Political Commentary
Power and the plotters
Patrick Cosgrave
It appears that, even after eleven years, there are senior Conservative politicians who do not realise the extent of the dantage done to the party by the 'magic circle' who secured the choice of Sir Alex Douglas-Home as leader in the autumn of 1963. For, even before the election campaigrkended, and most particularly in the weekend following the fourth Tory defeat in five successive elections, a coalition of politicians and party officials who had enjoyed high favour in the Heath years made a serious, sustained, and private attempt to deliver the leadership on a plate to Mr Whitelaw. The extent to which Mr Whitelaw himself knew of these activities on his behalf is uncertain — I can scarcely believe that he countenanced them — but there can be little doubt that they were injurious to his considerable and worthy prospects of securing a succession that can be delayed by weeks, but hardly by months.
Perhaps the most squalid of the rumours put about on Sunday last was to the effect that Sir Keith Joseph, who has emerged as the principal standard bearer of those concerned about the central economic and management failures of the Heath government, had himself agreed to stand down, and serve Mr Whitelaw as Shadow Chancellor — with Mr Heath completing the triptych as Shadow Foreign Secretary. Sir Keith's known personal diffidence, the gentleness of his nature, and the candour with which he is willing to assess and re-assess himself, lent a certain spurious colour to a rumour which emanated from a quarter whichany journalist could be presumed to accept as authoritative; but it was baseless nonetheless. Unlike the busy supporters of his rival Sir Keith spent the weekend quietly, though he talked to several journalists and friends about the political situation when they telephoned or visited him. His decent unwillingness to pitch himself into any battle before the king was dead was, however, turned to a sharp but temporary advantage by the 'magic circle', the members of which rapidly began to emphasise supposed deficiencies in his character or ability to shoulder responsibility of the heaviest kind — accusations which anybody who has worked with or knows the man know to be ludicrous.
What must, of course, deeply concern Mr Whitelaw and those who are honourably anxious to advance his claims to succeed Mr Heath, is the damage instantly done to Mr Whitelaw's prospects. This happened in two ways. First, backbenchers who were quite uncommitted so far in the fight for the leadership, but who were, naturally, still considerably troubled by the two defeats of this year and the curious confused arrogance, as well as what seemed a constantly altering state of policy which had given rise to them, were disturbed to be approached by men who had themselves been an integral part of precisely those failed strategies which aroused worry. The instinct of the canvassers, it seemed to some such members, was to protect themselves, while ditching the man on whom they had most depended. (It was also suggested that the rapid promotion of Mr Whitelaw might well be a ploy to keep the whole of Mr Heath's kitchen cabinet, including the man himself, in power in the party — with Mr Heath, so to speak, crewing for Mr Whitelaw). Second, although Mr Whitelaw is held in wide and affectionate regard, there are serious doubts about the real nature of his achievement in Northern Ireland, about his temperament, and about his capacity to understand, develop and follow through a settled and intelligible economic policy. The early canvass caused the raising and discussion of these doubts far earlier than was necessary. The argument in favour of them, of course, according to one loyal Whitelaw supporter, was that "Willie's candidature is best promoted on a wave of quick enthusiasm. The longer the thing goes on the more doubts there would be about him." This may well be true; but it does not justify the tactics employed.
There are two further matters of Considerable concern arising from last weekend. The first is that the speed and ruthlessness of the 'magic circle' in action recalled not merely 1963, but 1965, when some of Mr Heath's henchmen orchestrated beautifully a. campaign to bring down Sir Alec Douglas-Home, the considerable bitterness that might have been created thereby being averted only because of the extraordinary gallantry of Sir Alec's conduct. The second matter of concern is that the early creation of faction recalls, unhappily, the deep divisions which Mr Heath has created in the party in recent years, through the promotion of favourites and the exclusion or critics; if the Conservatives are usefully to employ whatever period of opposition now faces them it is vital to avoid the creation of entrenched camps early in the day. Were Mr Heath to retire for at least a period of contemplation to the back benches and the stately minuet of the process of electing a leader to take its course in a gentlemanly fashion all the ghastly shadows of the period since November 1972 could be dispelled. Thus, though Sir Keith's public silence, and his refusal actively to advance his candidature depressed many supporters last weekend, inaction then may well have been in the best interests both of the party and of Sir Keith.
