1 JULY 1916, Page 12

TOPICS OF THE DAY.

THE MINISTERIAL CRISIS AND THE DUTY OF UNIONISTS.

TORD SELBORNE'S resignation owing to disagreement with the Government's Irish policy has not, we are glad to say, been followed by that of any of his Unionist colleagues, and it is our strong hope that it will not be found necessary for them to follow his example. We respect his motives, but we are bound to say that in our opinion his action was premature and so mistaken.

The situation during the last three weeks has been so delicate, and the issues involved so full of peril to the country, to the Unionist Party, to Ireland, and, most important of all, to the carrying on of the war with that efficiency which alone can come from concentration of mind and effort in our rulers, that we have hitherto avoided anything but the barest allusions to the subject of Mr. Lloyd George's negotiations. We think, however, that the time has now come when we shall do more good than harm by stating quite frankly our view of the situation, and what we believe to be the duty of patriotic men, whether Unionists or Liberals. In the first place, we feel bound to state our opinion that the Prime Minister, though no doubt he acted with the very best of intentions, made a grave error in reversing the decision taken at the beginning of the war to apply a moratorium to Irish politics—to insist that while the war continued no more should be heard about putting the Home Rule Bill into operation, and that no opportunity should be given for the breaking out of bitter controversies. The inclusion of the Unionist leaders in the Cabinet, on the one hand, and the refusal to apply compulsory service to Ireland, lest it should raise the political issues involved in Home Rule, on the other, must be regarded as practical endorsements of the policy of the political moratorium. Then came the Irish Rebellion, and the temptation to Mr. Asquith to use the new situation it created as an opportunity for Irish reconciliation. We understand the temptation, but we are compelled to say that we believe that the Prime Minister erred in yielding to it. In spite of all his difficulties, and we are not going to minimize them, or to say that any course was easy or unfraught with dangers, he had much better have stuck to his original resolve, and told the Nationalists of all types, whether moderates or extremists, that nothing they could do would deflect him from his determination to have no Irish politics till the war was over. He should have stated plainly that he was determined to listen neither to threats of further risings, nor to anxious forebodings that if nothing were done to help the party which believed in a Parliamentary solution all Ireland would become Sinn Fein. Very possibly the result would have been a further rising ; but if that had taken place we should have had plenty of power to deal with it, and we must never forget that no one who knows Ireland is prepared to say that we shall avoid a rising even if Mr. Asquith's policy is completely successful at Westminster. Again, who will dare to declare that we shall be sure to avoid, what we admit would be a misfortune per se, the ruin of the Irish Parliamentary Nationalists through a successful issue to Mr. Lloyd George's negotiations I However, it is no good to cry over spilt milk. The Prime Minister yielded to the temptation to try to use the existing situation as an oppor- tunity for conciliation and agreement by all Irish parties, and, perhaps most important of all, as an opportunity to get the Ulster problem out of the way. He abandoned the moratorium and entrusted Mr. Lloyd George with the work of negotiating a scheme for at once setting up Parliamentary government in Ireland, minus the homogeneous Protestant and Unionist area generally known as the six counties, for that in effect is what the settlement means. That is the Parliamentary project which is hanging in the balance. In view of these facts, what Unionists have now to ask themselves is, not whether Mr. Asquith made a mistake, but what, in all the circumstances, and remembering that at this very moment we are at the crisis of the war, is their duty, not as members of the Unionist Party, but solely as patriotic men. In our opinion, it is their duty to say : "Though we think the path chosen perilous, and though we think it would have been far wiser not to have entered upon it just now, if the Coalition Government, including the most trusted leaders of the Unionist Party, ask for our support in making the experiment, we must give it to them free of all mental reservations, and with the resolve, when the work is once entered upon, to go through with it, provided always that two essential conditions are observed. The first of these is that the most solemn pledges shall be given that the homogeneous Ulster area known as the six counties shall not only be exempt from the operation of the Home Rule Bill and shall remain under the Parliament at Westminster, but that no attempt shall subse- quently be made to force that area under the Dublin Parliament. Only if that area changes its mind and itself asks in unmistakable terms for inclusion shall the pledges of exclusion be withdrawn. Otherwise exclusion must be permanent. The other essential condition that Unionists have a right to insist on, and must insist on, is that the most absolute guarantees shall be given for the preservation of law and order in that part of Ireland whick is to pass under the Dublin Parliament." Here Lord Croinor and the Peers associated with him who signed the letter which appeared in last Saturday's newsvapers may be ea:d to have put their finger upon the essential point. If under existing conditions those who rise in rebellion and disturb tho peace, or conspire to disturb it, are to be tried by Irish juries, they can never be brought to justice. And they know it and will act accordingly. Unless some system other than trial by jury is to prevail in Ireland, promises in regard to stable civil government and for the preservation of law and order are worthless. It is further essential not only that a competent body of troops shall remain in Ireland under ths direct orders of the Imperial Government, and that the Irish Constabulary shall also remain under Imperial control, but that the Defence of the Realm Act shall be not merely applicable to Ireland, but shall remain, as it now is, applied to Ireland, and not be removable by the action of the Dublin Executive. With the six-counties area exempted, and with the machinery which we have named for preserving law and order and for meeting armed rebellion intact, the Government experiment, even if it remains a perilous one, will be one of mitigated danger.

