THE CAMPAIGN IN BURMA
By STRATEGICUS
the gravity of the campaign in Burma is only now beginning to be appreciated it is not because the strategical importance of country has not been recognised from the first. It is because in the last ten days has it begun to appear doubtful if even a er link can be preserved between a great ally and his main base pply in India. It is probably true that when Japan first crossed Salween some three months ago it was with the idea of the ediate defence of Malaya then in her hands. The Kra peninsula cry narrow, and the Allied aeroplanes appeared to be over-enter- ing for its security. The airfields in Burma had to be neutralised e immediate threat to the land link with Japanese supply and orcements was to be removed. But, after over two years of , no one requires any further education in the military idea of ant defence and the ambitious ways in which it tends to expand. seems certain that from the first Japan must have shaped her s on lines that give effect to such ideas and if, as we must assume, intends to assimilate Malaya, Siam and Burma, have their place them. Siam, as at present constituted, is necessary for the safety the Malay peninsula ; and it is pretty certain that Burma would be absorbed if Japan were to be victorious. These dreams are, ever, of less interest than the immediate problem of Burma. can no more be blind to the obvious role of Burma than are Allies. It represents the isthmus which joins the base of India our great ally. If this isthmus can be cut, it is difficult to see China can be supplied or reinforced and how she can continue play any great part in the Allied plans and in her own resurrection. Burma was described in the Simon report as a country cut off from is by " sea, mountain and jungle. Its land frontiers form a tically impassable barrier, and it is invariably reached from is by sea." Communications have appreciably changed since report was drafted ; but in general the conditions remain the e. It may be possible to get a trickle of supplies to Burma direct India, and by air more considerable supplies might be trans- • ed ; but to keep great armies in the field in modern war necessi- es immense quantities of materiel. Rangoon was captured about en weeks ago, and from that time the hope of the Allies was built n the chance of holding the Japanese off vital objectives suffi- tly long to enable China to bring up adequate reinforcements pd the Allies to increase the strength of their air power to such a hch that there would be a chance of a counter-offensive. Every- king turned on the time-factor. There has-been a distinct improve- tent in the balance of power in the air ; but it has not been sufficient prevent the swiftly moving Japanese reaching considerably nearer kir goal.
If we recognise that the campaign has not followed the course that as become customary in battles between the Allies and the Japanese, re cannot ignore that it has been governed by the same conditions. be Allies have once again been compelled to fight against a americally and materially superior enemy, and the capture of angoon made it almost certain that the conditions would remain luch the same unless a definite check could be administered to the IPanese. It has, however, been obvious that the British troops have Night magnificently and, for the first time in the war with Japan, le enemy has been compelled to pay for his success. The Chinese ne been heavily reinforced, and the evident skill and resolution town in many fierce engagements have been very heartening. But le Japanese have found it easier to reinforce than the Allies, who lye been overborne more by weight than by skill ; and it is the hinese who have had to bear the main brunt of the attack.
During last week the position suddenly deteriorated when the 'Pause began to develop a rapid and heavy drive in the Salween oa'• Up to that time it had been reported that they were digging 'about Yenenyaung,'after the Allies, by a brilliant concerted action, id relieved the British troops who had been encircled there. The ritish had been withdrawn beyond the Pinchaung River, and farther
east the Chinese main body was about Tatkon on the railway to Mandalay. On the eastern flank they were about Loikaw, some
4o miles south of the central column, which was itself about the same distance south of the western flank on the Irrawaddy. The Japanese then carried out an operation on the east similar to that which had successfully encircled the British on the Irrawaddy. They secured positions north of Loikaw, and the Chinese were cut off. After a heavy two-days' battle the Chinese broke through to rejoin their own main body ; but meanwhile the Japanese had succeeded in sending a column to Hopong, nearly 5o miles north of Loikaw, but they were held at Taunggyi about ten miles to the west. This town has changed hands several times ; but once more the Japanese appear to have divided their force, and while one column is threatening to turn the position of the Allied centre and move up the railway to Myingyan, below Mandalay, another appears to be striking eastwards towards Lashio, a third is moving northwards even further to the east.
It is the role and fate of these columns that give the present movements their interest. At the moment the " Lashio column " appears to be about 6o miles south of Hsipaw, on the Burma Road, and that may be its objective ; but it is probable that if the Road were to be cut, the Japanese would seize Lashio and attempt to sever the communications between China and Burma. The move- ment westward from the Taunggyi area threatens Mandalay. Indeed, there are now three spears pointing towards Mandalay which may be attacked simultaneously with Lashio. The position has become almost desperate. The Japanese are reported now to be using tanks ; but it is impossible to conjecture their strength, and on that the whole issue may turn. There has been little sign of any determined movement on the Irrawaddy recently, and the present advance on the east which threatens to turn the whole of the Allied position may be combined with an advance in the west in an attempt to encircle the Allied forces. To imagine such a project is not to suggest that it is as easy to accomplish as it is to write ; but it gives some idea of the seriousness of the immediate issues in Burma. The Allies may yet be able to check the advance in the cast. Bad as the communications are, it is here that it is easiest for the Chinese to be reinforced ; and the British are now so weary from incessant fighting against odds under unfavourable conditions that almost everything must depend upon the arrival of more Chinese units.
The next week is likely to be decisive for the fate of the Allied armies in Burma. General Alexander is a bold and experienced soldier, and he is the first Allied commander who has been able to cope with the Japanese tactics ; but now the crisis is upon him. The Japanese have been heavily reinforced. They have command of a number of tanks ; and, although the Allied aircraft have been taking a greater share of the fighting recently, the enemy still appears to have the advantage. The Allied purpose must be at all costs to maintain the communications between China and Burma and between the latter and India. While they are retained in being, there is hope of improvement. Lost, it is difficult to see how they can be regained without prolonged operations. In Burma at this moment, therefore, the Allies are trying to maintain their grip on the chance, slight and precarious as it has become, of building up an advanced base for the recoil against the Japanese in the south- western peninsula of Asia. While communications can be preserved, there are chances of a more immediate blow against Japan even than that ; for if China can be supplied with a sufficient number of heavy bombers there are possibilities of attacking some of the towns which suffered from the recent American raid.
While the situation in Burma is discouraging it can hardly be doubted that the resolute fighting has earned some respite for Aus- tralia and India. The latter could hardly escape raids at least if the Japanese were not so heavily engaged in Burma, though the direction in which the operations are developing suggests that China may be more in danger of invasion from another quarter than India from any
serious expedition. There is very much that is obscure about the present phase of the Japanese campaign. The strong naval squadron seems to have disappeared from the Bay of Bengal. It may only have left to refit after the losses which its aircraft-carriers suffered in their first attacks upon Ceylon. It may return stronger to resume the attack ; or it may have been recalled in pursuance of a policy of concentration suggested by the reported visit of American aircraft- carriers.
Its movements and the development of the Japanese operations in Burma are certainly not entirely unconditioned by the Allied dis- positions. There are now American troops in India ; and it may be assumed that the desirability of reinforcing the air-power there is sufficiently recognised. Even if experience in the Far East had not shown how decisively aircraft govern the issue in modern battles, it is evident that it is only through the air that the Allies in Burma can be strengthened with the speed that may be necessary. It is to that direction we must look for assistance in the hope that however gravely the situation has deteriorated it may yet be redeemed.
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