THE SPECTATOR
GORBACHEV'S MODEL
Mr Gorbachev has opened the new era in characteristic Soviet fashion: by denouncing his predecessor, without ever actually naming him. Once again, the aspiring young apparatchiks, the Russian Vicars of Bray, must learn some new language. What was right yesterday is wrong today. It is in truth difficult to dissent from Mr Gorbachev's castigation of the late Brezhnev and Chemenko years, the 'inertia', the 'immobility' and the growth of bureaucracy. 'If you stand still you go a verst backwards,' said Mr Gor- bachev. That, in plainer language, is what the rest of the world has been saying about the Soviet Union for the last few years. Mr Gorbachev's denunciation of his predeces- sor is not half so dramatic as that made by Mr Nikita Khrushchev of his predecessor exactly 30 years ago. (Nor need it be: ttrezhnev's crimes are hardly comparable his Stalin's.) More important, however, ms prescription for change is also far less radical than was Khrushchev's, and cer- tainly far less 'reformist' — let alone `liberal' — than we have been led to expect ut the West. On foreign policy much of his speech could have come straight from the Mouth of Mr Brezhnev. Dashing some of the unrealistic hopes raised by the Geneva summit, he was (strange reversal) more dismissive of President Reagan's latest Proposals on European nuclear disarma- Ment than the White House has been of his own utopian proposals for abolishing all nuclear weapons by the next century. The United States he described as a locomo- tlYe of militarism'. He also sustained at full !Moll the long-running Soviet propaganda theme of wooing Western Europe away from the United States. Yet this is not surprising. If he does have a realistic i)utinpromise on arms control in mind, the arty Congress is not the place for him to announce it. Most of the 5,000 delegates assembled before him would have little part in its implementation. On the domes- tic front, however, their contribution will be vital. And here they did receive their marching orders. More dynamism, more discipline, more initiative, more productiv- ity: these are the new leader's demands. He called for a 'necessary and radical reform of the economy'. There are three questions to be asked of his prescription for the next few years. What kind of reform does Mr Gorbachev have in mind? Is it possible? And even if it is possible, is it desirable? To the first, the provisional reply must be: much less than many people thought. There is no hint in his speech that Mr Gorbachev wishes to follow the Hunga- rians down the path of a genuinely radical reform, decentralising economic decision- making, introducing market forces and even encouraging a marginal reprivatisa- tion. Not in the industrial sector, at least. Here the East European 'model', if there is one, would seem rather to be East Ger- many or Bulgaria, with their industrial combines co-ordinated by new super- ministries, which ensure even stronger central party-state control. Can it work? Self-evidently there is some more to be got out of Soviet industry by more dynamic management, stricter work discipline and the introduction of new technologies. But we doubt whether such 'adjustments' are at all sufficient to enable the Soviet Union to reverse the trend of recent years, and increase its rate of growth not only in absolute terms but also relative to its main competitors, the United States, Western Europe, Japan, and, last but by no means least, China. Moreover, politbureaucratic changes which bring good results in small, compact, highly centralised states like East Germany will not necessarily bring compa- rable results in a huge, sprawling multina- tional empire like the Soviet Union. Some optimistic Western Gorbachev-watchers say Mr Gorbachev himself knows this perfectly well. He will try this course for a year or two, while fully consolidating his power, and then, armed with the proofs of its relative failure, move on to the genuine- ly radical Hungarian-style reforms which he inwardly desires. We shall believe that when we see it. Meanwhile, we should ask ourselves most seriously the third question: even if it is possible, is it desirable? The received wisdom of most Western obser- vers and policy-makers seems to be that it is. A 'reformed' and modernised Soviet Union would be more secure and therefore less dangerous, more 'Western' and there- fore more free. We question this wisdom. Obviously we would like the Soviet people to live better. But the experience of the last decade in Eastern Europe has shown that — contrary to one of the original dogmas of détente — there is no necessary connec- tion between modernisation and 'liber- alisation' let alone democratisation. For the peoples of Eastern Europe, a revital- ised, strong imperial centre may be more of a hindrance than a help. Moscow may strive to reimpose uniformity and central control — Mr Gorbachev is already trying to do this in Comecon — and curb their various wanderings. Moreover, a modern- ised and re-tooled Soviet Union might indeed feel more secure and therefore more inclined to take risks abroad, en- dangering us all. So maybe we should after all be thankful that Mr Gorbachev's speech falls short of the great expectations raised by Mrs Gorbachev's pearls. Perhaps the quicker he comes to resemble his geriatric predecessors, the better for us — and, ultimately, the better for the people living under Soviet domination.
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