THE DIFFICULTY OF FRANCE IN ASIA.
GENERAL CAMPENON, the French Minister of War, was on Wednesday interrogated by the Committee of the Chamber, which is discussing the Tonquin grant, as to his resources for carrying on a war with China. In reply, he made a statement which throws a remarkable and an un- pleasing light on the French position, and confirms in a striking way a statement made by ourselves on May 19th last, which at the time greatly irritated our French friends. It is really the fact that in spite of their enormous expendi- ture on armaments, the French Departments of War and Marine have not the means of carrying out a forward Colonial policy, or of fighting China, without great Euro- pean danger. As we then pointed out, the Minister of War cannot, except in some great emergency, employ the
Regular Army in Asia at all. The vast numbers of trained men who now form that Army consist in great part of Reserves, who cannot be called out except in national danger ; in another part, of undrilled conscripts, who die like flies in a camp ; and in a third part, of men with only a year to serve, who would be useless for a long war. None of these can be taken, and to make up a powerful Corps d'Arm6e the Minister must deprive his regiments of their bones, the men of eighteen months' service, and thus, in the event of European commo- tion, dangerously enfeeble his whole Army. He will not do it, especially as, the Colonies being part of the Department of Marine, he is slightly jealous of surrendering soldiers to an alien authority ; and if he would, the Chamber would not permit a " dislocation " which, expecting, as the Deputies always do, a German attack, they regard with extreme terror. The War Minister and the Minister of Marine are, therefore, when pressed by events or policy, compelled to get together scratch armies, made up of that excellent force the Marines—say 15,000 effectives—that singular but daring body the Foreign Legion, usually 2,500 strong, and a certain number of Volunteers," who draw high pay and are attached where the Departments please. This force, roughly estimated at 20,000 men in all, is now con- fessedly used up. Part garrison the West India Islands, part are fighting and sickening in Tamatave, part control that pande- monium, New Caledonia, and the remainder are in Tonquin, where they are insufficient. There must be from 8,000 to 9,500 of them in Cochin China,—but the authorities there have to garrison Saigon, their own city ; to overawe Hue, the capital of their vassal King ; to garrison Hanoi, the fortress-capital of Tonquin, effectively ; to watch Haiphong, the town guarding the entrance to that mouth of the Red River which they find most convenient ; to garrison Haidzuong, the fortified station which protects the same mouth higher up ; and to supply the Army of action against Bacninh, which, as we now know offi- cially, is defended by Chinese regulars. There are not, there- fore, enough of them. Admiral Courbet has no native auxili- aries worth mention, for his Yellow Flags, or Anarnese, cannot be trusted ; he dare not empty his garrisons, lest the Black Flags should attack them, as they did Haidzuong the other day, and the moment he leaves the river, he must post at least 1,000 men at the landing-place to protect his stores. His actual force would be whittled away to some 3,000 men, with whom to attack a fortress carrying Krupp guns, defended by Chinese, and made as unapproachable as ditches and canals dug in a tropical delta, where the water rises if you stick a spud into the earth, can make it. The force is too small, and we do not doubt the rumour that Admiral Courbet, an ex- cellent officer, trusted, like most experienced sailors, for prudence, as well as valour, has telegraphed that he will not risk a defeat by advancing without more men.
Where is he to get them ? There are 600 Marines nearly due at Haiphong, and 1,200 men in the Red Sea on their way, and it is reported, though we cannot verify this, that 2,400 more have been collected by different expedients in the ports of France. None of these, however, are the material the Admiral wants, except the 600 seasoned Marines ; and, apparently, there are no more to be obtained in time. Admiral Courbet must, therefore, advance, or indefinitely postpone his move- ment; and we are by no means sure that he will not choose the second course. If he does not, he risks a repulse which would be followed by insurrection and massacre ; if he does,the Minister at War has but cold comfort to give him. He told the Committee on Tonquin that he would not touch the Regular Army in France in any case, but that he could find 2,000 troops in Algeria— who, however, cannot be in Tonquin for two months, and who will probably be stopped, for fear of a coming insurrection—
and that if more were required, he "would call for three volunteers from every company of the French Army," and so make up 8,000 men additional. Imagine the time it will take to collect these men from every little barrack in France, the kind of men who will volunteer for a detested service, the want of non-commissioned officers, and the general disorganisation of a drilled crowd like that, and recollect that General Campenon knows war, and we may realise the straits to which the French Ministry is reduced. It is really fighting twelve thousand miles away, with a great empire for opponent, and with the name of France to guard, while it dis- poses of less force than the majority of third-class Powers. Well may M. Ferry say that "the situation is grave," amidst cries and starts from his opponents ; and well may he hint, as he does to all who can read between the lines, that if China would only give him a nominal victory—which Tseng, snub- bed and affronted by all Frenchmen, is in no temper to do— he would gladly be out of Tonquin without beat of drum.
Many of our friends will ask why even the small force avail- able should not serve, as equally small forces have often served the English turn, and we confess to a certain perplexity on that point. It must be remembered, however, that even in Olive's early battles, and in the Mutiny campaigns, we have always had native auxiliaries, and have, therefore, been ex- empt from "fatigue duties ;" that the Chinese Regulars are thoroughly armed, and trained by Europeans—are, in fact, as good as Sikhs—that the Tonquinese are exceptionally daring men, accustomed for ages to a position like that of the Monte- negrins; that all French training has for object the acting in masses ; and that all French officers are disheartened by the singular severity with which French opinion treats those who fail. Allowing for these things, however, there remains something to be explained, and the explanation we believe to be this. The French soldiers, including in a less degree even the Marines, never like this kind of work. They hate to be away from Europe, they see little glory in jungle-fighting, they lose heart in the horrid climate—worse than that of Rangoon before it was drained—and they have some special liability to dysenteric disease and low-fever, which every doctor notices, which has never been explained, but which is, as we believe from the Tunis record, due to the most reckless careless- ness about the water they consume. A small allowance of brandy, instead of their abominable vinegar, and peremptory orders not to drink water unmixed with it, would save half the invaliding which so weakens their expeditions ; but in conscript armies, human life is cheap. It is a pity to see men so brave and so resigned so served, but the Medical De- partment is worse treated in France than even in our own country, till the soldiers dread sickness much more than wounds. Be that as it may, the fact is undeniable that French soldiers in the tropics show little or none of the elasticity they display at home, and that French officers there hate to move forward with visibly inadequate means. It is this which makes a full supply of men so necessary, and General Campenon, with all the will in the world, has, as he frankly admits to the Committee, not got them to send, unless he collects them from all France with a toothcomb. Of course, if things go worse, the difficulty will disappear, for France will use her Regular Army at any risk, and send 50,000 men ; but the Chamber will be crazy with panic, and the Reserves must be called out for garrison duty,—an order which would, even in Prussia, under the iron German disci- pline, create bitter murmurs. The French Ministry are not to blame for their difficulties, which lie deep in the very structure of their State, but they are to blame for at- tempting three wars at once, and still more to blame for refusing to believe, in spite of evidence, that a Monarchy which governs three hundred millions in tranquillity must possess some fighting force. China is weak, as Chinese Gordon told her, because her capital was selected with an eye to Tartary, and not to the sea ; but if France cannot get to Pekin, let her not fight China. Anywhere else, the Empress- Mother can waste men like shells, and not know that they are wasted.
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