Extremists

Tactics against terror

Joel Cohen

Although the Easter outbreak of terrorism in the Middle East tends to overshadow the outrages at home, there is no question but that Britain itself is seriously involved in the continuing international war against terrorism. During the first weeks of ,„the year the bombing campaign in 'Northern Ireland was again extended to London and to some provincial cities, a foreign diplomat was kidnapped in Belfast, a businessman was shot in London for ,..hts Political-cum-religious beliefs, and major west European airports began to resemble Military fortresses. While it is not just coincidental that a variety of terrorist groups, linked together on an operational level, are extending their terror campaigns to Britain during an economic depression, it is unlikely that any single foreign state is directly involved in most of these recent terror operations. Intelligence reports have indicated that a spectacular act of terrorism was to be expected some time during the spring or summer. Although terrorist groups have as their targets well-known and respected People, it now seems unlikely that the abortive kidnap attempt on Princess Anne was the Operation intelligence officers had in mind. And in view of the relative freedom of Movement in Britain it is likely that Britain Will be the scenario for more terrorist operations in coming months. The wave of terrorism in Britain recently is seen by some foreign intelligence officers as a blessing in disguise. Now that the British authorities have woken up to the problem of terrorism, the argument goes, the international — or at least the western — community can now act to deal with a problem transcending national boundaries. They point out that Britain allows into the country too many undesirable political extremists although Other western countries do not remain immune from such criticism. Terrorism, it is a‘rgued, is no longer something happening over there."

,Put will turning airports into fortresses stop hijackings or will an increase in security for roYalty and politicians avoid a repeat of last month's kidnap attempt? To answer this and related questions it is necessary to examine the motives and aims of terrorist groups. Foreign observers believe that Britain's immunity, until recently, from international terrorism may be the reason for, what they believe to be, the lack of understanding of the dimensions of the problem the Government has shown when handling the small number of incidents it had been faced with.

The Government first faced the problem of international terrorism during the series of hijackings to Jordan in September 1970. Britain was involving by holding in custody an Arab terrorist who tried unsuccessfully to hijack an Israeli plane. A few days later a British airliner was seized by the terrorists in order to bargain with Britain for the release of the terrorist. The Government perceived the 9'isis as a legal problem and the matter was handled by the legal department of the Foreign Office. This was in spite of the fact that terrorists are so far not recognised as legal entities and, of more practical importance, are a law unto themselves and cannot be nego tiated with from a legal standpoint. The lack Of knowledge of the problems of international terrorism is also found at an academic level.

Only two academic centres — Exeter University and the Institute for Study of Conflict— are engaged in studies of political violence.

While there has been a guerrilla campaign in Northern Ireland for some time, as well as in some British colonies, the tactics suited for dealing with guerrilla warfare in this type of military situation are a different kettle of fish from those suited for combating urban terrorists who engage in hijackings, letterbombs and assassinations. While in a paramilitary situation, such as in Northern Ireland, one is expecting violence and can take defensive measures and one has a good idea where the enemy is lurking, the urban terrorist moves underground in built-up areas, is often in an independently-controlled group of four, and cannot easily be located by intelligence services. The aim of the urban terrorist is not so much to cause physical destruction, the general aim of guerrillas in military situations, but to attack unguarded and civilian targets such as aeroplanes and railway stations with the object of surprising and alerting the public even if, as is likely, the initial effect is a reaction to the urban terrorist's cause.

Intelligence agencies keep potential terrorists under surveillance. However, this entails keeping watch on the movements of a suspect for several months. It has not proved to be very successful in dealing with the modern urban terrorist. First, the terrorist groups dispatch their men only a few days before the scheduled operation. Secondly, the actual planning and surveillance of the target is carried out by men on the ground. A more successful method has been the penetration of terrorist groups by an intelligence service. However, the most up-to-date terrorist groups make. penetration virtually impossible by organising themselves into independently-controlled units of up to five members. Neither outlawing groups nor the introduction of the death .penalty close the loopholes open to potential terrorists.

