THE DEFENCES OF INDIA

LETTERS TO THE EDITOR

[Correspondents are requested to keep their letters as brief as is reasonably possible. The most suitable length is that of one of our " News of the Week" paragraphs. Signed letters are given a preference over those bearing a pseudonym.—Ed. Tim SPECTATOR.] [To the Editor of THE SPECTATOR.] Sia,—The Statesman of Calcutta has recently taken the lead in calling attention to the potential dangers which face modern India, by the regrouping of Powers elsewhere, by the reduction in the British Navy in the supposed " interests of Peace," and by the grave menace of War both in Europe and in Asia. A competent authority has recently contributed a remarkable article on India's defences which may be sum- marised as follows, under ten appropriate headings.

1. Naval Forces in Indian Waters.—The Senior Naval Officer is dubbed a " Commander-in-Chief " and his position is so exalted that he must be addressed as " His Excellency " and, no doubt, the immense importance of his command, strategically considered, fully warrants these honours. But what forces has he at his disposal ? It would perhaps suffice to say that even with the whole of those forces actually in Indian waters he is no better off than was MS predecessor on the same station at the outbreak of war with Germany in 1914.

And what does that mean ? The War broke out with one somewhat important ship locked up in dock for repairs. The rest of our small forces did not prevent a single cruiser— near there was only one near enough to give much trouble— damage doing- large-scale damage on the Indian trade-routes. Today these ridiculously small forces are all we have to look to in a position which has altered in every way for the worse. At the moment, as the n ire world, except the Indian taxpayer, knows, every ship of any real utility on this station is in African waters, keeping an eye on the Italians in their great adventure against a relatively defenceless people.

2. The Ports.—In 1914 we had no dock in India outside of Bombay capable of dry-docking any fair-sized modern warship. Twenty-two

years have passed and we are in the same preposterous position today in that regard. There is, in fact, nothing nearer than Singapore which, from the exposed flank of India, is, at a moderate consumption of fuel nearly a week's steaniing.

In a modern sense her ports are nnfortified. With the exception of Bombay her principal commercial ports are not fortified at all. Vizagapata, a new, most important and most tempting deep-water harbour, should have been put into an efficient state of defence long ago. It. is an open port today. Calcutta has no which could be called defences.

3. Home Waters, Estuaries and Coast Defence.—There are no arrangements for mine-laying on any modern scale and none for mine-sweeping. There are no civilian craft. e.g., any steam fishing fleets upon which the authorities could rely and which they could take over and utilise for these duties. Nobody with any candour and honesty can pretend that a couple of sloops and the few relatively insignificant units in point of gun-power which now make up what used to be called the " Royal Indian Marine " (now styled " Royal Indian Navy ") are more than barely sufficient adequately to patrol one of India's great coastlines, even in peace. There are no coast- guards.

4. Aerial Defence and the Air .4rm.—All the commercial towns are open to aerial attack. Nor are the port towns any better positioned. Oil supply, stocks of coal, strategic railway centres are alike left without any protection, whether static in the form of anti-aircraft batteries with their necessary searchlights, or mobile in having the aid of air squadrons.

3. The Army in India, as all the world knows, consists of the Indian Army plus a number of units from the British Army. These units do not arrive as tactical formations but are just so many battalions of infantry, regiments of cavalry or batteries of artillery. As in the case of British warships out here, there is nothing from which British casualties can be replaced from depots maintained in. India.

It is, of course, otherwise with the Indian Army ; but that Army is in process of what is described as " Indianisation." And at the moment it is, in consequence, not in any ultimate sense a homogeneous force. Speedier Indianisation would mean handing it over at India's weakest moment to officers

who were wholly without training in the higher command of troops, and in large scale administrative duties wholly without experience. Such training and such experience consumes many years of a professional soldier's life under any known military, system.

Indian Artillery, heavy, medium and field, has yet to be created. Only a somewhat sketchy foundation has been laid.

6. Mechanised Tactical Units.—No mechanised modern tactical unit of any scale has yet reached or been formed in

India ; and the problem of its maintenance, repair and. reinforcement (if and when it arrives) must be one of no small difficulty to solve.

7. Arsenals, Gun, Shell, Rifle and Ammunition Factories.— The Arsenals are. relatively few and for the most part are in the wrong places. The armament and munition factories are inadequate both in number, size, and in sufficiency of plant. India is not in any modern sense industrialised. She is badly off for coal and has never utilised her water power. To maintain an adequate supply of munitions whether for the Navy, Army, or Air Force means transportation over six thousand miles.

8. Stares.—To meet the ill-informed demand of India's" politicians for a reduction in the total annual cost of her defences, the dangerous expedient was resorted to of allowing stores to be used up without adequate provision for replace- ment on an intelligent mobilisation scale. They are now depleted below danger point 9. Medical.—The staff of I.M.S. doctors capable of taking the Field has already been reduced below what the Corps itself considers safe. A Corps of trained Nurses capable of working under active service conditions does not exist.

10.—Railways.—Strategically the Northern Indian systeni of railways are well adapted for military movements out of areas of partial concentration into areas of strategic deploy- ment in a north-westerly direction ; only because all of -the aforesaid areas lie west of the bottle neck represented by the great railway junction at Moghalserai. On the other hand, they are at present ill-adapted for concentration and still worse adapted for deployment in the direction of India's eastern and south-eastern frontiers. It may be a sea frontier, for the most part ; but it represents the exposed flank today.

Such briefly is the truth about India's defences—the truth about her resources. The whole country has been lulled into a sense of security—a false security. So much so that a distinguished member of the Council of State recently moved a resolution in the Council to reduce India's Military expendi- ture from 43 crores to 9 crores. And some years ago Mr. Gandhi told the present writer that he would fight every invader of India by presenting him with a aharka" (a spinning wheel). The authorities at present have very little more to offer by way of resistance to an invading Power.—I