THE USE OF SHORT PARLIAMENTS.
THE dismissal of the Whig Ministers—though probably the most wanton and uncalled-for dismissal of public servants that ever took place in England—has given the Reformers one great advantage, of which they ought to avail themselves, whether a dissolution of Parliament takes place immediately or not. It has brought Mem- bers :nto contact with the constituencies, and enabled the latter to make fresh terms with all those whose conduct hitherto has not been satisfactory. At the last election, people were too easy, too confiding ; and hence much of the disappointment that has arisen. Now is the time for amending the Representative compact. Perhaps no one vote of the House of Commons created more discontent than the refusal to repeal the Septennial Act, which would be the same in effect as reverting to Triennial Par- liaments. Lord Joni.; RUSSELL, in introducing the Reform Bill, let it be distinctly understood that the repeal of the Septennial Act was only postponed. For many years the Whigs had ad- vocated a return to Triennial Parliaments ; and if any pledge had been considered unnecessary, it would have been one from a Whig Member to vote for that measure. We will not dwell upon the Jesuit of Mr. TENNYSON'S motions in the House of Commons ; hut we do call upon the Reformers, if they wish to give the Re- tain Act fair play,—if they would have Real Representation,—to lay hold of the present opportunity, and exact pledges from their Members, as well as from all new candidates, to fix the future duration of Parliaments at three years.
A few Whigs and suspected Liberals, of no great mark, wish to have Quinquennial instead of Triennial Parliaments. This heresy seems to have sprung up, originally, among certain timid, wavering, hair-splitting, bit-by-bit Reformers of the Northern Athens. The thing is as new in England as the phrase coined to express it. It is strange to the constitution of the country and the ideas of the people. We have all heard of Annual, Triennial, and Septennial Parliaments; the two former have been petitioned for, repeatedly,by the People; but this Quinquennial bantling is little more than a year and a half old, and we have never heard its name mentioned except by some Member of Parliament, who was either trimming or crotchety. Let those who name it now be marked, and punished as the promoters of mischievous divisions. What is the objection to Triennial Parliaments? While, owing to the extreme irregularity of their duration, Parliaments for the last forty years have not sat, on an average, for more than three years and a half, it is pretended that three-year Parliaments would be only biennial ; and that, it is said, would be too short a term. But why should they be only biennial ? Why should not the time be fixed at three years, neither a day mote nor a day less ? The advantages of such a regulation would be manifold. Let us mention some of them.
All who have any Parliamentary business to transact, are familiar with the trouble and loss consequent upon sudden disso- lutions. New notices must be given for bills, new fees to the officers of Parliament and the lawyers, new petitions got up, new maps, surveys, and estimates made. Commercial plans are de- ranged, for the announced alterations in the budget are laid aside. Money is taken for the public service without a vote. Disorder and confusion reign in the offices. The Ministers are oil; God knows where, on sudden electioneering expeditions. He who has business at the Treasury or Somerset House may wait long enough before he gets it attended to.
But this is not the worst. The country is taken by surprise. The constituencies have no time to look about for the best Repre- sentatives. Alehouses are thrown open; bribery flourishes ; at- tornies are riding, all bustle and self-importance, about the country ; and the most impudent and wealthy, not the best-in- formed and discreet candidates, are too often returned. The case would be greatly altered under the system of a fixed time for the duration of Parliaments. Men of business would make their cal- culations accordingly : the saving of useless expense and the avoidance of hurried legislation would of themselves be a great gain. Members would be prepared to meet their constituents, and all the better prepared in consequence of having never voted treacherously with a view to postpone the evil day of settlement. Electors would have made up their minds as to the choice of Members. This would put a stop to useless and expensive con- tests in many places—contests which are often got up by a few jobbers for their own pecuniary benefit. An election would be a sober, serious, well-considered, regularly-recurring exercise of the most important political privilege. The result would be greater satisfaction among all the friends of wise legislation and steady government. It will be objected, that to take away from the Sovereign the right to dissolve Parliament at his own good pleasure, would be an encroachment on the Royal prerogative. Certainly it would be a change, a new limitation of the prerogative. But the preroga- tives of the King are only constitutionally exercised when exer- cised for the national good. Any branch of the prerogative whose existence or use is inconsistent with the public welfare ought to be abolished or restrained. It is indeed notorious, that the King's prerogative, in the most essential matters, is little more than nominal. Whenever a British Sovereign, since the acces- sion of CHARLES the First, has attempted to govern in opposition to the House of Commons, he has either been beheaded, or ex- pelled from his throne, or been forced to yield after an abortive struggle. Whichever way we turn, we find the Monarch restrained by the People acting through their Representatives in Parliament. It is therefore a wretched argument to bring against a good mea- sure, that it infringes on the Roy al prerogative. If it Joes, the prerogative must submit to be infringed upon, or—in the first place, the House of Commons must refuse the Supplies. But there is no occasion to anticipate any proceeding of so stern a character. We shall not believe that the Sovereign will refuse his assent to a bill for assigning a three years' duration to Parlia- ments, or any other measure deemed necessary by the Legislature, until such refusal has been actually recorded. Under a system of three-years Parliaments, the country, at present disturbed and agitated by a strife wantonly provoked. for selfish ends, would have continued profoundly tranquil : since there could be no dissolution, in all likelihood their would have been no change of Ministers.
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