As the recent Irish campaign in Britain has illustrated, the leaving of parcel bombs on coaches and in public places incurs only a slight risk of detection. Even in those cases where the terrorists can be detected, such as in situations where hostages are held in embassies or in hijacked planes, the terrorist insures himself by insisting upon freeing his hostages only after he has been given a safe journey, often, to a friendly country. On a governmental level, a successful method has been to place pressure on countries which give shelter to terrorist groups. Some countries, particularly developing ones, some of which are unstable and have differing factions, find difficulty in restraining extremist groups. Other countries, such as Russia, China and Libya volunteer support and practical aid to terrorist groups. For different reasons, the international community does not find it easy to place pressure on these countries. If these three countries, and some others who also lend support to a lesser extent to terrorist

groups, were receptive to such pressure, international• terrorism and guerrilla campaigns would diminish drastically.

The recent operations by Israeli and Jordan intelligence against leaders of some Pales tinian groups, though breaking international

law by intruding into a third country, have stopped a number of spectacular terrorist

operations. It is not insignificant that since the Israelis sent a commando force into Beirut in April 1973 killing three Black September chiefs, the group has been virtually inopera tive and all major operations since then have been carried out by other groups. While it is claimed that such acts turn their 'victims' into martyrs, they do have a demoralising effect within the group. In the long-term, a more positive response from the international community to the grievances of groups which demonstrate peacefully could persuade some potential terrorists to rethink their tactics. At present, the trend is to answer grievances only because one is threatened; and this en courages peaceful demonstrators to turn to violence. As a result of greater freedom, and extensions to democracy the lid has been lifted from a pot of repressed grievances and calls for change. However, governments — whether they call themselves communist, socialist, democratic or liberal — tend to be conservative and accommodate as little change as is necessary for self-preservation. Aiming for the greatest good for the greatest number is still not fundamental to most political structures. And this seems unlikely to change in cases where the administration's position and powers are threatened if the grievance is satisfied.

How do groups with grievances protest peacefully and succeed? Surprisingly, there are only a few ways in which to resolve grievances. Trade unions are one of the few institutions with clearly-agreed procedures for this. In Britain, democracy does not exist in practice to the extent which some theoreticians claim it does. And certainly, governments going to the country every five years, often on a manifesto composed of a bunch of threadbare promises (likely to be altered "to meet altered circumstances"), which may perhaps be convincing during the three-week rush of an electoral campaign can hardly be considered an adequate process for the resolution of grievances. Apparently, one way is to write to one's MP — although this is dependent upon whether your overworked MP takes an interest in your case, whether the minister concerned also takes an interest, and whether there is the political machinery to solve your grievance. It is reasonable to suggest that this unpredictable process is too tiresome and shows too little promise for most people not to bother. While they learn to live with the problem, unhappiness remains, frustration grows and at some stage, often in desperation, feeling is vented against the society.

Even more precarious means for resolving grievances exist such as pressure groups: by hook or by crook one has to attract the attention of the media to publicise one's cause, for the readers to take notice, for them to react, and then for those able to do something about the grievance to act. This often involves heavy expenses, organisation and contact in influential quarters — which the individual usually does not have.

Clearly, a clarification of the methods for rectifying grievances is necessary. It will be argued that such action will invite a host of unfair demands. To the demander, however, no demand is 'unfair.' Standards and aims which determine whether a grievance is a valid grievance are set by the people, it is argued. It is well nigh impossible to close the stable door after the horse — 'Democracy and Freedom' — has bolted. Indeed most people, even those with the power, would not be in favour of this.

Thus, while groups and individuals aim for improved standards, political protest is inevitable. The form which their protesting takes, through the barrel of a gun or through peaceful demonstrations, depends largely on whether their protests are heard. In the short-term there is little those in authority can do about the urban terrorists. Tighter security, hunting down terrorists, and placing pressure on states which aid terrorists may reduce campaigns of terror. Answering force with greater force, showing terrorists that terrorism does not pay off, is a reasonable basis for those who have to deal with terrorism. At the same time, the other process of extending a hand to peaceful protesters may spare potential bloodshed. Cities may have to resemble military fortresses in the short-term. The choice is whether our ordered way of life will disappear in the long-term as well.

Joel Cohen, a regular contributor to . The Spectator, is completing a hook on political extremists.