POLITICAL COMMENTARY

The Future of Mr Heath

By ALAN WATKINS As I write, a Labour victory is regarded as being as inevitable as spring flowers or a tough budget. This is therefore an appropriate time to inquire into the likely condition of the Conservatives in the next few months—indeed in the next few years. Will the Tories panic, or stay calm, or do a bit of both? Will they attempt to dislodge Mr Edward Heath as leader, and, if the attempt is successful, who will replace him? Let us (showing that concern for the welfare and true interests of the Conservative party for which this column is renowned) have a closer look at these questions. And let us begin with what is possibly the most important, and certainly the most in- teresting, of them : what is to happen to Mr Heath? The most convenient way of approaching this question is, first of all, to investigate the current standing of his possible successors.

Now Mr Reginald Maudling—there is no get- ting away from it—has not had a particularly happy election. Perhaps we should not be alto- gether surprised about this, for Mr Maudling has never in any case seemed to be having a particu- larly happy period of opposition. Even so, he has appeared an oddly diminished figure. At the start of the campaign, it will be recalled, he was scheduled to storm the countryside, to be a Con- servative equivalent of Mr George Brown, if that were possible. It was to be Mr Maudling's task to stand in the pouring rain, growing hoarser by the hour but fearlessly overcoming those hordes of schoolchildren whom even the normally in- trepid Mr Brown finds so menacing.

Has Mr Maudling done this? Well, perhaps he has : but if so his feat has gone unsung and un- remarked. None of his campaign speeches has made the slightest impact. (It is only fair to add that exactly the same can be said of most of Mr Maudling's colleagues in the shadow cabinet. One of the features of the campaign has been that shadow ministers, Mr kin Macleod and Mr Quintin Hogg excepted, have played a minor part. Indeed it might almost be claimed that they have not given Mr Heath the backing he deserves. But perhaps Mr Heath prefers it that way.)

On television again Mr Maudling has seemed curiously apologetic, as if his heart was not really in the business. It may be that this is one of those politico-televisual illusions; that what appears as self-confident relaxation in a Chancellor of the Exchequer looks like half-heartedness in an oppo- sition spokesman; but somehow one doubts it. In fact some people are asking how much longer Mr Maudling intends to stay in politics. Recently a friend suggested to Mr James Callaghan that he should appoint Mr Maudling Governor of the Bank of England. 'A brilliant idea,' Mr Callaghan is said to have replied.

So much, then, for Mr. Maudling. What of Mr Enoch Powell? Has he particularly distinguished himself? He did of course make that intervention on Vietnam. The trouble was, however, that in true Powellite fashion his question was framed in terms which for political purposes were far too precise. Thus the Government was able to issue a denial without much difficulty. If Mr Harold Wilson, say, had been in Mr Powell's shoes he would have dropped a hint here, a suggestion

there, an innocent-seeming question somewhere else; without ever saying so, he would have con- trived to suggest that the troopships were already

half way across the Indian Ocean. But all this is in passing. The principal point to take account of is that, Vietnam apart, Mr Powell has made no particular impression on the campaign.

Which brings us to Mr Macleod. Unlike the two previously mentioned politicians, he has won some golden opinions for his television perform- ances. Most of the praise that one hears comes from the television or political professionals.

Though this is pleasant enough music to Mr Macleod's ears, it should be treated with .some reserve; for the opinions of ordinary viewers are frequently in complete contradiction to those of the professionals. Still, let us grant Mr Macleod his television triumph (apart, that is, from his `confrontation' with Mr Callaghan). At the same time he seemed lacking in thoughts or ideas of his own; he was a kind of Central Office Michelmore. As far as television was concerned, admittedly, this was precisely what he was in- tended to be. And yet the same impression persists over a wider field. For the moment, at least, Mr Macleod seems to have settled down to a promin- ent but subordinate role.

I do not want to give the impression of eliminat- ting Mr Heath's possible rivals in too neat a fashion. The position of all or any of them may be quite different in a year's or even in a month's time. Mr Macleod in particular—and especially so if he distinguishes himself in the forthcoming economic debates—may yet be seriously talked about as a leader of the Conservative party. The preliminary point I am concerned to make is that, following the election campaign, none of the likely contenders appears noticeably more im- pressive than Mr Heath.

