• HITLER-STALIN IDYLL

By WILSON HARRIS THE wrathful reactions of the Kremlin tathe documents on Nazi- Soviet relations 1939-1941 recently published by the United States Department of State are sufficient,testimony to the importance of the documents themselves—which have not so far appeared in this country. Their value consists in the light they throw on the rapprochement between Soviet Russia and Nazi Germany in the summer of 1939, culminating in the Russo-German Treaty of August

23rd, and on the gradual tension in the early months of 1941, ended by Hitler's invasion of Russian territory on June 22nd of that year. The documents arc a selection from the mass contained in the captured archives of the German Foreign Office. It is claimed, and there is no reason to doubt it, that the selection has been made on the basis of the highest objectivity ; every document published has been quoted in full ; a much larger selection is to appear later.

The first point that emerges is that Russia's swing away from Britain and France towards Germany synchronised with the dis- missal of Litvinov and the appointment of Molotov as Com- missar for Foreign Affairs. That took place at the beginning of May, 1939, and the German Chargé d'Affaires in Moscow laid stress on its importance. " Sudden change," he cables to Berlin, " has caused greatest surprise here since Litvinov was in the midst of negotiations with the British delegation. . . . His dismissal appears to be result of spontaneous decision by Stalin. . . . Molotov (no Jew) is held to be `most intimate friend and closest collaborator' of Stalin."

From this point there is a steady rapprochement, first economic, then political, between Berlin and Moscow, though negotiations be- tween British and French delegations and the Kremlin pointing to an Anglo-Franco-Russian pact are in progress simultaneously. Schulen- burg, the German Ambassador in Moscow, sees Molotov from time to time and keeps Berlin well posted on Moscow tendencies. Gradually the idea of a political understanding between the Nazi and Communist 4, States takes shape. On June 29th Schulenburg could report that " although a strong distrust was evident in everything that Molotov said [Russian ' distrust ' crops up again and again in these despatches] nevertheless he described normalisation of relations with Germany as desirable and possible." The talks continue, and on August 14th Ribbentrop instructs his Ambassador to tell Molotov that ideological differences do not exclude friendly co-operation ; that " the capital- istic western democracies are the unforgiving enemies of both National Socialist Germany and the U.S.S.R.," and that he, Ribben- trop, was prepared to make a short visit to Moscow " to set forth the Fiihrer's views to Herr Stalin." On August 23rd he arrived there. In a long conversation with Stalin and Molotov he covered much ground. England, said Ribbentrop, was weak, and wanted to let others fight for her presumptuous claim to world domination. " Herr Stalin eagerly concurred, and observed : the British Army was weak ; the British Navy no longer deserved its previous reputation ; England's air-arm was being increased, to be sure, but there was a lack of pilots." Forthwith the Russo-German Non-Aggression Pact was signed, with general rejoicings.

On September 3rd Germany invaded Poland and at once began efforts to get Russia moving too. Molotov agreed that it would be absolutely necessary but (on September 5th) took the view that the time had not yet come. Three days later he congratulates the Ger- man Government on the entry of their troops into Warsaw. On September 9th he promises Russian military action "within the next few days." On September 17th Stalin receives the German Am- bassador will into 2 o'clock in the morning and says the Red Army wi cross into Poland in four hours' time, but the next day he expresses doubt whether the German High Command will stand by the line of division agreed with Moscow ; the German Ambassador, "in view of Stalin's well-known attitude of mistrust," asks for authority to make more categorical declarations. The Russian invasion begins, and a day later Molotov informs Schulenburg that Stalin's first in- clination to permit the existence of a residual Poland has given way to an inclination to partition Poland along the agreed line. Ten days after this Ribbentrop visits Moscow and signs the treaty partitioning Poland along the specified line. So the war proceeds, but difficulties almost at once arise, Germany wanting more from Russia and Russia more from Germany than

either is disposed to give. In October the Germans say they must try to obtain a more expeditious delivery of raw materials. In the end an agreement was signed on February tith, 1940, whereby Russia

undertook to assist the German war effort by the delivery of vast amounts of feeding-stuffs, mineral oil, cotton, phosphates, chrome ores, scrap and pig iron, platinum, manganese, copper and other minerals, to a total value of too,o00,000 Reicbsmarks.

