TOPICS OF THE DAY.
THE WAR AND THE DANGERS OF THE FUTURE.
THE dangers of the European situation are all in the future. There is now happily little doubt that the war will be localized. The Powers will keep a ring and allow the Turks and the Balkan League to fight the matter out. Not till the war is over will the difficulties, which may very possibly involve all Europe in disaster, become actively dangerous. This sounds rather cold comfort, and yet, as a matter of fact, the virtual certainty that the ring will be kept till it is seen who is the victor makes the prospects of a final settlement without war very much better. The time gained will enable the Powers to find out the exact nature of the problems which will arise in the end, and to provide for their solution. Every- thing turns upon the demands of Austria-Hungary, or, to put the matter more specifically, upon whether the irreducible demands of Austria-Hungary are of a kind which can or can not be tolerated by Russia. If they are intolerable to Russia, then there will be no way of settling whose will is to prevail, that of Austria-Hungary or of Russia, but the old way—an appeal to the ultimo, ratio. If, however, Austria-Hungary can be induced to keep her demands within limits which do not appear absolutely impossible to Russia, all may be well. What is it that Austria-Hungary wants ? Unfortunately this is a question very hard to answer, for Austria-Hungary has no clear or, at any rate, no positive policy. Therefore to satisfy her is exceedingly difficult. The nearest that one can get to a statement of Austria-Hungary's policy is that she is determined that her road to Salonika and the 2Egean shall not be barred by the growth of such upstart Powers as Servia, Montenegro, Bulgaria, and Greece. She would be quite content to leave the Turks in Macedonia and at Salonika, and has no desire to precipitate her own march eastward ; but in all her conflict of doubts and jealousies her one essential and unchangeable aspiration is not to be cut off from the Agean. Friends will call this wise forethought. Enemies will declare that it is the policy of the dog in the manger, the policy of "I do not want Salonika unless somebody else wants it, but then I want it so badly that I would rather set the whole of Europe in flames than be baulked of my legitimate aspirations."
We shall not attempt to decide which of these views is the true one. All that it is necessary for us to say on the present occasion is that if war is to be avoided the solution reached must not cut off Austria-Hungary's hope of eventually reaching Salonika and the sea. Translated into geographical terms, this means that the Sanjak of Novi Bazar must in any case fall back into Austrian possession and occupation, and that a stretch of territory which shall include Salonika must either fall to Austria-Hungary at once or, what in present circumstances Austria-Hungary would probably prefer, be left under some system of government which will not close the door to her. The territory in question, that is, must either be left as a State under the nominal protection of Turkey—left as a pear on the wall not yet ripe for gathering, but reserved for a particular gatherer—or else go straight to Austria. If the war ends as some people think it will end, though we are not to be counted among them, either in a Turkish victory or else in a game drawn in such a way that neither the Allies nor Turkey can be declared the victor, a settlement on these lines, and so agreeable to Austria-Hungary, will not be very difficult. If after, say, a year's inconclusive war the Powers intervene they could easily arrange that the disputed provinces of Turkey should become autonomous States under a nominal Turkish suzerainty, an arrangement which might postpone the final settlement for another ten or twelve years--until the Allies are strong enough to begin again and the autonomous States break into rebellion against their Suzerain. If, on the other hand, the Allies after, say, a year's fighting are able to do what the Russians did in 1878, bring the Turks to their knees, the difficulties, though much greater, need not prove insuperable. In that case it would, of course, be impossible for Austria-Hungary, whatever she may say now, and for the Powers who support her, to demand for her a return to the status quo ante. The most that they could. do would be to insist that if Bulgaria gets a large part of Thrace, Greece pieces of Epirus and Thessaly, and Montenegro a portion of Albania, either a Macedonian principality should be set up under Austrian protection which should include Salonika, or else that Austria-Hungary should at once take possession of the province in question, as she did in the case of Bosnia and Herzegovina. If anyone looks at the map he will see that the difficulty of such an arrangement is to give Austria-Hungary her road to Salonika and the sea without putting an absolute negative on all Servian expansion. The difficulty in regard to Bulgaria is by no means so great.' Bulgaria might easily be given all the country north of a line drawn from the mouth of the River Maritza through Mandra to Midis, on the Black Sea. On the west the new Bulgarian boundary might be the Struma. At the same time Servia might be given the south-eastern portion of the province of Kossovo. This would make " the road to the sea " province given to Austria-Hungary either in ease or in posse somewhat narrow, but if Italy could be got to agree to Albania being placed under Austrian protection, which means, in fact, under Austrian military domination, this difficulty might be avoided. Thus while Servia, Montenegro, Greece, and Bulgaria would each get their piece, Austria-Hungary would be bribed to consent by having Salonika and virtual supremacy over a nominally independent Albania. As far as we are con- cerned we see no objection to such a proposal, though we can quite understand many people asking why the selfish- ness and shortsightedness of Austria-Hungary should be rewarded. at the expense of the unfortunate Macedonians, who are most anxious not to be placed under her sway.
The only answer we can give—unfortunately it is a very potent answer—is that Austria-Hungary has the power to enforce her demands, and that it is no good to tell an armed man that he is selfish and shortsighted. The previous question, " Will he shoot ? " is far more urgent and important than the moral invalidity of his claims to consideration.
