SWITZERLAND AND THE NEXT WAR.
TWO little States on the Continent have long enjoyed, peace and prosperity under the shield of neutrality, —Belgium and Switzerland. They have done nothing to. provoke hostility, given no reason whatever why they should be turned into cockpits, and their sole offence is that, geographically, they lie between greater States which, by- design or accident, may become open and active enemies, and consequently may need these inoffensive and flourishing territories to obtain strategic advantages. The questions pertaining thereto are coolly discussed, and the military experts are supposed to assume, and probably do assume, that if something decisive can be secured by trampling on Belgium or Switzerland, some easier way of striking at each other can be found, then Belgium or Switzerland, or both, should be remorselessly trodden under foot. One reason is, that two Powers have so obstructed the narrow. fronts where their borders touch, that they must seek some other area of conflict, utterly regardless of the welfare and rights of the people dwelling therein, who are to be overrun, even without a, moment's warning, because it would be con- venient to the brutal intruder. We seem to have returned, at least in speculation, to the days when the French Directory, in 1798, conquered and plundered the Swiss Cantons because it had the power and wanted money. " Switzerland," writes Soult in his Memoirs, " had not given any offence to the French Government. It is true she possessed an attraction for the Directory,—the treasury of Berne was believed to contain some thirty or forty millions of francs, and not so much was needed to excite cupidity." The magnet which is to draw in armies from one side or the other is not now gold or silver ; it is the great facilities for an offensive movement which the Federal territory would supply. In point of meanness, not to use a stronger word, we do not see that there is much difference between the effective motives of 1798 and the motives underlying the military speculations of 1889. The calculation which we have been told has found favour, is not only devoid of a moral basis, but rests on large assumptions. It is assumed that the French could surprise the Swiss and the Germans by suddenly throwing 100,000 men over the Jura, occupying the country south of the Rhine, from Basle to Constance, and crossing the river, could concentrate beyond Schaffhausen, without let or hindrance, for an invasion of South Germany by the classic line of the Danube. The world is to go to sleep in peace on one night, and learn the next day that three French corps, taking many trains, are in possession of the Swiss and German bank of the river. We say that this is a large assumption. Very considerable difficulties beset the movement of military bodies- by railway in their own country. These intrusive French are, however, to run their course in a country not their own, and over lines which they do not control. The Swiss must be meeker than they are supposed to be, if they took no steps to block or destroy the lines. A little dynamite, for example, would bar the tunnel through the Mont Terrible, a little more would render the Munsterthal impassable, and the important railway junction over the Jura at Olten could be broken up, to say nothing of points further removed from the frontier. If there were the least delay anywhere, a harum-scarum invasion carried on by successive trains would be marred at the outset, and no French army would, by surprise at all events, peacefully gain the great road to Stockach. Bade might be easily occupied, but we gravely doubt, seeing that the Swiss Staff is a sharp body, whether, in the case supposed, the head of any French column would reach Schaffhausen. Another large assumption is that the Triple Alliance does not exist, and that no danger would menace the adventurous warriors from the right bank of the Rhine above Constance ; and a third that Italy would count for nothing. We will not consider what the Germans might do to render the sur- prise abortive. They have not yet been, though of course they may be, caught napping. Nor has it been shown that they could not be as quick as the French. There is also much that is misleading in the implied comparison of this scheme with what happened in 1800. At that date, a fact which seems to have been overlooked, though it is very important, the French had been for many months masters of Switzerland. They held the left bank of the Rhine from Constance downwards, and it was the virtual annexation of the Swiss Cantons by the Directory which gave them the famous rectangular frontier. Moreau actually had possession of the line of the river which it is now proposed to seize by an act of military brigandage, and also of the country within it, so that he was supported and secure from the outset ; he had not to provide support and create security. What a great military genius might be able to do, none can say or imagine ; but clearly, in the case supposed, he would have to be greater than Moreau, or even than Napoleon, for he would have to begin by acquiring the advantages which the lesser and the greater General possessed in 1800.
Whether the plan is sound or unsound from a military point of view, and even in that aspect it seems a risky operation, which might easily entail its own severe punish- ment, it is doubtful as an act of policy, and morally with- out a rag of excuse. The mere invasion and subjection of Switzerland, on the ground that possession is " necessary " to France or necessary to Germany, would be bad enough, but how much more heinous would be the guilt were the theft of territory to be accomplished on the barbaric principles of the lurking footpad ! The present age is highly enlightened, no doubt ; still, were such enterprises executed, the highly enlightened age would not materially differ from preceding ages which have been qualified as "dark." As to what may happen when the war, breaking out, throws Europe once more into the melting-pot, no one in his senses would pretend to guess. The amusement of planning campaigns, or dogmatically asserting that this or that would occur, is entertaining—and profitless. When millions of armed men are set in motion on many frontiers, not the wisest can say where they will go, what they will do, or under what conditions they will march and fight. In this very case of Switzerland, which it is almost taken for granted would succumb to "a temporary Violation of her territory," how can the confident strategist tell whether the invasion would not light up a flame which would wither a grand design dictated by military necessities, regardless of the barest human rights, and of moral principles the least conventional ? Before such reckless strategy, based on a contempt for the most rudimentary among the laws which hold societies together, is put in motion, it would be well to remember what happened in Spain early in the century, and the consequences which followed in the fullness of time. Soult, taking a practical view, remarks that France had profited by Swiss neutrality, which covered the Jura frontier, and, he adds, " this advantage was infinitely more important than that of obtaining some fresh daouches upon Germany and Italy," for in the end they were turned against France. So did the invasion of Spain, and we are inclined to think that the plan now said to be favoured would be bad strategy and bad politics, besides being a dreadful example of flagitious immorality. What confidence could possibly be placed in France by the other nations of Europe, were she to attempt even the design, we hope wrongfully imputed to her, of breaking like a burglar into peaceful Switzerland, on the naked plea of military necessity ? One thing, we should think, cannot have escaped the strategists who are said to accept openly the violation of Swiss neutrality as the inevitable condition of a Successful attack on Germany. If it has, reflection should cool their ardour, for the case supposed must have often occupied the minds of the German Staff, and pro- vision must have been made, conditionally, against such a contingency. The apparent weakness on the side of Germany, depend upon it, covers genuine strength, and if the French strategists try their plan, they will probably find that they have been accessories to a crime committed in vain. But the mere discussion of such questions bodes ill for the small States and—for public faith.
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