Battles long ago
OLIVER WARNER
The British Army of 1914 Major R. Money Barnes (Seeley, Service 50s)
How quickly myth and misconception grow. The writer of a book about airships which appears this very season provides an instance. Talking of Zeppelins, he affirms that 'ten of them operated with the German navy at the Battle of Jutland, and the scouting effectiveness of the hulking dirigibles frustrated the British in their attempt to capture or sink the Kaiser's warships.' This statement, distant from truth in every particular, shows how soon even the most impressive clashes of arms can be made to appear travesties of what they were. This current sample is all the more surprising since there is evidence that serious, not to say scholarly, interest continues to be given to the First World War. It is seen as the initial stage in a phase of history in which suffering is still predominant. That being so, two new books,
one on the navy and the other on the army of half a century or so ago, may, as detailed surveys, serve to help enlighten a generation to whom the actualities of large-scale war may appear remote. Remote, yet threatening, if public demonstrations are any guide, for the young, perhaps mainly through television, seem to have supped with horror, and had their fill.
In August 1914, when war opened, the Royal Navy was incomparably the largest force of its kind in the world, while the army, though small by comparison with those of Russia, Germany, France and Austria, was in every essential, save in its higher direction, first-rate. Even at the very top there was Kitchener, and whatever may be said, after distant scrutiny, about his qualities and defects, he had size, ex- perience of varied operations in the field, and the wit to plan, almost single-handed, for a long war which would involve, and indeed engulf, the ordinary citizen. Kitchener had a few good generals, but not enough of them, and they were becoming crusted. There was Haig, to whom promotion had come early, and who had the sort of stamina which could stand up even to years and years of almost incredible slaughter as the accepted price of gaining a few yards of shell-pitted mud, over which men had been fightidg to and fro almost since the struggle opened. There was Smith-Dorrien, but the Commander-in-Chief did not care much for him, so home he went.
Admirals were cautious; generals new to war- fare in western Europe. Jellicoe, commanding the Grand Fleet, was the pattern of a scientific oa officer, loved by his officers and men. But he was haunted by' the potential power of weapons unknown to his professional fore- bears : not the good old gun, which he under- stood, but the mine, aircraft perhaps, and above all the submarine. As Churchill remarked later, he was the only man on either side who could lose the war in an afternoon, and he had some initial shocks, well described by Captain Ben- nett—for instance, the sinking of the new battle- ship 'Audacious' by a single mine, the loss of three cruisers in quick succession to a single U-boat, the discovery of the real strength of German ship-construction for combat purposes, and, in the earlier months, poorly equipped and defended bases. Moreover, with world-wide commitments, even the Royal Navy's resources were stretched at times until there was not in- variably that preponderant margin of strength, vis-à-vis the German High Seas Fleet, that Jellicoe relied upon. Then came Jutland.
Captain Bennett is one of many who have written about Jutland, and much of what he said in an earlier account is included in his new book. He writes well on this dramatic, mys- terious, smoke-enshrouded meeting, of which outstandingly the best narrative yet to have seen print is by that stalwart friend of the Royal Navy, the American historian Arthur Marder. Jutland was deeply disappointing to a nation which had looked for another Trafalgar, yet it altered nothing. Jellicoe started the day in strategic control of the surface of the main sea passages, and that control was retained. But—Jutland helped to drive the German naval effort under water, and it was by means of the submarine that Germany could, and very: nearly did, strangle the Allied war effort, so dependent was it upon supplies by sea. The lesson was not forgotten, and a second time, under Raeder, she came as near to success as she had done in 1917.
Both Captain Bennett and Major Money Barnes convey a certain nostalgia about the
past, but their books are as different in method as in production. Captain Bennett, a critic of strategy and tactics, relies on photographs to illustrate his record, and very evocative some of them are, particularly the scene as the `Blucher' sank during the battle near the Dogger Bank in 1915, her sailors scrambling down her battered sides into the water. That was the only British success in a fight which, had signals been better, could have led to the annihilation of the German battle-cruiser force. Beatty's 'Lion' was crippled, and the admiral who was left to conduct what should have been a chase did almost everything wrong, and achieved nothing.
Major Money Barnes confines himself to 1914, and to the splendid professional army, the 'Contemptibles,' as they proudly called themselves, at their peak of fame, achievement —and loss. His strictly factual book is full of pictures careful in detail, though jejune and old- fashioned in their impact. Far more photo- graphs would have been welcome, the difficulty being that the great wealth of First World War photographs to be seen at the Imperial War Museum was harvested later, after war corre- spondents, artists and so on had appeared in numbers at or near the front, sending home sig- nificant impressions of what was going on.
Captain Bennett writes primarily for the general reader interested in naval history, Major Money Barnes more for• those whose concern includes military minutiae—an increasing band, if current manifestations of the collecting habit is a proper test. Both authors present records.
of achievement and reverse. ,
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