BOOKS

All great

men make mistakes

Richard Lamb

CHURCHILL: THE END OF GLORY by John Charmley John Curtis/Hodder, £30, pp. 742 CHURCHILL edited by Robert Blake and Wm. Roger Louis OUP, £19.95, pp. 581 These lengthy books add over 1,300 pages to the massive Churchill bibliotheca. Robert Blake's is the more important and the better buy.

I am one of those historians whom David Watt recently described as 'revising the Churchillian version of the second world war' with the help of recently released archives. Yet I can find little original research in either book. This should not be expected from Blake's, which is a collection of papers for a USA conference in 1991; John Charmley's, however, has been hailed by some reviewers as shedding fresh light on Churchill's behaviour during the second world war. In fact, it is a well enough written rehash of what is already known, topped up with wild judgments unlikely ever to be taken seriously by historians although they have produced unprecedent- ed publicity for the book.

To be fair, Alan Clark in his Times review overstated Charmley's case against Churchill for refusing to try and make peace with Hitler at the time of Dunkirk or after Hess' entreaty to join Germany in an attack on Russia in March 1941, or after the Allied victory in North Africa in 1943.

When Churchill became Prime Minister in May 1940 all but the naive knew Hitler would tear up any peace treaty he signed at a moment's notice; to surrender then would have put Britain and all Europe at the mercy of the mad jew-hating dictator. In his memoirs Churchill glosses over Hali- fax's and Chamberlain's pusillanimity at the crucial Cabinet meeting on 26 May, 1940, but Charmley produces no evidence to justify Clark's claim that 'a rational lead- er could have got first reasonable, then excellent terms from Hitler.' It is indisputable that if Churchill had accepted Hess' offer in 1941 to join Germany in fighting the Russians Hitler would have destroyed Britain as soon as he had defeat- ed Russia.

In a previous book Charmley defended Neville Chamberlain's policy of appease- ment. Now he reiterates the same argu- ment. Chamberlain helped to bring about the electoral success of the Nazis in 1933 because at the 1932 Locarno Conference on reparations, as Chancellor of the Exche- quer he had insisted that Germany paid further sums. Goering declared that if the Nazis came to power they would 'pay noth- ing,' and this was a potent factor in the Nazis' electoral success and the downfall of the Weimar Republic. Once Hitler was in power Chamberlain supported Baldwin over allowing the remilitarisation of the Rhineland and as Prime Minister con- doned the German rearmament which raised Hitler's army from three Divisions in 1933 to a staggering 100 in 1939.

When Churchill denounced Munich in the Commons as 'a total and unmitigated defeat' there was a storm of protest from Conservative MPs. A few weeks later he was triumphantly vindicated in a devastat- ing pamphlet written by the late Professor R W Seton-Watson which, amid great pub- licity, proved the Munich terms were worse than Hitler's Godesberg ultimatum. Cham- berlain, who in the Commons had staked his reputation on Munich being an improvement on Godesberg, was discredit- ed; the political climate changed dramati- cally with the Tories losing the Bridgwater by-election, and Chamberlain instead of being looked upon as the 'angel of peace' was referred to more and more as the `undertaker'. Charmley does not mention Seton-Watson's pamphlet.

Charmley is on stronger ground over Italy. In 1940 and 1941 Churchill wanted to give soft peace terms to an alternative anti- Fascist Italian Government. In 1943 with Italy down and out Churchill agreed with Eden they should offer nothing but unconditional surrender. Hence, when the King toppled Mussolini in July 1943 the Allies were taken by surprise and lost the opportunity to occupy Italy unopposed before the German army arrived.

Churchill can be criticised for sinking the French fleet at Mers-el-Kebir against the advice of the Chiefs of Staff. This made Vichy France an enemy and produced war in Syria with 10,000 casualties. Even worse it resulted in France handing over their air and naval bases in Indo-China to Japan so that Malaya, only a short distance away across the Gulf of Siam, was put at risk. Churchill ignored this and, while he pro- voked Japan into war so as to ensure USA entry, he failed to reinforce Malaya. When Grew, the British Ambassador to Japan, wrote in his final despatch that Japan could have been kept out of the war by a differ- ent policy, Churchill was so angry he refused to allow Grew to be re-employed.

Charmley ignores these points, and sur- prisingly only gives Potsdam a few perfunc- tory words. Thereby he throws away his best chance of establishing the case for his vendetta against Churchill because, when all else is forgotten, future generations will condemn Churchill for meekly agreeing with Truman that atom bombs should be dropped on Japan. Both chiefs ignored advice from their respective Foreign Offices that Japan would surrender imme- diately without any need for atom bombs, provided the Emperor could stay as ruler. Charmley has not found the Series in the Public Record Office containing the key Potsdam documents; he discloses this through listing his PRO sources. At the top of one important document Sir Alexander Cadogan, Head of the British Foreign Office, put a handwritten note which, when I read it, made me feel he was signalling to future historians that he himself had no responsibility for atom bombs being released on civilisation because Eden and Churchill had ignored his advice.

Charmley's strictures on Churchill will not appeal to Robert Blake and Wm. Roger Louis, who write that the time has come to take 'full measure of Churchill' and how he came to be 'the saviour of the nation'. Their view is that with Britain out of the way in 1940 Hitler would 'almost certainly' have conquered Russia, and Japan 'might not have risked Pearl Harbor' because a defeated Britain would have been 'more vulnerable'. As a result Hitler would have ruled 'a satellite Empire from the Urals to the Atlantic'. They could have added that Japan would have been all-pow- erful in the Far East.

