POLICIES WITHOUT PRINCIPLES
DURING the famine in Ireland at the end of the Hungry Forties, it was not uncommon for coroners' juries, faced with a row of corpses, to bring in a verdict of 'Wilful Murder against Lord John Russell.' This was not because he was considered responsible for the potato blight, or for the measures which had condemned the Irish peasant to starvation : he was indicted because he had failed to take the drastic action which a desperate situation demanded. He had persisted in considering Ireland from an English viewpoint —the viewpoint of the English economist, wedded to laissez faire: and of the English politician, determined to let sleeping dogs lie. In some circumstances these policies could work; many a crisis has been surmounted by judicious use of the pending tray. But in others it can be, and is, disastrous, because the disease is not one which can be healed by time : only by surgery.
The verdict on the Cypriots killed in the com- munal rioting of the past few days might be : Wilful Murder against Whitehall. Successive Governments have known, or ought to have known, how dangerous the situation in Cyprus was becoming; yet year after year they have done, in effect, nothing. The first culprit was the Labour Party. It had the opportunity of taking action at a time before passions had boiled over into civil 'strife; and it had in its councils men who knew Cyprus well who must have realised that the lull which followed the abortive flare-up in the Thirties could not last. The only defence they can fairly put forward is that Governments are not by nature good forecasters: there were few signs, before Labour left office, of the chaos to come. But it is a poor excuse. In other parts of the Commonwealth the power of nationalism was early recognised, and handled with care. In Cyprus it was ignored.
To have taken decisive action since the troubles began would not, admittedly, have been easy. It would have excited the usual criticisms: the Government would have been told that it was truckling to terror. But terrorism—difficult though it is to learn this lesson—is not itself a force : it is a symptom of an explosive force gathering underground. Terrorism rarely commands the allegiance of more than a fraction of any country in which it has flourished. The great bulk of every community is peace-loving, anxious only to go about its own business, whether it be making money or making love. If terrorism begins to win toleration, and then support, it is because the morale of ordinary men and women has been sapped by frustration so that what in normal circumstances they would dismiss as delinquency becomes symbolic of national aspiration. It is never really popular, because it is so feared; but people who themselves detest it do not abet it only from fear : they begin to feel that to betray it would be disloyal.
That is why the repetition of the weary old cliché—that before any settlement is possible, order must be restored—is futile. Terrorism is not a cause, but a symptom of unrest. It can be crushed, or at least rendered innocuous, by a sufficient weight of arms; but only a settlement can banish it altogether. It is safe to say that the island will not be free from the threat of terrorism until a settlement is reached.
A realistic appraisal suggests that the Govern- ment's plan is unlikely to provide the basis for that settlement. Unless there is heavy American pressure upon them, the parties to the dispute will refuse to work it; and that appears to be that. But further thought suggests that even if the plan in its present form, and at the present time, is unacceptable, too much attention should not be paid to the arguments of the objectors. They will claim that they cannot accept it on principle; but the history of the past few, years suggests that principles and policies can change with surprising speed. It is not so long since the British Govern- ment was claiming that Cyprus was British in perpetuity : now, it would be delighted to see it in other hands. The Greeks would have welcomed a compromise settlement earlier : now, driven by anti-Turkish feeling, they feel bound to reject it. The Turks were delighted to co-operate with the Colonial Office in destroying any chance of eno.sis: they would now be delighted to destroy, the Colonial Office and everything connected with it. Archbishop Makarios once refused even to consider any scheme which did not promise self- determination within a fixed period; he is noel coming forward with alacrity to examine a plan which specifically excludes that possibility. Eve" EOKA has retreated recently from the positio0 of intransigence its leaders once took up; it hat been watching silently while the Archbishop studies an offer of a constitution much less liberal than he could have had in 1956. Nor can the parties here boast of their consistency. The Corr servatives have so far forgotten the Government argument in the UN that no foreign power can be represented in the administration of Cyprus, as to sponsor a scheme which, in effect, gives representation both to Greece and Turkey; and although the Labour Party is pledged to self• determination for Cyprus, its leaders are now pressing a half-a-loaf policy on the Greek Cypriots.
The fact that nobody can claim consistench though, is not necessarily going to make a coin' promise solution any simpler. And if the Govettr ment's plan is not for the moment feasible, it be wise to rely for a time on direct administration by the Governor. This may be the only solution, at least until the UN meets. By that time the TO will have realised the weakness of their position' They are in desperate need of economic aid; theY cannot afford to goad the Western powers tooli far. And the Greeks may be persuaded to hod their hand until the Turkish bluff has been called.
The immediate rejection of the plan, in foci' need not cause too much concern. It was alai° bound to be detested both by the Turks and the Greeks, no matter what form it took. Wbas is necessary now is to make it clear that henceforw the needs of the island (and not the strategi° requirements of Britain, let alone of Turkey) I atl going to be paramount. The Government's deters mination to stop truckling to Menderes must be made clear; then if the Greek Cypriots can 1)l4 persuaded that British intentions are honourable and the Turkish Cypriots shown that their h01 of direct intervention for the mainland are 10 the day may come when some workable C°°' stitution can be established.
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