BOOKS The War of Containment
By P. J. HONEY
THE old Communist teaching that war is in- evitable so long as part of the world remains under capitalist control and its corollary that World peace will become possible only when Communist rule is world-wide had the virtue of simplicity. The believing Communist, could behave as aggressively as he liked and remain convinced that he was the true peacemaker. The victim of his aggression, even if he failed to raise a finger in his own defence, inevitably be- came the warmonger. But the manufacture of nuclear weapons has now progressed to the stage at which war between two powers possessing these arms is unthinkable. Neither could hope to escape destruction. This develop- ment has necessitated the rethinking of the old doctrine, a process which has provoked funda- mental differences between the two major Com- munist powers. Both still adhere to the belief that the frontiers of Communism must be extended until they encompass the globe but disagree about the means of achieving that objective. Russia preaches 'peaceful coexistence,' by which
Atshe means substituting political struggle for armed struggle, while China still advocates the latter, particularly in the form of 'people's libera- tion wars,' which the Chinese believe to be their own invention.
The differences are more complicated than this would suggest, however, for it was the Russians who plashed the North Koreans into invading South Korea, carried out the Berlin blockade, and set up their rockets in Cuba. The current effort to extend the frontiers of Com- munism is being made in South Vietnam, where the struggle is undeniably armed and terms itself a ''people's liberation war.' Khrushohev was acutely aware of the dangers of involvement in Vietnam and bluntly told R. A. Butler during the latter's brief spell as Foreign Secretary that he intended to lift the Soviet Union off that par- ticular 'meat hook,' but his successors have shown themselves less cautious. Out of fear of denunciation by China, Brezhnev and Kosygin are reluctantly permitting the increasing in- volvement of Russia in this conflict.
Although the United States is still relatively new to her role of leading western power in the international political scene, she has already shown herself to be a rapid learner. She has studied the history of Hitler's armed aggression against the Rhineland, Austria, Czechoslovakia and Poland in the 1930s and how the western Policy of appeasement led inevitably to world War. The reverse policy of containment initiated by President Truman in 1947, of confronting local aggression with firmness and determina- tion, has shown its effectiveness since the end 42d the Second World War in a number of Places, notably Greece, Malaya, the Philippines, Berlin •and Korea. Each conflict was contained within its local limits and was eventually abandoned by the Communists. Consequently, that was the policy the late President Kennedy * THE NEW FACE OF WAR. By Malcolm W. Browne. (Cassell, 25s.) THE MAKING OF A QUAGMIRE. By David Hal- berstam. (The Bodley Head, 30s.)
adopted to deal with the Cuba crisis—it proved its effectiveness once again—and it is now being followed by President Johnson in Vietnam.
Two new books about Vietnam* ignore these 'wider issues and treat the happenings there in isolation, as though they were unconnected with events in the world outside. This is regrettable, since both would have benefited from additional chapters setting the Vietnamese situation in its international perspective, but understandable. The two authors are American foreign corre- spondents, members of that small foreign press corps resident in Saigon during the eventful year 1963, which witnessed a popular revolt against the government, the self-immolation of Buddhist monks and the military coup d'etat that overthrew the regime of Ngo Dinh Diem and brought about the deaths of Diem himself and his brother Nhu.
Only slightly less dramatic than the Viet- namese developments was the furore caused by the hostile reporting of the correspondents and their battles with the Vietnamese and United States authorities. With courage, enthusiasm and energy, these young men repeatedly risked their lives in their efforts to provide first-hand reports on the war. They accompanied the army in its operations, slogged across flooded ricefields, flew on helicopter assaults and shrugged off the hardships of climate and terrain as part of the job. American military opinion at the time was sharply divided about the war, with the senior commanders confident it was being won and the juniors at unit level equally sure it was being lost. To a man, the correspondents backed the junior officers and their pessimistic dispatches provoked cries of protest in Saigon and Wash- ington. Only history will record which side was right, but the press corps refused to retract, stub- bornly went on writing reports in the same vein, and engaged in noisy verbal conflict with its critics. Small wonder if the authors of both books have decided to concentrate upon what happened inside Vietnam and their own reactions to it rather than to relate it to events in the world outside.
