A REMARKABLE DEFENSIVE
- By STRATEG IC US
SOME of the ambiguities in the present military situation are obvious ; and they have already been discussed. But there are others which do not in any sense conflict with the picture of a great Army compelled to temporary, and generally unsatisfactory, makeshifts, though they may be irritating and confusing. Such are the incidents in the German offensive in the Dodecanese. It is perfectly natural that an army strategically thrown back on the defensive should retain some local initiative and the capacity for a tactical offensive. We, of all people, should know that, since we had only that consolation until about a year ago. Indeed, many took it rather hard that we did no more than defeat two great armies and redeem an empire.
It is, therefore, not unnatural that Germany should be recapturing the islands we seized in September. If there is one thing we can predicate of the German Army and its leaders it is that they will exhaust every expedient before they surrender. There is little point in Hitler insisting that he will never give in. We saw a marginal comment on that in Tunisia, and it taught us that, beyond this pattern of war with its rules and conventions, there is the fighting spirit which defies or ignores them. It is that which triumphed in Russia ; for it is impossible to look back on the Russian campaigns without being convinced that though they show astonishing skill, versatility and organising power, it is the invincible spirit behind
them that has brought the Russian armies to their present position. It is not that the Germans abandon the battle while there is any conceivable chance; but that the Russians—and after the heroic defiance of 1940 'He thay include ourselves—continue when the conventional, and ordinarily conceivable, chance seems gone.
But the Dodecanese inevitably offers a chance, a sound, con- ventional, military chance ; and the Germans are apparently deter- mined to seize it. They can give their troops fighter cover, and it is, in general, impossible to fight successfully when one side has it and the other has not. Cos and Leros should, therefore, be gifts to the enemy ; but, as soon as this is said, we are driven to ask what conceivable purpose there was in attempting to hold them. It is not so much the loss of these islands that disturbs us. They matter very little whileRhodes remains in the hands of the enemy ; and, in any case, the picture of an Allied army making its way by these small stepping-stones to the mainland is far from encouraging. When we begin the invasion of the Balkans, it is to be hoped, we shall by-pass them and leave them 'to detain away from the battle area the aircraft for which the ground-troops will then be clamour- ing. They provide the Qermans with some innocent propaganda, but otherwise they are of little importance.
What is disturbing is the suggestion that the position was never thought out. Mathematics have only a very subsidiary part in war, and it is rarely just to invoke them. But if ever any position were mathematically untenable, it is the Dodecanese. What is, then, disturbing is the spectacle of brave men being left in an untenable situation. Britain has far too few trained men, even if we could ever become reCoriciled to the loss of any unnecessarily. It is just possible that the Balkan campaign, which at a certain point would make these gestures altogether too expensive a luxury, has been held up by the political ferment that seems to develop so easily and so seriously in the Near East. The Balkan troubles are among the few wholly discouraging factors in the war, and the Lebanon explosion suggests that there are other places where the flash-point is low. It is when we reflect upon such possibilities and such events that we glean a new insight into the meaning of Germany's fight for time. Looking at the Balkans and -Lebanon, can we say that, from her point of view, dragging on the war, when the general military situation suggests all is lost, is quite hopeless?
If the Allies make mistakes, or if they indulge in the luxury of disputes and disunity, they must expect that the Germans will turn them to the best account. They suffer in Russia from the know- ledge that they are facing an adversary who will profit by every slip they make, and they will certainly take advantage of any made by us Leros is disturbing for the reasons given ; but, as compared with the vast movements that are at present taking place in Russia, it is simply an irrelevance. For some time the Germans affected to regard the Italian campaign in much that way ; but now their attitude has changed, and, with ten or eleven divisions engaged on what they have determined to make a winter line, they recognise the inconvenience of the Allied Army Group. This in itself is signi- ficant ; for, to be quite frank, ten divisions do not suggest the order of continental armies. The Italian campaign has begun to be a nuisance to the Germans because they are experiencing, the tremendous strain of the continued pressure in Russia.
General Vatutin has pushed out so great a bulge west of Kiev that now this " elastic " process of "shortening the front" ha; resulted in lengthening the ime very considerably. The problem of reserves, which from the first was seen to be the crux of the struggle between Germany and Russia, calls for a solution. German com- mentators frankly admit the difficulties without promising any eaiy way out. Indeed, there are hints of further withdrawals ; and, when we have fully realised that the front is definitely and obviously longer than before the Germans set out to shorten it with a view to economy in reserves, we can see that already the Russians have won an important victory even if Et goes no further.
At this very serious juncture the German Command are still using their troops very skilfully. In the southern sector, where Vatutin threatens to complete a greater encirclement than that from which Manstein escaped by his success at Krivoi Rog, the advance in the critical direction is being pegged. At Krivoi Rog one arm of the pincers threatened to close in on the troops in the pocket to the east. It was held open while the troops effected a readjust- - ment. It is true that the price paid for that relief was the break through at Melitopol and the extension of the line to Kherson. Still, if Manstein did not wish to evacuate the bend with the man- ganese of Nikopol, that was the best thing to do—if i: could he done safely. That is the question that is now being answered. After Krivoi Rog came Fastov. This junction lies on the direct line to Vinnitsa on the Bug and Zlunerinka on the Lemberg-Odessa railway. The severance of that line would so gravely complicate the supply, reinforcement and evacuation of the German armies below the Dnieper that it had to be prevented at almost any cost.
It was prevented, and one can recognise the skill and resolution. But what price has Manstein paid for this respite? Zhitomir has fallen, and the Russians hold now a considerable strip of the main lateral communications of the German Army. They have pene- trated beyond Zhitomir and are threatening Korosten, which is a junction on the same lateral communications, and the main line below the Pripet Marshes into the :wart of Poland. Even that is not the whole of the price, since the Russians have now cut the main line and road by which Gnmel is linked with the west. The defence of Gomel has been one of the most remarkable incidents in the year's campaign ; and as there is still a line towards the north- west by which the garrison can be reinforced, or if necessary escape, it may continue for a while to defy the Russian threats. But the position is definitely perilous The Russians have cast a line about the fortress on the east and north, and it would be very natural for them to complete the encirclement, as their most recent move- ments suggest.
The alternation of these powerful thrusts, with the full knowledge that they are designed to be articulated later on and become an irresistible gigantic movement, makes the problem of the defence extremely difficult. Not only are troops pinned down, or alter- natively drawn off to some unexpected point, but it cannot be certain whether the obvious riposte does not equally play into the Russian hands. Below Fastov, for instance, has Manstein effected any real relief? There can hardly be any doubt that evacuation of the whole of the troops below the Dnieper would be the higher
prudence. For what will happen if the Russians, temporarily pre- vented from extending towards the south-west, should continue to push out to the west? It may be all the better finally for the Russian plan for Manstein to hold on about Nikopol and Fastov. The Russian Staff, if they have the resources for it, may have designed a greater envelopment than Stalingrad.
Whatever the Russian plan, whatever the Russians' relative resources, it is obvious that so far they have contrived to out- manoeuvre Manstein. When about Krivoi Rog he selected the best point to hold, as he was determined to maintain himself in the eastern part of the bend, he weakened his hold on Kiev, and for the first time the Russians have given us their version of Blitzkrieg. Manstein has again chosen the critical point on which to deliver his counter-attack. Has he once again laid himself open to a more damaging reply? The Germans are still fighting with undiminished discipline and with very remarkable skill ; but the strain on them tends to reach the breaking-point.
Previous page