The essays in this book, written by an impressive team of 29 historians, are often critical and unflattering, but the consensus is that Churchill 'above all was a great war leader'. I am even more critical in my book Churchill as War Leader, but come to the identical conclusion.

It is often forgotten that Churchill stated his war memoirs 'were not history' but 'my case'. He only kept amongst his personal papers documents which were favourable to him, and Martin Gilbert in his official biography relies too much on Churchill's personal archive instead of the Public Record Office. As a result he glosses over Churchill's worst blunders as wartime Prime Minister.

Sir Harry Hinsley reveals that Churchill was sent all the voluminous daily transla- tions of the decrypts made at Bletchley of intercepted German and Japanese signals (Enigma) including the diplomatic mes- sages. Unfortunately the Cabinet instructed Hinsley to confine his volumes on 'Intelli- gence in the Second World War' to 'strate- gy and operations,' and he included nothing on the wider issues.

There has been considerable doubt as to the whereabouts of the original Enigma. Until recently Hinsley himself thought they might have been destroyed. Lately I have been informed by the Cabinet Office His- torical and Records Section that the origi- nal Enigma is safe in the Government's top-secret Communications Headquarters at Cheltenham; even better news is that it is in the process of being 'placed' for public readership in the Public Record Office `time and labour permitting'. In future years there will be a glittering opportunity for a historian, who is a good German scholar, to examine Churchill's wartime leadership in the light of his knowledge of enemy intentions.

Release of Enigma should end the con- troversy over Mihailovic and Tito. Jean Howard, a German expert, is a survivor of Bletchley and she claims she remembers translating signals which proved Mihailovic was a more valuable ally than Tito. This might explain why Churchill became disillusioned with Tito a few months after he had abandoned Mihailovic.

Enigma should also show how much Churchill knew of the German opposition to Hitler which he and Eden cold- shouldered. Brigadier Edgar Williams, Montgomery's Head of Intelligence, has recounted that Churchill was at their Nor- mandy headquarters the day after Stauffen-

berg exploded his bomb, and when he heard this Churchill shuffled frantically through his despatch boxes because he remembered Enigma was disclosing strange events in Germany. Williams was shocked that Churchill was so `unbriefed' about what was going on in Germany.

Both Michael Carver and Richard 011ard castigate Churchill for his treatment of admirals and generals. Churchill knew how unashamedly Haig and Robertson had withheld information in the first world war, and made himself his own Minister of Defence so that, as Michael Howard writes, `he could make or break generals as he saw fit.' In my view his chief mistake was bully- ing Auchinleck into defending Tobruk against his better judgment and then sack- ing him when it fell.

Blake is fascinating on how Halifax could have had the job of Prime Minister in May 1940 'for the asking', and came within a hair's breadth of succeeding Chamberlain with unimaginable disastrous conse- quences. Blake explains that Halifax him- self opted out, knowing how weak would be his position as Prime Minister in the Lords with Churchill as Minister of Defence run- ning the war and dominating the Com- mons. Blake believes that Churchill would have served under Halifax although there is no written evidence to confirm this.

Max Beloff writes that Churchill never envisaged Britain becoming part of a Fed- eral Europe and would have disliked the emergence of an European Super State. I doubt this. Churchill's inspiring speeches at Zurich and The Hague were an important factor in the making of the Common Market. Beloff overlooks the fact that Churchill told the Commons shortly before the 1951 General Election: 'We are pre- pared to consider, and if convinced accept, the abrogation of national sovereignty.' He was forced to accept Eden as Foreign Secretary who was adamantly opposed, and rather than spoil the pleasure of his return to Downing Street with a running battle Churchill climbed down. But as Roy Jenk- ins writes, he would never have made Eden's great error of 'not going to the Messina Conference of 1955'.

Paul Addison and Peter Clarke write about Churchill as Chancellor of the Exchequer sympathetically. We learn that Churchill hated Montagu Norman, Gover- nor of the Bank of England, and bitterly regretted the decision forced upon him by Norman to return to the Gold Standard in 1925. Later he said that this was the biggest mistake of his life, and it explains why he did not oppose the nationalisation of the Old Lady in 1946. Successive Conservative leaders have followed his lead despite their free enterprise philosophy, and definitely the present Government do not want an independent Governor vetoing their eco- nomic U turns.

Those who revere Churchill as Britain's greatest statesman will enjoy these essays, whereas they will find Charmley's informa- tive but hostile biography infuriating.

Richard Lamb's Churchill as War Leader: Right or Wrong is being republished in paperback this month by Bloomsbury.

Alan Brownjohn

Over the Road

The woman, holding her face after the dentist, Has crossed the carriageway safely towards A known-to-be-sympathetic long-haired cat; The pain is over and the two are smiling.

The tall man wearing pressed corduroys Has crossed behind her with the jaunty pace Of a reassured lover, so he too survives A very high statistical risk.

There is more black death on the M25 Than there was in Surrey in 1349.

It was safer to be in Kuwait than Oxford Street. It is safer to cross the Atlantic than Belsize Park.

I am half across and stand in the draught of an island left between two deathly streams. I rest my hand on a bollard, no protection, And the venerable rust of antiquity stains me, But I stand and breathe, in the unforeseeen sunlight, In one of those minutes when nothing can touch me, as certainly as the woman and the cat Can touch each other and the man stride on.

There's a feel of new leases being taken out.