War is an activity in which success or failure can be measured in terms of casualties, territory, advance or retreat. It is capable of assessment by men who, like the Saigon press corps in 1963, observe the fighting at first hand and record its outcome on maps. That is why the parts of both books concerned with purely military matters carry conviction and vividly create for the reader the atmosphere of the Vietnamese war with its strain, hardships land frustrations. The political struggle, on the other hand, was something the press corps was singu- larly ill equipped to report since all its members were young, relatively new to Asia and in- experienced professionally. In his book, Browne has devoted little space to political matters and a misleading chapter on the National Liberation Front—the political arm of .the Vietcong in- surgents--only serves to confirm that this was a wise decision. Halberstam, the more thought- ful of the two writers, has been bolder. It is evident, though, that subsequent reflection, assisted by hindsight, has led him to modify in writing his book some of the confident assertions he made in his dispatches during 1963.
Political struggle in South Vietnam is a pro- cess of extreme subtlety conducted according to its own highly individualistic rules. Nuance, rumour, deception, blackmail and much else besides are imployed throughout the campaign, but naked force is reserved for the final and decisive phase. It is a product of conditions imposed on politically conscious Vietnamese by a century of French rule. Clandestine activity is hectic and continuous, but there are few visible signs of it and such phenomena as do appear are deliberately contrived for the purpose of mis- leading opponents. Nothing is what it seems to be. Only after years of experience and endless coaching by Vietnamese practitioners can the foreigner hope to develop a feel for Vietnamese politics, yet the foreign press corps was sud- denly faced with the task of reporting the com- plex and desperate political struggle which dragged on through the summer and autumn of 1963.
Since they were in Saigon, and since their words were published and read around the world, the correspondents were regarded by Vietnam- ese as an important factor in the struggle. They found themselves the recipients of 'secret' dis- closures and advance tip-offs which enabled them to be present, complete with cameras, when Buddhist monks burned themselves to death. Skilfully manipulated by the Vietnamese, they conceived a consuming hatred for the regime, which they held responsible for the terrible happenings, and committed themselves emotionally to the struggle to overthrow it. The government, too, devoted much attention to the correspondents, creating difficulties for them, censoring their dispatches and attempting to dis- credit their reporting, though without much suc- cess. The press was eager for dramatic stories and pictures, while travellers willingly smuggled out dispatches for them. They believed, prob- ably with some justification, that their lives were in danger and took to sleeping in friends'houses.
In sharp contrast, a seasoned analyst of the Vietnamese scene, Joseph Alsop,'who has studied political developments there, for decades and is acquainted with many political, leaders, visited Saigon for a week at the height of the crisis. By dint of meeting the people of influence and asking them the right questions, he was able to offer his readers a balanced and accurate account of what was going on. It was he who uncovered the fact that Diem and Nhu were receiving emissaries from North Vietnam at the instigation of the French Ambassador, who was obliged to return in some haste to Paris when Alsop published the news. Halberstam records the disclosure in his book but ungraciously withholds the credit from Alsop, to whom the young correspondents took a dislike when he remarked on their inexperience.
Since the overthrow of Ngo Dinh Diem, both the political and military situations in South Vietnam have undergone many changes. An entirely new phase of the war commenced last February, with the bombing 'of North Vietnam. Today more than 160,000 American troops have been committed and they play a direct role in
the fighting. The government of Nguyen Cao Ky put an end to recurring coups d'etat and street
violence, so that the country has enjoyed un- troubled political calm and stability during recent months. Nevertheless, these two books recall vividly the stormy scenes of two years ago when a youthful press corps was striving to win its spurs and achieved fame or notoriety de- pending on one's point of view.
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