And now comes a point which it is of the utmost moment that Unionists should bear in mind, and which if properly understood should steady public opinion. What sane and patriotic men have got to fix their eyes upon just now is not newspaper babble about the negotiations between the Irish Unionists and Ulstermen on the one hand, and the National- ists, both moderates and extremists, on the other, but the wording of the Parliamentary Bill which will be introduced as the result of these negotiations. The promises asserted to have been made to this or that man or group, or the alleged understandings or misunderstandings, matter comparatively little. What does matter is the treaty or compact which is to result from the negotiations and be laid down in the clauses of an Act of Parliament. We have got to look to the terms 4 the treaty and not at the preliminary pourparlers. The two Houses of Parliament have to give their assent to any Bill before it becomes law, and that assent has not been antici- pated or pre-empted by the negotiations. When we say this we do not mean that a majority, either in the Commons or the Lords, would be morally or politically justified in wrecking a compromise which may have been arrived at by Mr. Lloyd George merely on the ground that they, like us, regret the Government's resolve to experiment at such a time as this in a political settlement in Ireland. What, however, they can do, and we feel sure they will do, is to see to it that the Act of Parliament establishes in unmistakable terms the double safe- guard ef which we have spoken—i.e. : (1) the permanency of the exclusion of the six-counties area, and (2) guarantees for the maintenance of law and order in Ireland and for the preven- tion of armed revolt by means of the presence of British troops and the maintenance of the Royal Irish Constabulary, who, it Will be remembered, are by the provisions of the Home Rule Aot already placed under the control of the Imperial Government.

The position in which the Unionist leaders in the Cabinet are now placed is one of extreme difficulty, and calls for the sympathy and support of the Unionist rank-and-file. We de not suppose that any of them like the experiment any more than we do, or are any more optimistic in regard to what is likely to be its outcome. That being so, resignation mtua offer them great temptations. It would be the easy course, and the course which on merely personal grounds would pay best. We hold, however, that in the existing circumstances, and provided of course that the guarantees which we have demanded are given fully, their duty is not to yield to this temptation, but to let their conduct be governed by what we must call war considerations. After all, the essential fact just now, the fact that must never be allowed to fall into the background, is not only that we are at war, but that we have reached the very crisis of the war. If we make a Woe step at this moment, or if we fail in maintaining a concentra- tion of energy at the centre of Government, we may easily throw away all that we have gained of late. The Unionist leaders must remember that if we make an unsuccessful experiment in Irish politics, the results, though mischievous in a high degree, can be put right. If we make a blunder in the war, we may be lost for ever. If we go over the edge of the wall on the war side, we must be dashed to pieces on the rocks. If we go over the edge on the Irish side, we shall merely fall into a muddy ditch. We may conceivably, be drowned therein, but it is not certain death like the fall over the precipice. What, then, the Unionist leaders and the Unionist Party at their backs must first of all consider is the necessity of getting back to the waging of the war with the utmost deter- mination and concentration of mind. It is no use for people to say that this is now a matter in the hands of the soldiers and can be safely left to them. To say : "They will pull us through, no matter how the politicians may be scuffling and shrieking at Westminster," is madness. The action of the soldiers will be paralysed if they are not able to feel that the Government upon whom they depend are giving their whole and undivided attention to the prosecution of the war. Provided, then, that the essential guarantees which we have named are maintained, it is, in our opinion, the duty of Unionists, even if their hearts are full of anxiety and foreboding, to let the Government experiment go forward, and think only of how to beat our enemies.