Civil and Military
THE ability of American statesmen to control the activities of the military who are constitutionally their subordinates has been much debated in the United States in recent years. Mr. Spanier's im- portant study of the circumstances and conse- quences of the dismissal of General MacArthur by President Truman is a contribution to this debate, rather than a new historical investigation of circumstances ,already pretty well known. In- deed, the one point of comparative novelty—Mr. Spanier's view that the United States before Korea was clearly envisaging a policy of trying to divide Communist Russia from China, in part by jettisoning the Formosa government—is not substantiated by any hard evidence. On the other hand, he has no difficulty in proving that the price of getting rid of MacArthur, a step that the general's own conduct had made inevitable unless civilian control were to become meaning- less. was to abjure any flexibility in Far Eastern policy. The attack mounted on the administration by MacArthur and his supporters in Congress, notably Senator Taft, was so menacing that it could only be fought off by bringing in the Chiefs of Staff as the Administration's chief defenders, and by denying any intention of modifying American policy towards Peking. In that sense Eisenhower himself, although able to make peace in terms of less than total victory, which Truman could not afford to do, has subsequently been a prisoner of his own party's partial victory.
But the interest of Mr. Spanier's book is not limited to the issue of how best to fight Com- munism in the Far East, which was thg one over which Truman and MacArthur clashed. He examines the wider question of what it was in American political and military thinking that made such a clash possible. He finds the answer, as others have found it in relation to other such problems, in the sharp division made by the American democracy as a whole between foreign policy and war. If this division is absolute, physical force is only a last resort, but then it must be total; nothing short of complete victory can suffice and any attempts to limit commanders in their use of means amounts to civilian 'inter- ference.' Since 'limited wars' are in the present State of international relations more likely than total ones, this doctrine is hopelessly unsuited to the present age; but much effort will have to be put into the task of converting some of the mili- tary, and much of Congress and of public opinion, to this view. The separation of powers in the American constitution, with the temptation it pre- sents to ambitious soldiers to seek support from he political opposition, is a prime obstacle to proper civilian control both of defence and of the foreign policy that is now largely made in the course of taking military dispositions.
Admiral Theobald's book helps one to under- stand why many of the American military are sus- picious of politicians. In their standard history of America's pre-war diplomacy, Messrs. Langer and Gleason write of Japan's attack on Pearl Harbour: 'it remains inexplicable that respon- sible military authorities should have been taken so completely by surprise.' Admiral Theobald Offers an explanation. The likelihood of such an *Hack was, he maintains, overwhelmingly plain ttt Washington as a result of the breaking of the Papanese codes. The two chiefs of staff, Admiral Stark and General Marshall, were too well versed
in their craft not to see that all such information was made available at Pearl Harbour. The only reason for their behaviour in the preceding weeks, and in the final very curious twenty-four hours in Washington, could have been orders from above, that is, from their constitutional Commander-in- Chief, President Roosevelt. In other words, in order to make sure that when the inevitable war with Japan arrived he would be followed by a united people, President Roosevelt was prepared to offer up the Pacific Fleet as bait. As an explana- tion of the facts, it makes sense; and yet the tremendous risks involved seem out of harmony with what we know of the personalities involved. The final secret remains a secret.
MAX BELOFF
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