What, though, is going to happen? Sir Keith's silence encouraged some on the right to move to the side of Edward du Cann, in spite of his lack of Cabinet experience, slightly oily manner, and City connections. Mr Du Cann has, too, his supporters in the centre of the party and among half a dozen or so utterly committed adherents, must, it is said, be numbered Mr Peter Tapsell. Mr Du Cann himself may feel that, after his long exclusion from office at the whim of Mr Heath, he must strike now, or fail forever. In addition, there will be some anti-Common Marketeers who recall his
friendship for their cause and advocacy of freer,
international trading agreements: others will prefer Sir Keith's evident willingness to look
again at nearly all policies and decisions in the past, or will oppose Mr Du Cann because Ile never had the courage to pursue his opposition to the Market to the extent of consistentlY, voting against it. No anti-Marketeer coula consider, of course, voting for Mr Whitelaw. The mention of a series of names raises, of course, the whole question of the procedure for choosing a leader. In theory there are two ballots. Last time Mr Heath, Mr Maudling and Mr Powell all stood in the first, and Nif Maudling did well enough to earn the right to a
second shot at Mr Heath. This, however, he declined, preferring, most honourably, to put
before personal ambition the need for partY
unity which is just as evident today. His conduct on that occasion may well establish a
binding precedent, and I would be surprised if
any future election went to a second ballot. The canvassers for Mr Whitelaw are, of course,
trying to ensure that there is not even a first ballot, since they want to have a situation in which there is only one candidate. Anyway, the possibility that there will he only one ballot increases the desire of the various wings of the party — and their need —
to ensure that there is only one candidate representing their way of thinking, especiallY as there will be very serious and reasonable pressures to ensure that whoever finishes second in a first ballot immediately stands down. Thus, one or two people who would like to see Sir Keith as leader are inclined, ft,lf reasons of obligation, to vote for Mr Du Cann a first ballot, without realising that this MaY, destroy Sir Keith's chances; just as the handful of enthusiastic supporters of Mr Carr woul,t1 certainly support him in a first ballot, thougn objectively preferring Mr Whitelaw as victor,
thus ensuring the defeat of the chairman of the party. In the event a right-wing candidate like Mrs Thatcher who, on a luckier day would have claims as strong as those of Sir Keith himsell' seems certain to give her support to him, just as Mr Carr will weigh in behind Mr Whitelaw. Prior's always slender chances seem certain likewise to be deposited in the Whitelaw box, and Sir Geoffrey Howe, one of the really gifted younger figures of the last Cabinet who has the invaluable capacity of being able to appeal tu both right and left in the party will certainly everything he can for Sir Keith, and might we make an excellent campaign manager.
A quick glance at those who served in middle and junior posts in the last Conservative government suggests that the weight nAf intellectual distinction — including, one woulAt' have thought, that of Mr St John-Stevas — of serious thinking will be aligned with Keith, though there are exceptions like Mr, John Peyton who, as an old friend and ally, NO' probably be at the side of Mr Whitelaw. The Conservative Party would be well servel by either Sir Keith or Mr Whitelaw, and, regard Mr du Cann as essentially one wn°, distracts attention from the fact that the rea contest is and must be between these two. Sir Keith may be judged to have weakened his chances by doing nothing to promote them; Mr Whitelaw is certainly weakened by what is being done on his behalf. Personally, I hold Mr
Whitelaw in the highest regard — not least for the perception of his judgement just after the February defeat — though I reckon that the
claims of Sir Keith, at a moment when the most, careful, open, and intelligent re-appraisal 0' where the party is going is necessary, to be
superior. For those who suggest that he lacks broad appeal one has only to recall his, achievement, which no other senior Tory coul°
equal, in getting a standing ovation from the Child Poverty Action Group: he has the breadth all right, as well as the intelligence.