The Case for Attack
Defence Will Not Win the War. By W. F. Kernan. (Heinemann. 6s.) Tins little book by a lieutenant-colonel in the U.S.A. Army has been very widely read and discussed in America, and has played its part in gradually turning American public opinion in favour of an offensive against Germany. The author argues his case vigorously, and although by now many of his points are familiar in this country, their striking formulation in a popular—at times too popular—form will be found stimulating by the British reader. Lieutenant-Colonel Kernan's main contention is that Mahan's theory of the supremacy of seapower has no absolute validity. In his view, it merely reflects the state of affairs which has been in existence from the downfall of Napoleon until the rise of Hitler. In the 125 years of this period no really " total " war was fought ; that is no war involving the risk of absolute annihilation of the vanquished by the victor. But when- ever a conflict breaks out in which one side is out for conquest on a continental scale, and for the utter subjection of the conquered, as in the case of the Persians of antiquity, of the Saracens, of Spain, &c., and now of Hitler's Germany, the defensive strategy of sea- power and of the Chinese Wall stands no chance, and means at best only doom deferred. Nothing will save the intended victims counter-onslaught on the same scale, and total defeat of the ag on land.
This view leads the author to some practical conclusions the present war, some of which will be more readily accepted others. Not everybody will agree with his opinion that F would have defeated Hitler's armies by an all-out offensive in She might conceivably have done so if in the place of a G she had been led by a Turenne or a Napoleon. It is true, of c that theories of defensive warfare flourish most in times of me generalship. The modern idea of staff-conducted wars, all car planned in advance on a safety-first principle, against Lieutenant-Colonel Kernan is at his most caustic, is no dou by-product of the scientific era. Great captains have at all inclined to lay more stress on the art than on the science of Yet surely there is some begging of the question here. To the field against strong material superiority demands a sold' genius, and genius is more difficult to produce at will than and engines of war designed to restore equality.
The final chapters, which advocate the immediate invasi Italy by an American armoured force of 400,000 men, carry the conviction. Only the promise of swift and overwhelming s could justify the choice of Italy for invasion in preference to points of attack much nearer to the vital centres of Germany. failure to smash Rommel's Germans and Italians in Libya is encouraging in looking for results which might be achieved Italian soil, where enemy lines of supply would be immune naval attack. Italy has indeed been the theatre of one of the spectacular invasions of all times, when Garibaldi in 186o achi the lightning conquest of the Kingdom of Naples with a th ill-armed volunteers landed on the coast of Sicily, but forty y of political strife had paved the way. A present-day invasion Italy might look more hopeful if the Allies could count on the a sympathy of the population. It is doubtful if this can be gained the kind of appeal made hitherto. For the time being, the figh of the Italians seems to have improved rather than deteriorated the course of the war. It is a fact which invites reflection.
ALAN R
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