We do not pretend that the comments are all favour-
able, but no harm can come of the discussion, and very much good may be done if the idea builds itself up in the public mind that an alliance is the only logical culmination to the stress of forces which compels France and Great Britain in all circumstances to march together. It is as well from the very outset of such a discussion that it should be understood that British opinion would not be agreeable to the condition of alliance -suggested by a certain school of French politicians. That condition is that Great Britain should guarantee a quota of military strength such as we could not produce except on the terms of a conscript Army. Great Britain, whose para- mount concern is her Navy, could nut offer for co-operation with France in case of need anything more than a very efficient moderate-sized expeditionary force. We might with equal justice demand an increase of French naval strength. We trust, therefore, that the question of guaranteeing quotas on either side may be disregarded and that attention may be concentrated on the important
object of effecting a purely peace-preserving alliance, binding together, for defence alone, the two countries with their naval and military resources, whatever they may happen to be ,on an independent computation of national needs. Wo have written more fully of the Mediterranean question elsewhere.
