of experience and not a political slogan. In Morocco, where the French settlers have for long been exposed to the full blast of German and Vichy propaganda, there still exists the residue of bewildered resentment that war and dissension should have come to disturb their once prosperous colonial life. And among the Generals and young officers there is considerable impatience with politics, and a desire only to restore, as is being done, the prestige and honour of the French army. It would be most obtuse of us not to realist that these currents and cross-currents are wholly in- evitable. If London had been occupied and a section of our fleet and army had, with American assistance, been re-formed in Kenya Colony, then we also would display a certain sensitiveness to the touch. If at Nairobi there had been formed a Consultative Assembly including such diverse personalities as Mr. Herbert Morri- son, Mr. Shinwell, Mr. Aneurin Bevan, Mr. Gallacher, Sir Herbert Williams and Mr. Quintin Hogg, it is at least possible that a certain diversity of opinion might have been expressed. To me the astonishing thing is not that there should exist some party rivalries at Algiers, but that under General de Gaulle's leadership so wide a measure of unanimous will should have been created.
* * * * The question is, however, " Will there be civil war in France once the country has been liberated? " Those Frenchmen to whom, in different forms, I put this question gave me many varied answers. Yet it was possible from these answers to extract some general common factors which almost provide a formula. That formula would run approximately as follows: " France is certainly passing through a revolutionary stage, but if firmness is displayed, if the Anglo-Saxons and the Russians do not intervene, then there should be no need for a revolution, only a need for some marked change. If the Allies sought to compromise with Vichy, if for instance they sought to revive the old Chamber and to recognise some ' neutral ' government formed by men like de Monzie or Georges Bonnet, then assuredly fire and slaughter would spread in a single night throughout the land. If, again, the Allies imagine that France will return
without a word to the 1875 Constitution, that the old system of parliamentary and press corruption will be reinstituted, then certainly all this dilapidated furniture will be swept away by force. But if the Allies accord full powers to the National Committee of General de Gaulle, and if that Committee is supported by the Resistance and the Communists, then, after a momentary ' lightning revolution,' order will be established and unflinchingly maintained." Such. more or less, was the answer given me by men of different ages, parties and groups. But this formula leaves behind it two disturbing notes of interrogation. Will the Resistance, which is formed from men of every class of society, be able to maintain its present unity? What will be the future relations between the Resistance and the Com- munists? I could obtain no effective answer to these two questions.
Clearly -there is a strong element of Jacobinism in all this, and the danger of much heresy-hunting and accusations of " impurity."
It is for this reason that General de Gaulle's personal attitude, influence and intentions become of such immense importance. There is a general recognition that General de Gaulle today has become something more than a symbol, something more than a legend, and that he is emerging as' a defined military and political leader. He is the man of June 18th, 1940 ; he is the man who refused to be sub- servient to any foreign government, and who by his obstinacy and faith preserved the dignity and independence of France ; he is the man who, by sheer force of volition, eliminated all alternatives and imposed a unity of purpose upon all parties and politicians ; he is the only man who, when deliverance comes, will be accepted as unquestioned leader by a vast majority of the French people. He is a phenomenon ; he is essential ; he is unavoidable—but will he be democratic? There are those who contend that de Gaulle, recalling always his ancestor the Sieur de Gaulle who fought with Joan of Arc, sees himself only as the mystic Liberator, and that when once France is restored he will retire quite naturally into private life and give lectures on tank warfare at the Ecole de Guerre. There are those who contend that, even if he has no personal ambitions, he will be forced by chaos to direct the storm. And there are those who believe that so soon as liberation becomes a reality, he will summon the Conseils Generaux, prepare for a new Constitution and Assembly, and restore to France her parliamentary liberties in cleaner and more efficient forms. That, I am quite sure, is the solution which he himself would most desire.
* * * * The question is, however, whether France, the new France of the
Resistance and the Communist Party, has any desire at all to return to liberalism. That is a question which nobody can answer with assurance at this stage. De Gaulle himself has indicated recently that he is opposed to totalitarianism. In a fine speech he rebuked the extreme apostles of revenge by stating that among all those who had supported Vichy there were "perhaps a dozen traitors ; perhaps a hundred men of weak character." When Combat a few weeks ago launched a disgraceful attack against M. Comert, the editor of France, and M. Duchesne, the leader of the French team of the B.B.C.—against two men, that is, who for four years have been models of brilliant patriotism—de Gaulle countered by according his official approval and support to the Duchesne equipe. Nor can we yet be certain whether the Press Law drafted by the Consultative Assembly, and which, while trying to suppress corruption, succeeds in suppressing all freedom of speech, has the General's real approval. The political censorship at Algiers was unwise, unintelligent and un- worthy of a great country. We learnt on Wednesday last that it had been abolished. From all these storms and clouds two pinnacles of truth do in fact emerge: (I) The only hope of preventing civil war in France is -co-operation between the Risistance and the Communists in a Government headed by de Gaulle and recognised by the Allied Powers. (2) The only hope of restoring liberalism in France is that de Gaulle should maintain his authority undisputed until France gains her health, her sanity and a new Constitution.
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