Holding the line in Europe
DEFENCE LAURENCE MARTIN
Laurence Martin is Professor of War Studies in the University of London and defence correspondent of the SPECTATOR.
NATO IS made to serve many purposes but its essential justification must remain that of a military alliance preparing to meet an armed attack. If we are not yet ready to dispense with the alliance, Czechoslovakia raises two straight- forward questions: firstly, has the danger of attack become more imminent; secondly, would it now be more difficult to contain?
On the second, more immediately military, question the official British and NATO line is that Soviet military advantages have not sub- stantially increased. It is true that Soviet troops are stationed on new and more advanced lines, but they face in the Seventh Army some of NATO'S better troops in some of the most difficult Central European terrain. Moreover many of the troops in Czechoslovakia represent a diversion of forces already in the Eastern European theatre rather than a net increase of forward deployment. This assessment is ener- getically disputed by some analysts and the true facts are simply not available. What seems beyond dispute is that the Russian forces must now regard many of their Warsaw Pact allies as an even more doubtful quantity than before and must devote considerable energy to controlling their conduct.
Despite these offsetting considerations, it is clear that Russian readiness for action in the short run is enhanced. Many of their secondline units have been brought up to strength and their logistical and communications networks are at a high pitch of alertness. This, however, is presumably only a temporary state of affairs. If it is not, and particularly of course if the forces attempt further adventures, NATO would be compelled to make a radical reassessment. Short of such a contingency, there seems little reason to quarrel with the generally accepted view that the strictly military threat is not greatly increased by recent events.
What NATO'S military commanders can justi- fiably assert, however, is that these events illuminate the grave weaknesses of which they were already all too aware. Recent American efforts to revise estimates of NATO'S military prowess upwards, widely suspected of being a preparation for further American withdrawals of troops, have not caused most western com- manders to alter their belief that in a swiftly launched war, Russia would quickly carve through NATO'S conventional defences; defences which are in many instances well below supposed strength, under-equipped, ill-deployed and beset with all the liaison difficulties of a coalition. In Czechoslovakia Russia had ample time, was able to carry out a virtual practice run, and faced no combat. Nevertheless the speed and efficiency of at least her initial operation surpassed NATO expectations.
Thus at a time when the trend of forces in NATO has been down—down for economic reasons, down because of complacency about the threat, down because of hope that the Russians would negotiate agreed reductions— Czechoslovakia comes as a sharp reminder that Russian policy has been to maintain, modernise and greatly strengthen their forces in Eastern Europe. Moreover, because of increasing Russian nuclear strength, NATO has just adopted a new strategy of 'flexible response.' The gradu- ations still include nuclear weapons, but they are now reserved for worse contingencies than in the former strategic directives. Thus the emphasis is increasingly upon just those conventional forces in which the balance looks unfavourable to most observers. A more revealing way to express the situation might be to say that the new strategy emphasises the difficulty of using the nuclear weapons which' for so long have served as the excuse not to face up to deficiencies elsewhere.
Military planners must obviously survey all these changes and look on the gloomy side. How alarmed the rest of us should become depends very much on the prior question of Russian intentions. Many will say that Czechoslovakia is on the Russian side of the line, that the Russians took care to tell us that they were staying on their side, that they were merely shoring up their own tottering edifice, and mean no harm to us. There is a lot to be said for this view, which very probably represents present Russian intentions. They have plenty of trouble and need not look for more. But there are exposed members of NATO, in the centre and on the flanks, who are unhappy to leave it at that.
According to this more anxious view, the Russians have used force and followed those leaders who have the stomach to employ it. Leaving NATO On one side, there are obviously other members of the Soviet bloc who might be next. Fears about Roumania and Yugoslavia are well publicised. Occupation of the former seems quite possible, of the latter much less probable.
Either event would have strategic con- sequences for the NATO planners, but the political effect on the alliance would be even greater. The sense of security in Europe has indeed rested on the notion that here at least, the lines were clearly drawn. What Czecho- slovakia, a country edging away from Russia, has done, is to create a renewed awareness of the several ambiguities that still exist, and of the way in which political change can alter the sense of what is possible. Some of the more exposed members on the flanks of NATO, already uneasy about what they regard as the less decisive new strategy, and standing as they do without allies on their soil, must inevitably ask themselves whether they are far enough across the line to be immune. At the same time, in Germany, troubles on the Eastern side are
unavoidably entangled with the security of the Federal Republic.
It is therefore unavoidable that the Czecho- slovak affair will precipitate one of the periodic reappraisals that the alliance makes of itself. This one, however, coincides with another source of anxiety in a way that may soon become more conspicuous. The Johnson Administration seems intent upon a major effort to begin talks with Russia about strategic nuclear weapons. Indeed the mildness of American reaction to Czechoslovakia very probably arose from this ambition and the parallel hope of co-operation over Vietnam.
Whether or not the talks lead to good results—a very controversial matter in itself— they would inevitably have awkward impli- cations within the alliance. They would sym- bolise American nervousness about the growing nuclear power of Russia at a time when NATO, for all its new strategy, still depends for its security on American readiness to fight nuclear war. Moreover, by being held soon after the Czech invasion, they would be widely regarded as offering Russia at worst a temptation to probe the limits of American tolerance further to the West.
None of this suggests that the West should deliberately seek to reinvigorate the Cold War on its own account or start a programme of re- armament in fear of imminent invasion. It does suggest the wisdom of doing as much as possible to reaffirm the solidarity of the alliance upon which the stabilising clarity of the lines in Europe depends. It also makes it seem desirable that NATO should at least remain capable of the modest degree of deterrence it has sustained over the past few years.
Anything meriting the word rearmament would not only provoke Russian imitation and exacerbate their anxieties; it is also politically impossible. But at least the rot should stop for the time being. There are signs that it is stopping. The remedy of certain deficiencies would have salutary effects on the exposed flanks—more mobile forces, more airlift and more assistance to the local forces with their own equipment, in view of the probable tech- nical and political limitations on reinforcement. Britain is in the fortunate position that her recent redispositions have enabled her to make a genuinely larger contribution. Indeed the British share of the burden is now comfortably above the average. This is just as well, for the Europeans will not have to demonstrate too much agitation before the United States suggests once more that they begin to stand a little more on their own feet Conventional feet, of course.
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