There are two further reasons, more positive than the one given above, for the relative stability of Mr Heath's position at this moment. First, not only have Mr Heath's potential rivals resolutely refused to glitter, but Mr Heath himself has per- formed rather better than could reasonably have been expected. To a certain extent he has been helped along his path by some lamentable speeches from Mr Wilson : but this is not all. He has run an unexciting but honest campaign which contained one serious mistake. This mistake was to drop the European question as a major issue just when Mr Wilson had shown, particularly in his Bristol speech, that he was embarrassed by it. (Shortly after this speech, instructions went out to Labour ministers to ignore the subject of the Common Market altogether.)

The second reason why Mr Heath now finds himself in a place of comparative safety is that the Conservative party is deeply sick of divisions over the leadership. To change leaders yet again, whatever the merits of the change (say the more candid MPs), would be to make the party look even more ridiculous than it is already. There are many Tory politicians who trace the current situa-

tion of the party back to the events of October 1963. There are some, indeed, who believe that the fault lay, not so much in Sir Alec Douglas-Home being chosen, as in Mr R. A. Butler being passed over for a second time. Nor are these views about the undesirability of change confined to Conserva- tive MPs (or more accurately, in view of the election period, Conservative candidates). Party workers hold the same opinions, if anything even more strongly. Altogether the general view seems to be that whoever suggests a change is due ought to be sat on and have his arm twisted in the manner inculcated at all the best schools.

This is not to say, however, that some trouble will not arise in the next few months. But the trouble is more likely to arise out of policies than out of personalities. Not that one can draw a rigorous distinction. Policies and personalities in- termingle, as they did in the Labour party's disputes during the 1959-61 period. Moreover, though Mr Heath himself will probably escape serious criticism, the same cannot be predicted of some of Mr Heath's assistants. There will un- doubtedly be demands for the resignation of Mr Edward du Cann. (And who would succeed him?

Lord Chelmer, perhaps? Or even Mr Ernest Marples? At any rate, it would seem prudent to

go this time for an established Conservative who did not have to make his way in the party.) Again, Mr Heath's advisers, such as Mr John MacGregor and Mr Peter Walker, may come in for some mild and probably unjustified abuse.

But to return to policy, and Mr Heath's role in relation thereto. From what one can gather, most Tories agree that for the moment the party has quite enough policy to be going on with. Indeed one former Conservative minister believes that it was a mistake for the party to produce so many detailed proposals so soon before an election. It is all very well, says this ex-minister, to talk of Mr Butler and his work after the 1945 defeat : but in that case the country had three years to absorb the results before the 1950 election came along. In 1965-6, on the other hand, the country had a little over six months. Be this as it may, it is fairly clear that what is now needed is for the party to (as it were) un-rethink its policies; that is to say, to refine and reject, to emphasise and underplay. Above all, perhaps, the party should remember that Oppositions rarely if ever defeat Governments: Governments defeat themselves. Or to put it in a slightly different way, it is much

more profitable for an Opposition to point out and criticise a Government's mistakes than to advance detailed policies of its own.

This, it will be remembered, was Mr Wilson's style of opposition; whereas Hugh Gaitskell, particularly in the pre-1959 period, was prone to advance over-detailed policies and hence land himself in difficulties. On this level there is little doubt that the Wilson method is superior. On another level, however, there is room for argu- ment about the two Labour leaders' styles of

opposition. Mr Wilson was—he still is—a party manager. Gaitskell, on the other hand, attempted to recreate his party in his own likeness. Mr Heath does not seem to have made up his mind which type of opposition leader he intends to be. One can hear some Tories say that he now needs to assert himself a little more, to put his mould on

the party, to cut out such dead wood as has not already been cut out by the voters. And one

wonders. It is no doubt fine, stirring advice. But is it entirely wise? The Conservative party is still in a jumpy condition. What the patient now needs, one feels, is a period of rest with as little excite- ment as possible.