POLITICS
If Sir John was covering up for No. 10, all is explained
BRUCE ANDERSON
Every nation which holds the EU presi- dency feels obliged to hold a summit during its term of office, whether or not there is anything to discuss. So over the years there have been some pretty pointless gatherings. Even by those standards, Cardiff was exceptional, because this time there were matters of great import which should have been addressed. But Mr Blair was deter- mined to dumb down the proceedings, and other key players, especially Chancellor Kohl, had reasons of their own for collabo- rating with him. The only interesting comments were made before the main proceedings started, as a result of President Chirac's prediction that Britain would join the single currency in 2002. This was unwelcome to Mr Blair, for it threatened to disrupt his euro strategy, which is to persuade the public that our membership of the single currency is inevitable, without its becoming a major issue at the next election. But there was more embarrassment to follow, at the hands of Robin Cook. He told the British People and, by implication, his own col- leagues that it was time to get off the fence and prepare for the euro. Those remarks were not welcomed in No. 10, for Mr Blair has every intention of remaining in close contact with that partic- ular fence, at least until he is re-elected. Downing Street has now acquired yet another grievance against the Foreign Sec- retary, especially as it questions his motives. Robin Cook cannot abide Gordon Brown and is always piqued when the Chancellor gets good publicity, as he did last week. Downin.6, Street assumes, therefore, that the Foreign Secretary was in the business of headline-grabbing, in a doubly inconve- nient manner. The next day's star billing was meant to be reserved for Mr Blair, and Mr Cook's comments would have produced the wrong headlines. So on Sunday afternoon there was an interesting example of headline repair work by No. 10. It was revealed that Mr Blair had had a conversation with Mr Hoddle, the England manger, who had benefited from the PM's advice on team selection while confiding his own thoughts. This was meant
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to Messrs ensure that, at least in the tabloids, '-"Is.srs Chirac and Cook would receive nummal coverage, if any. As it happened, football did come to Mr Blair's rescue, in the form of hooliganism, which ensured that the Cardiff summit was almost effaced.
But Mr Cook's crimes will be added to an already extensive charge-sheet, though there may have been some covert attempts at mitigation. One plausible explanation has recently been offered for the inept way in which the Foreign Office has handled the Sandline affair: that officials and minis- ters are not merely trying to cover up their own activities, they are also protecting No. 10. It seems inconceivable that a lot of the telegrams dealing with Sierra Leone were not routinely copied to the Prime Minis- ter's office. It is even more inconceivable that the Joint Intelligence Committee (JIC) did not consider Sierra Leone, and the JIC reports directly to the PM. It is hardly a hanging offence to overlook telegrams about a small African country, but surely the Prime Minister must read JIC reports? If he did not, he was grossly negligent; if he did, he knew much more about Sandline, and at an earlier date, than has yet been acknowledged.
This may also help to clear up the great- est mystery in post-war British politics: the reason for Sir John Kerr's cackhanded per- formances in front of the Commons com- mittee. John Kerr is not only industrious and able — hugely so, in both respects he is also quick on his feet and above all, intensely political. This is not some desic- cated mandarin blinking in unaccustomed daylight; Sir John is the sharpest manoeuvr- es in Whitehall — one reason why John Major nicknamed him Machiavelli. Yet he gave abject displays which have had a dampening effect on Foreign Office morale; no department enjoys watching its paladins being humiliated. If John Kerr were a horse, the stewards would have ordered a dope test, but if he was merely concealing the PM's role, all is explained.
So Mr Cook's account with No. 10 may not be as heavily overdrawn as has been assumed, though Mr Blair's team would still prefer it if he kept his thoughts on the euro to himself. But someone ought to be doing the thinking, as Douglas Hurd argued this week in a characteristically lucid and elegant lecture, with every sen- tence containing far more weight than the entire proceedings in Cardiff. As he tacitly acknowledges, Lord Hurd's conclusions will be regarded with suspicion by the Eurosceptics and with dismay by most Europhiles. At a time when the peoples and politicians of Europe are suffering from treaty fatigue, so that there is no enthusiasm anywhere for another Maas- tricht, he argues that there ought to be a fundamental reassessment of the EU's institutional structures and future develop- ment.
This is unlikely to happen, as Lord Hurd also tacitly acknowledges. Most European leaders are so aware of the difficulty of win- ning their electorates' consent to the cur- rent European arrangements that they entirely lack the political self-confidence which the Hurd proposal would require. But his Lordship makes a powerful case. If Europe is to expand further in pursuit of what ought now to be its great historic mis- sion, the consolidation of freedom, law and prosperity in eastern and central Europe, it will have to recast its institutions. In Lord Hurd's view, there are too many commis- sioners, while the Council of Ministers is an inadequate forum for decisions, and would become even more so if it had additional members on the present terms.
Lord Hurd could also have developed his argument in the context of the euro. Whether or not Britain joins, the euro will have a dramatic effect on the politics of Europe, but only a tenuous relationship with democratic legitimacy. That, of course, was originally part of Chancellor Kohl's plan; first establish the euro, then deal with the democratic deficit by moving rapidly towards federalism. But Herr Kohl has an election to fight. He has decided that he can no longer steamroller German public opinion, and that his only hope of defeating Herr Schroder, nicknamed Herr Blair, is to sound like Frau Thatcher. Whatever the outcome in September, the new or — still unlikely — re-elected chancellor will have a continuing problem with public opinion and Europe. Yet it is impossible to see how the euro could work without a federalising political infrastructure. Otherwise, it will end up like one of those Italian bridges, only half com- pleted before the money ran out. In his text, Douglas Hurd warns of the dangers of ambiguity, but his warning is likely to be unheeded. On the evidence of Cardiff, and on the eve of the euro's creating one of the greatest political challenges of the post-war era, the statesmen of Europe seem to have decided to take their cue from Mr Blair and stop thinking, except about football.
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