THE FRUITS OF ROME •
TWO questions must be asked regarding Mr. Cham- berlain's visit to Rome—was he wise to go, and what has his visit achieved ? The answer to the first does not depend on the answer to the second. The attempt to achieve something might be, and in this case was, amply justified even if its outcome was failure. The outcome at Rome was not failure. The results of the con- versations, it is true, were in the main negative, but that was because they had no set or specific purpose, beyond the relaxation of tension and the dissipation of misunderstandings between the two countries ; in that direction some progress would seem to have been made. A talk which was described as " ranging the horizon " necessarily covered some questions on which the views of the British and Italian Governments coincide and some on which they patently do not. Among the former is the general desirability of the maintenance of peace, which Signor Mussolini declared his country to need for both internal and external reasons. Her need of peace is manifest, but it is not so imperious as to exclude the possibility of the pursuit of policies incom- patible with peace ; it is significant that two of the questions which found no major place, if any place at all, in the Rome discussions were the situation in Spain and the Italian demands on France.
Those two hard facts form an uncongenial back- ground to the Prime Minister's declaration of belief in Italian good faith and goodwill. Italy signed the non- intervention agreement and is still intervening in Spain on a scale sufficient to decide the issue between victory and defeat for General Franco ; and while it is incredible that Mr. Chamberlain did not appeal for at least the abandonment of blatant demonstrations of ill-will to France, those demonstrations broke out with renewed force the moment the Prime Minister had left Rome. A natural and right desire to manifest cordiality in a statement to the Italian Press explains much, but it is no service to peace and understanding to let the writers and readers of the Italian papers imagine that British Ministers are either blind or indifferent to Italy's violation of good faith in regard to Spain and of good- will in regard to France. It is against, and in spite of, that background that the balance-sheet of the Rome talks has to be struck. On the right side must be entered the fact that personal relations between the two statesmen were genuinely cordial; that Signor Mussolini appears to have declared that he had no intention of pressing Italian claims against France to the point of war ; and that he reiterated the pledge in the Anglo-Italian agreement regarding the mainten- ance of the status quo in the Mediterranean, affirming specifically that at the end of the Spanish war he would withdraw his forces completely both from Spain and the Balearic Islands. More gratifying, more noteworthy and perhaps of greater ultimate political importance was the quite abnormal warmth and spontaneity of the greeting given by the Italian crowds to the British visitors.
The undertakings regarding withdrawal from Spain and Majorca are welcome, but they inspire hope rather than confident faith in the light of Italy's recent record in the matter of pledges and the recognised doctrine of dictators that the fulfilment of promises is subject always to considerations of national interest. Signor Mussolini is bent on seeing a Nationalist victory achieved in Spain at the earliest moment possible, and the fact that General Franco was engaged in what was to be a last victorious drive naturally indisposed him to discuss at the moment either mediation or any early withdrawal of the forces on whom the successful advance into Catalonia depended. Lord Halifax many weeks ago told the House of Lords candidly that all Signor Mussolini's conversa- tions with Great Britain were based on the tacit assump- tion that General Franco's victory was a sine qua non. For the Duce it is still a sine qua non, and he has gone some way towards destroying any satisfaction his talks with Mr. Chamberlain may have given in this country by issuing, on the morrow of the Prime Minister's departure, a document warning all other governments of the consequences of lending support to the Spanish Government. Coming at a moment when Italy herself has been intervening actively in the Spanish Civil War for two years minatory language of this kind, endorsed as it is by a semi-official statement from Berlin, is cynically indecent.
Till Signor Mussolini has actually made good his word regarding withdrawal from Spain no better comment can be made on the Rome con- versations than a question-mark. There is every disposition in this country to hope for the best and give the Italian Prime Minister full credit for good intentions. But it would be folly to be deliberately blind to other possibilities. Whatever the reason for Italy's original intervention in Spain, she certainly is not ignoring the advantages her position in the country gives her. She has presented certain far-reaching claims on France—not officially, but through the con- venient agency of a subservient Press—and though Mr. Chamberlain has been assured that they will not be pressed to the point of war that may well be because the now approved technique of the totalitarian States is to avoid war by obtaining all desired results merely through a threat of war. If once the Government forces in Spain are defeated and General Franco becomes master of the country, France will be faced with a hostile force, to which Italy contributes a substantial element, on her southern frontier, while Germany, who has declared repeatedly that the Italian claims have her full support, masses troops on the Siegfried line. Conditions eminently favourable for the discussion of such questions as Tunis and Djibuti would be created thus.
That is a contingency which it is essential to visualise. It is only a contingency. Italy's purpose in Spain may be simply to defeat a Government which she regards as Bolshevist, and having assisted in the establishment of an authoritarian regime she may genuinely be contem- plating the withdrawal of her troops, the more so since their continued presence in Spain, when once they have servel their purpose, would be highly unwelcome to General Franco. If that happens, the prospect for peace in Europe, and particularly in the Mediterranean region, will have sensibly improved. But it cannot be pretended that the attitude of either Herr Hitler or Signor Mussolini is conspicuously pacific. They are work- ing in the closest concert—there is no sign of any break- down of the axis—and neither of them will hesitate to back any of his demands with at any rate the threat of force. In those circumstances Mr. Chamberlain's visit will have done good if he has made it clear at Rome that no wedge can be driven between Britain and France, and still more good if he has left with Signor Mussolini an impression rather of British firmness than of British pliancy. The only person who can supply evidence on that point is the Duce himself, and it is not so far forthcoming. The fact that no concession was made to the Italian view on such questions as belligerent rights for General Franco is a hopeful sign. Another is the obvious preference of the Italian crowds for an umbrella over a dagger as a popular symbol. But the Rome conversations, like so many other elements in the confused international situation of today, impose inexor- ably on the Government of this country two inseparable policies—appeasement and A .R.P. Preparedness may avert not merely the worst consequences of war but war itself.
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