Ten Years of NATO
By CHRISTOPHER HOLLIS THE tenth birthday of NATO found the world perhaps in better, but NATO in worse, condi- tion than it was when it was invented. Ten years ago Stalin was still alive. Four years before, the Russians had made themselves masters of half Europe and it was possible to find ominous quota- tions from Stalin's speeches to suggest that they would make themselves masters of the other half if they were not opposed. Whether or not these fears were exaggerated we shall never know, They were at any rate not unreasonable, Disarmed Western Europe was precariously defended by the American atom bomb; but whether, if Europe was invaded, the Americans would dare to use that bomb no one knew. Everyone knew that sooner or later the Russians would have the bomb too. Therefore, if Europe was to be secure it was essential that she should build up her own defences.
Today Europe is vastly more pr.osperous than she was ten years ago, but far from having achieved economic unity. The military and economic strength of Russia is also vastly greater than ten years ago; and though it is as nearly certain as anything can be that she is not planning a direct military invasion of the West, the Western powers have reason to be alarmed at the dangers of the Far East, the Middle East and Africa. They have failed, too, to provide them- selves with conventional weapons; and they are divided among themselves. The old year has gone out with a fierce battle between the Americans and the French on military policy and military leak- ages; and in that battle the British arc not able to play a part, whether to side with one side or the other or to mediate, because British policy has been fatally weakened by our possession of the independent nuclear deterrent. ever there should be a Russo-American war. It is equally certain that by possessing the act!, rese . bomb we do not make ourselves a more effectiNc or more powerful ally of the Americans. There tlini ll' is a strange belief, prevalent alike among some ''' friends and among some enemies of the bomb,' _ 'll that the Americans want us to have it. Nothing not could be more false. Our possession of the bornh aill adds nothing to the offensive power of the West,wea The Americans already possess what we can. out out exaggeration, call an infinite power 01 and destruction, and to add a little bit to infinity is ce,ek to add nothing. Infinity plus one is no greater that """( infinity. Your enemy cannot be more dead than wmor dead. On the other hand the Americans arc b'ns justifiably frightened of a Russian attack on then' r7 and therefore dislike other powers being able to (2'1' ( , to11( trigger off such an attack by a nuclear attack 0; than their own. Ever since Suez they have been reason- L-aa ably nervous of the fact that we are in such 3 ,,for, position, even as we are nervous of the French ' a The point of our possessing the bomb has nev been coherently explained. Sometimes we haV been told that we must possess it in order that vd should be able to pursue a policy independent America. Sometimes we have been told that tam the most tin-pot of campaigns for more th cannot be true and obviously, in fact, neither ir Hqu.e true. No one can be so mad as to suggest filo' b °r with our nuclear weapons we could make war 00 ca.sr ' er that without American support we could not sus must possesS it in order that we may play our part as loyal allies of America. Both explanatio esr Russia without American support. Suez proved osofle at' b tb three days. The nuclear weapon is useless to LP for offensive purposes, and far from giving tis lgarr security our possession of it only makes it more n.°,ss certain that the Russians would blot us out i--ea havi being in such a position. If we should act indepen- dently, the Americans would obviously and reasonably try to dissociate themselves from us, but whether they would be able to escape the consequences is obviously doubtful. They prefer that the possibility of the experiment should not exist. The Americans, in fact, do not want nuclear allies. They want non-nuclear allies—capable of making their contribution of conventional forces to the prevention of small wars.
For what purpose is it possible that we shall ever use our nuclear bombs? No one can seriously believe that we would ever be so insane or so Wicked as to use them first, or that we could pos- sibly survive if we did. To do so would, as Sir John Cowley truly said, be to commit 'suicide. Equally, no one can believe that we should ever be in a position to use them as a retaliation; we t should not be alive to do so. The position is 1 already such that a single attack would destroy us. Therefore our present defence programme of reliance on 'the unique deterrent,' which is no deterrent at all, is entirely useless, and it is not unreasonable to complain, even of a Government, that it should be spending £1,500,000,000 a year on something that is not worth twopence.
But the truth is really worse than that. Not only has our defence programme brought us no strength; it has greatly added to our weakness. It has done so in two ways. First, while it may be— or it may not be—that the Government learnt more political lessons at Suez than it has seen ht to confess, defence policy since Suez has 'got not better but worse. In order to equip ourselves with this 'unique deterrent' we have cut down on the conventional equipment which might be useful, and in which Suez revealed that we were already woefully deficient.
By 1961 our Army will be reduced to 175,000 men. That is 10,000 below the minimum figure desired by the Army Council. We are, in conse- quence, without adequate strategic reserves. The Hong Kong garrison is a token. The Singapore base is totally dependent on local labour. The Gibraltar garrison is reduced to a sufficient num- ber to change the guard. In spite of the obligations solemnly assumed at the time of the formation of Western European Union we have reduced our garrisons in Germany with the consequence of a loss of influence in Europe. Nor have we any means of moving such troops as we possess. We have available two landing ships troops, three in reserve and four on lease—all built in 1944 for an active service of eighteen months. We are, in fact, unilaterally disarmed—at a cost, I repeat, of £1,500,000,000 a year. We are worse than disarmed. Few people in Britain, I think, doubt that General de Gaulle's ambition to equip his country with nuclear Weapons not because he has any sane use for them but simply as a matter of prestige is both dotty and dangerous—dotty in itself and dangerous because it is all but certain that other nations will follow his example, and the ultimate danger of a World of nuclear powers needs no emphasis to _those who have read or seen On The Beach. Yet how can our Government say anything in criticism of General de Gaulle's policy when he is merely following in our footsteps? How can our Opposi- tion say anything in criticism of it when it was ,rd Attlee who first committed us to this policy of atoms for prestige'?
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