LETTERS TO THE EDITOR.
" COMMAND OF THE SEA."
[To THE EDITOR 07 TIER "SPACTATOR.] Six,--May I venture to criticise the able article on the Navy in your last issue P Its spirit is right, but its maxims seem to me to be at variance with a considerable body of naval thought. The writer says that the only way to secure our- selves absolutely is to obtain command of the sea. There is no such thing as command of the sea. There is such a thing as command of a sea. Again, he says that our ships must be kept close to the points where the ships of a Power able to dispute with us the command of the sea may be found. This idea was very common in the 'nineties till it collided with the login of reality in the Spanish-American and Russo-Japanese Wars. The focus point of strategical consideration is not fleets at all, but maritime areas. The command of certain areas is necessary for offensive or defensive operations. If the enemy's fleet interferes with these operations it is the business of our fleet to deal with it. The North Sea is to us an area of maximum importance because we must guard ourselves against invasion and secure our great trade terminals. The writer seems to say that our fleet is in the North Sea solely because the enemy's fleet is there. It is not. If the enemy's fleet were at Timbuctoo or in the moon it might stay there and bake for all we care. Again, in the maxim at the end of the article, that "the fleet must be kept close to the points where the ships of any Power able to dispute with us the command of the sea are to be found," there appears piled on top of the "enemy's fleet" fallacy the fallacy of the "close blockade."
The old-timers used to say, and persist in saying still, that "the flare of our fleet is off the enemy's coast." Russia and Spain thought so and left their fleets there. Close blockades are things of the past. Torpedoes, submarines, mines, and aeroplanes have blown the idea to bite, but apparently cannot get it out of the heads of a certain school of naval writers. I would like to substitute for the maxims at the end of the writer's otherwise interesting article a single interrogatory: What are the maritime areas of importance to us in the degree of their importance According to the degree of their importance they must be commanded by us. If the enemy's fleet comes out and dis- putes our command it must be mopped up. The problem which bothers us at present is that, though the North Sea is an area of maximum importance, the Mediterranean is also of great importance, as it is one of our biggest wheat roads and also the Eastern highway.
The control of that sea is prospectively threatened by the growing navies of Powers allied with our possible opponent in the North Sea. The strain will come on the hawser at Malta and Egypt. Punch seems to think the occupation of an .gean island a very small thing. It is a matter of consider- able importance if Italy is going to face us in the Mediter- ranean. Malta was considered strongly fortified in the 'nineties, but it is doubtful if its defences could stand the attack of forty 12-inch guns. In fact it is pretty certain they could not. The old island up the Straits has nothing bigger than a 9.2 inch, and not too many of them.
That is the problem, and it is not wholly solved by merely concentrating our fleet in the North Sea and then viewing it with the optimistic eye of the writer of your article.—I am, (Lieutenant R.N.).
New College, Oxford.
[We have referred to this letter in our first leading article. .—ED. Spectator.]
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