Efforts are now made to persuade Stalin or Molotov to visit Berlin, but response is slow. Meanwhile the German invasions of Norway and Denmark and the Low Countries are carried out. Molotov is told of the former, which was due to the fact that " we had absolutely reliable reports regarding an imminent thrust of Anglo-French mili- tary forces against the Norwegian and Danish coasts " ; Molotov commenti: " We wish Germany complete success in her defensive measures." That is on April 9th, 1940. On May Toth the intimation is conveyed that Germany has gone into Belgium and Holland ; " Molotov appreciated the news and added that he understood that Germany had to protect herself against Anglo-French attack. [France was still sitting immobile behind the Maginot Line.] He had no doubt of our success."

Thus we reach mid-1940. From this point little rifts begin to appear. Molotov suspects German intentions in the Baltic and the Balkans and males anxious enquiries regarding them ; anodyne assurances are returned. On June 18th Molotov summons Schulenburg and "expressed his warmest congratu- lations on the splendid success of the German Armed Forces" [on the Western Front]. By the end of August friction is a little more apparent, for Hitler has settled the territorial dispute between Rumania and Hungary, to the annoyance of Molotov, who complains that this action, of which he had been told nothing, violates the provisions for joint consultation in the Russo-German Non-aggression Pact. In September there is more difficulty about delivery of war material to Russia. At the same time Molotov is informed of the conclusion of the Three-Power Treaty between Germany, Italy and Japan ; he insists on seeing the text, including the secret portions. By October he is getting extremely anxious about reports of German troops in Rumania. A visit by Molotov to Berlin is pressed for again and he goes there on November rith.

A month before he arrived. Ribbentrop had written to Stalin men- tioning that " recognising the complete absurdity of continuing this

war, on July 19th the Flitter again offered peace to England." Eng- land refused. The Molotov visit was a complete success. Ribbentrop impressed on him how utterly defeated England was and how incon- ceivable a landing by England and America (if America came in) would be. " This the English had not yet understood, because appar- ently there was some confusion in Great Britaht and because the country was led by a political and military dilettante by the name of Churchill, who throughout his previous career had completely failed at all decisive moments and who would fail again this time."

The next day came an interview with the Fiihrer, who expatiated on world policy generally, Molotov broadly concurring, though he was still worried about where Russia stood in relation to the German-Italian-Japanese—or Anti-Communist--Pact. The two met again the next day, when Hitler repeatedly urged an agreement on the division of the British Empire. More precise aspirations emerged in a conversation with Ribbentrop the next day. Germany would have the Central African region ; Italy, North and North-East Africa ; Japan's requisitions were so far a little vague ; Russia could expand right down to the Indian Ocean. Molotov quite approved of col- laboration generally, but they must come to a thorough understand- ing. Immediately afterwards the draft of a Pact between Russia on the one hand and Germany-Italy-Japan on the other is submitted to Molotov at Moscow ; he agrees to sign subject to certain modifi- cations.

That is on November 26th. The date is worth noting. On December ath, less than a month later, and more than six months before the invasion of Russia by Germany, there is issued as " Mili- tary Secret; Top Secret," a direct' nye, OPERATION BARBAROSSA, beginning

"The German Armed Forces must be prepared w crush Soriei Russia in a quick campaign (Operation Barbarossa) even before the conclusion of the war against England."

There follow full details of the operations to be undertaken against Germany's ally. Meanwhile superficial cordiality continues, but

Molotov is seriously disturbed with the news that—on account of British projects in Greece—Germany is throwing troops into Rumania and marching through Bulgaria.

Tension between Germany and Russia now grows rapidly. Ger- many complains both of Russia's lag in deliveries of raw materials and of the projected treaty between Russia and Yugoslavia (which Germany is intending to attack). Mutual recriminations against violations of the Russo-German frontier by hostile planes follow. This in the middle of May. Hereafter relations steadily worsen,. On April 24th the British Ambassador at Moscow, Sir Stafford CripPs3 is reported as predicting (quite inexplicably but quite correctly) that war would break out on June 22nd. It did. The Hitler-Stalin idyll was at an end.