If we are right in supposing that Austria-Hungary's irreducible minimum will be such an arrangement as will ultimately give her Salonika and a part of the shores of the .gean, we must next ask, Will it be possible for Russia to agree to such a solution ? Remember that from Russia's point of view it would mean that she must join in the coercion of the Slavonic States of Bulgaria, Servia, and Montenegro, and also of Greece, of which.
State she has always been the patron. To put it plainly, if the Powers who are only anxious not to have a row suggest this way of placating Austria- Hungary, what is to be their answer if the Russians in effect say, " Where do we come in?" or inquire whether the Powers really imagine that Russia is to sit by while Austrian selfishness is rewarded. and Russian sacrifices left without the slightest acknowledgment ? We admit the difficulty of answering this question in such a way as to render the reply acceptable not merely to the Government of the Tsar, but to the Russian people. In the rough sketch, however, which we have made of a rearrangement of the map of European Turkey it will be noticed that we are assuming that Constantinople and the piece of territory bounded on the north by the line from Midia, on the Black Sea to the mouth of the Maritza on the Egean, and on the south by the European side of the Dardanelles and of the Sea of Marmora, should. remain in the hands of Turkey. Might it not be possible to say to Russia, " This remainder piece of Turkey in Europe, including Constantinople, shall be earmarked as to fall to Russia, if and when circumstances make it impossible for the Turks to remain any longer in Europe, and they are obliged. to become a purely Asiatic Empire, or, again, if Austria goes to Salonika—whichever event shall first occur." In that case the situation would be something like this. Austria-Hungary would not at once go to Salonika, though she would be placed in a position to take it whenever she was ready and circumstances permitted. At the same time, Russia would not go to Constantinople, but she would feel that it was reserved for her and that she could claim her inheritance if ever the Austrians did descend to the Egean. In this way the two great Powers most intimately concerned with the problem of the Near East would. be satisfied, or at any rate would be enough satisfied not to fly at each other's throat and force their Allies also to go to war.
We shall be told, of course, that it would be most unneces- sary and most dangerous to allow Russia not only to have Constantinople, but the European side of the Dardanelles and of the Sea of Marmora. On the contrary, we think it would be most natural and most reasonable and entirely consistent with the interests of Britain and also of the peace of the world to give Russia, as the chief representative of the Eastern Church, the prestige which comes from the possession of Constantinople, and also the right to one side of the straits which . give access to the Black Sea. The Black Sea. for trade purposes is a Russian sea, and it has always appeared to us most reasonable that the Russians should desire and should obtain possession of the key of the door which leads into the Black Sea. Russia wants to secure her egress from the Black Sea, and ought ultimately to be given that right. Quite apart from this, it is very much to our interests to bring another Power into the Mediterranean, and a Power which will help to prevent the balance from inclining in a direction that may be hostile to this country. Critics will next assert that our amateur efforts at a rearrangement of the map of South-Eastern Europe are most ill-considered and most dangerous. Frankly, we are not impressed by such criticism. We fully admit that our partition is of a purely tentative kind, and that there are a great many considerations, not only political but geographical, which we appear to have ignored. We do not claim that our plan is in the least a final solution. All we have made is an attempt to think out some of the conditions of the problem. But it is to thinking-out of this kind that the statesmen of Europe must at once turn their attention if they are not to run the risk of being found barren of a policy if events should move more rapidly than they now think likely in the Balkan Peninsula. We shall be told also, no doubt, that we are ass um- ing a Turkish defeat and that there is no ground for such assumption, but very much the reverse. But even if we admit this, and also that if Turkey is successful the task of the Powers will for the moment apparently seem easier, there still remains a very strong case for looking ahead. If, however, Turkey is not successful, it is, as we have said, essential to have a policy outlined which will satisfy Austria-Hungary -without making Russia feel that, though she may dislike the idea of war, she must act or run the risk of having her aspirations for reaching the Mediterranean for ever negatived. At least we may say of our scheme that it is an attempt to find a modus vivendi between Austria-Hungary and Russia, and, further, that the discovery of such a modus vivendi is the only way by which a European war can be avoided. We may have most rashly and altogether in the wrong way waded into the morass, but even if we have, that is not a reason for saying that nobody ought to try to find the right way through. Rather it is a reason for a more careful examina- tion of the problem and for a more exacting search for a path which can be trodden in safety.
What we have written seems to demand a postscript in one particular. Suppose we are asked by our critics, as a final question, " Where does Italy come in ? " What should be our reply ? Though prima, facie it may be said that Italy has got the enormous territories of Tripoli and Barka as her share of the Turkish Empire, the fact no doubt remains that Italy may find it very difficult to bear seeing Albania set down as part of the Austro-Hungarian sphere of influence. We can only say that though we recog- nize the difficulty, it is one that Italy must, by the nature of things, settle alone with her Austrian ally. As long as Italy is in the Triple Alliance it would be an impertinence for any Power belonging to the group which is opposed to the Triple Alliance to attempt to interfere between her and her partners. We are bound to assume that Austria-Hungary and Germany will see to it that no Italian interests are injured in the final settlement of the Turkish problem. Though Britain is, and we trust always will be, a good friend to Italy, we have clearly no locus standi for specially championing Italian claims. We make no complaint against Italy for having refused to give us any right to regard her interests as our own, for we have always felt she alone could be the judge of where her interests lay, but this cannot alter the facts of the present European grouping, which are as we have stated. Possibly that grouping will not prove permanent in the case of Italy. Meantime we must deal with things as they are, not as they may be or as we should like them to be.
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