IN PRAISE OF SANDLINE
William Shawcross defends 'mercenaries', and an FO man, against the Legg Report IN SIERRA LEONE, the repulsive hood- lums who usurped power until they were driven out last year still seize villagers and ask, 'Do you want short sleeves or long?' If the wretched man, woman or child says 'short', then they hack off his or her arms at the elbow. The forearm falls to the ground. If the answer is 'long', then the machete chops through the wrists and only the hands hit the dust. This is the behaviour of the military gangsters who overthrew the elected government of Sierra Leone in 1997 and whom Peter Penfold, the excellent British High Commissioner in Sierra Leone, and Sandline, the British pri- vate security force known as 'mercenaries', tried to remove from power.
Hats off to Penfold and Sandline — despite the rebukes of this week's Legg Report. But don't forget a complication: the principal part in overthrowing the junta was played by the Nigerian army; it was the late and unlamented General Sani Abacha, who did much to ruin Nigeria in recent years, who did most to restore civil govern- ment in Sierra Leone. All rather confusing for an 'ethical' foreign policy. Perhaps that is why the debate about Sandline and Sier- ra Leone has been so superficial, not to say hypocritical.
Revealing the Legg Report on Monday in the Commons, Robin Cook declared that such a mess would not occur again because the Foreign Office would be reorganised to 'improve the gender and ethnic balance'. What this had to do with the price of machetes in Sierra Leone was unexplained.
He also declared, 'It would be hard to find anywhere on the planet where there is more enthusiasm for Britain than in Sierra Leone.' But that is no thanks to Cook — it is entirely because Peter Penfold is believed by ordinary people there to have played a literally superhuman part in restoring Presi- dent Kabbah. A recent report of a joint EU-US mission to Sierra Leone noted that Penfold 'is now a local hero, a Paramount Chief with a seat in Parliament and the right to marry another nine wives'. The rapporteur said that in 12 years abroad, 'I have never seen a diplomat with this kind of local status and respect.'
Yet Legg and his superiors scapegoated him, if only mildly. Cook's opposite num- ber, Michael Howard, has added to the pitiful, parochial charade. Like Cook him- self and Legg, he has failed to address the real 'ethical' question which the affair rais- es. How can, and should, other countries help places like Sierra Leone which are taken over by murderous gangsters? No one mentions it, but the saga shows how neces- sary it is to rethink the role of private amiies.
In his report, Sir Thomas Legg says that Peter Penfold 'was not sufficiently consci- ous of public and political unease about mercenaries', and should have been much more cautious in his dealings with Sand- line. 'Mercenary' is an inflammatory word which conjures up images of drunken, whoring 'dogs of war'. There are still such disagreeable characters for hire, but today's 'mercenaries' are more likely to be the employees of private military companies which are becoming both reputable and (dare one say it?) essential. Perhaps Sir Thomas did not know that so-called 'mer- cenaries' have been the saviours of Sierra Leone in recent years.
By the mid-Nineties the nihilistic anarchy which had swept Liberia was ravaging Sier- ra Leone. Much of the countryside was terrorised by a shadowy and horrible group known as the Revolutionary United Front, led by an exiled psychotic called Foday Sankoh. Increasingly, these 'rebels' found common cause with unpaid and disaffected soldiers of the regime — so much so that a villager often would not know whether it was a rebel or a soldier who was cutting off his hands. The men with the machetes became known as `sobels'. Such terror got worse and worse until even the military regime despaired and brought in the so- called South African mercenary group, Executive Outcomes, to fight the `sobels'.
Executive Outcomes had begun its suc- cessful work in Angola, where it was crucial in getting the Lusaka Peace Accords signed. In 1995 it contracted to reopen the area around Sierra Leone's diamond mines, one of the country's principal sources of wealth. They were worth their weight in the stones. In their areas, people could live again in peace without fear of having their arms chopped off. Thousands of refugees returned from Guinea and Liberia. The pacification was essential to allow the 1996 elections to take place.
After his election, President Kabbah — a decent, long-time politician and UN official who had returned from exile — made a ter- rible mistake. In a spirit of compromise, he agreed to Foday Sankoh's demand that Executive Outcomes go. The sobels flour- ished again. Just over a year later Kabbah was overthrown by a soldier called Johnny Koroma who allied himself to Sankoh. Kabbah went into bleak exile in Conakry, accompanied by the dedicated Penfold. In Sierra Leone the sobels ruled with terror. It was clear they would continue to do so until they were overthrown. I imagine Pen- fold thought of little else.
Last October, a UN resolution barring the supply of arms to Sierra Leone was passed. The key question is whether this referred to the legitimate government of President Kab- bah as well as the illegal junta. An impor- tant opinion from the legal department of the UN, in May, said it did not. Nonethe- less, an Order in Council made the supply of arms to Kabbah illegal under British law — although Britain, like the rest of the Security Council, was seeking the restoration of Kab- bah. This order is hard to explain in the light of the UN legal opinion.
Last December Kabbah contracted with Sandline for $10 million worth of equip- ment and training. They informed Peter Penfold, who informed the Foreign Office. Under the Order in Council, more should have been done. But in the event, Kabbah was not able to raise anything like $10 mil- lion. Sandline's contribution was to support the Nigerian-led peacekeeping force which got rid of the junta.
Companies like Sandline and Executive Outcomes are becoming more important as governments become increasingly reluctant to risk their own troops in traditional peace-keeping roles. They should be engaged and controlled, as David Shearer argued in a recent Adelphi Paper, Private Armies and Military Intervention. Five thou- sand well-led soldiers could have saved the lives of hundreds of thousands of Tutsi vic- tims of the Rwanda genocide in 1994, according to General Dallaire, the dis- traught UN general who was given none by nervous governments.
'Mercenaries' have saved a lot of hands and arms and lives in Sierra Leone. They have behaved 'ethically'. So has Peter Pen- fold. So, on this occasion, did the Nigerian army. But unspeakable crimes are still being committed with impunity in Sierra Leone. Why? Because the Kabbah govern- ment is not strong enough to stop them — and because people like Mr Cook and Mr Howard are not brave or 'ethical' enough to suggest that 'mercenaries' should do so. Think the unthinkable.
The author is on the board of the Intem&- tional Crisis Group and is completing a book on the United Nations and disorder.
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