LETTERS TO THE EDITOR
[Correspcndents are requested to keep their letters as brief as is reasonably possible. The most suitable length is that of one of our " News of the Week " paragraphs. Signed letters are given a preference over those bearing a pseudonym, and the latter must be accompanied by the name and address of the author, which will be treated as confidential.—Ed. THE SPECTATOR.]
YOUTH ON THE CRISIS
[To the Editor of Tire SPECTATOR.] Sia,—In these days of political crises there have been many letters expressing the views of experienced and learned men.
I have not yet seen a letter from any one of those, between the ages of 20 and 3o, who will be called upon to bear the brunt of national endeavour, should the force of events and the policy of our rulers involve us in war. That, Sir, is my excuse for seeking the publicity of your columns.
There seem to be two logical courses open to British Foreign policy. The first is to assert the right claimed by Pitt, Palmerston and Lloyd George, that England should not be treated as if she were " of no account in the Cabinet of Nations." The second is to allow this country to sink to the ranks of a second-class power, to allow others to struggle for world supremacy. At the moment we seem to be pursuing the second while aiming at the first.
Herr Hitler, as Mein Kampf shows, intends to make himself supreme in Central Europe. Without our help there is no Power strong enough to prevent him. If that supremacy means, as it presumably does, that he will obtain political and economic control of Western Czechoslovakia, Schleswig- Holstein and possibly • Hungary and that the other Balkan States, Italy and Poland are bound to him by " axes " we shall find that the balance of power is upset. When Hitler builds a fleet and decides to pick a quarrel with us about South-west Africa we shall have to give in or find ourselves involved in a war with a Germany immeasurably stronger than she is now. If by that time we are still determined not to fight, and acquiesce in Hitler's demands, we shall definitely become a second-class power.
It is perhaps worth considering our position in that eventu- ality. Those who have visited Norway, Denmark and Sweden are agreed as to the essential happiness and freedom which exists there. Possibly it will be an advantage to lack like them the responsibilities of Empire. The British Common- wealth of Nations, bound together by economic ties and the glory of the past, would, it is true, be poorer than now, and she would have to be very careful not to offend Hitler or Mussolini, or their successors. We should find our position in the Near-east precarious, we should probably not be allowed to trade with the Far East except round the Cape of Good Hope. India would seize the opportunity of casting herself adrift. Japan would refuse us access to the China market, Germany would not be a considerate neighbour in South Africa. Certainly our standard of living would go down. We should become more dependent on American good-will and the American tourist. We should have to undergo the dangers of revolution, for it is unlikely that capital or labour would bear such privations with patient equanimity. Nor is there any hope of a proud nation like ours allowing such things to happen without a struggle. No Empire in the past has gone under without struggling and there is no reason why we should provide an exception to the facts of history. So the vision of a Britain as free and happy as Scandinavia is unfortunately Utopian.
There seem to be three moments when Britain could make an effort to stem the tide which is carrying us relentlessly onward to ignominy and disaster.
(r) We could fight Germany when she demanded colonies from us or threatened the territorial integrity of France. In that case, though it is possible that we should win the war, it is almost certain that such an inevitably long-drawn-out struggle would bring European civilisation crashing about our heads, and lead on to conditions of appalling anarchy. In any event a war with a German-controlled Central Europe is a risk that no sane man would willingly run. It is not really possible to suppose that Hitler would be put off by a polite refusal, a dictator is not allowed the luxury of a first- class diplomatic failure. (2) The second alternative is to follow the lead of France. When Hitler decides that the time has come for absorbing the Sudeten Deutsch (not to iinention the vast mineral and timbered wealth of Czechoslovakia) within the bounds of the Reich, France will be faced with an extremely unpleasant situation. If she decides to honour her treaty obligations, the only course open to her is to invade Germany. A war between France and Germany, even though France would be technically the aggressor, would draw us inevitably into the maelstrom. Even if we could put up with German warships and French mines in the Channel, we could not run the risk of seeing France defeated. If we won the war and more important, won the peace, we might save some remnant of European civilisation and retain some leadership for ourselves. A war to be fought relatively soon, before Germany's strength has increased by the control of the economic resources of Central Europe, might not have such cataclysmic results as a war fought on the issue of Imperial, or French, territorial integrity against a Germany which dominated Central Europe.
(3) The third alternative is to state categorically that we shall combine with France, U.S.S.R. and any other nation, which is prepared to help us, to protect Czech independence by every means within our power. It is arguable that a firm statement by this country in 1912 as to our determination to fight for Belgium might have prevented the Greet War. Lord_ Grey of Fallodon's closing years were tormented by the thought that he might by stating beforehand our firmness on the Belgian issue have prevented the great catastrophe which he regarded with such heartfelt horror. It is pro- foundly to be hoped that such torments are not awaiting Lord Halifax or Mr. Chamberlain. The two factors which prevented Sir Edward Grey (as he then was) giving a categorical statement to Germany on the certainty of our protecting Belgian territory were that the Cabinet themselves were not agreed on the question and the electorate might repudiate such an agreement. Once again similar difficulties confront our politicians and they appear to have refused to take any steps to overcome them and seize the one chance of preserving the balance of power in Europe without fighting.
The great theoretical objection, which will be raised against this view, is that we should be maintaining the status quo and further crystallising the acknowledged iniquities of the Treaty of Versailles. Such a policy must therefore be com- bined with some form of treaty revision. We must discover what Hitler really wants and be prepared to make some sacrifices to remedy his justifiable grievances. We must also persuade France to do the same. But we must make it quite clear that these concessions are not granted from a motive of fear ; therefore we must first take a firm stand and show him a united strength. It will probably be our last chance to do so ; if we allow him to increase his strength further he will believe that any concessions granted are ascrib- able to the fear of the blackmailed.
There has been no mention so far of ideals. An explicit support of Czechoslovakia can be justified in terms of enlight- ened national self-interest alone. Undoubtedly there is an idealist basis also. There are a great many young Englishmen who believe in the ideals of freedom for individuals and for nations, and who further believe that this country is looked up to by many smaller nations of Europe as a champion 01 those ideals. They are not prepared to sacrifice their ideals, or their friends, on the altar of a temporary and unheroic immunity. They are afraid that the British lion is becoming an ostrich, whose head is being buried in the sands of isolation because it has been so often smacked by Hitler and Mussolini. With the exception of the Nyon agreement, we have utterly lacked the dignity of determination. Cannot we possibly combine to compensate for our mistakes by a firm stand on constructive principles ?—I am, Sir, yours faithfully,
.1.8 • Princes Gardens, S.W. 7. J. R. P. 241100N.
Previous page
