Heroic Failure

1111.asry excellent books have been written upon the Dardanelles Campaign, both from the British and the Turkish sides, some official, some as personal narratives told by soldiers and correspondents who were themselves actually present on the tragical but heroic scene. The attraction of the deadly struggle upon that small peninsula is irresistible. It was a drama of the highest kind, displayed in three great acts, the beginning, the centre, and the end, all performed upon the same scene and within the short time of less than nine Months. The leading, figures on both sides were men of

heroic mould, and equally heroic were the fighting ;soldieni who lived there and died. The Turks estimated their Jailed at sixty-six thousand, and the British losses on land alone amounted to at least a hundred and seventy-three thousand, including' the wounded and missing, a large percentage of whom must be counted as killed.

• Though I was present during the campaign, have studied most of the works upon it, and have twice gone carefully over the ground since the peace, I acknowledge Mr. North's hook as one of the best accounts of the conflict itself and of the many criticisms that have been passed upon it. He tells us not to .expect a straightforward narrative of the events, but in his early chapters he gives a patient and accurate history of the fighting upon its three main scenes—Helles, Anzac, and Suvla. To have unravelled the complicated stories of those three scenes is of itself atribute to his industry and patience,. To describe the landings at Helles and the futile attempts to advance over the exposed ground up to Krithia and Achi Baba was comparatively simple, but the complications of the August fighting at Anzgc and Sinda make the historian's task incredibly hard. Yet within his brief space Mr. North contrives to explain the situations clearly to any reader, with the aid of the excellent maps. This is all the more remarkable as Mr. North was serving in France during the campaign, and has learnt the nature of the terrible scenes only by five visits (one by air), and diligent study on the spot.

The only point on which I should disagree with his narrative is that he makes too light of the furious Turkish attacks

that drove the isolated and neglected defenders of Y Beach from their vital position above Gully Ravine—a long and precipitous cleft of which they had been entirely unaware.

The seizure of Y Beach, from which, by union with S Beach just across the peninsula, the Turkish forces at the Helles landings • should have been taken in rear, was evidence of Sir Ian Hamilton's tactical genius ; but the appeals for assistance from X Beach, so near at hand, remained unan- swered, and the small body of defenders were driven from the summit down a difficult gully to the sea by repeated assaults of Turks, who actually got mixed among them.

But the history of the conflict at the three main points is by now familiar to everyone who has taken the trouble—

no small trouble—to work it out on the spot or with the British and Australian official accounts. The chief value of

Mr. North's book lies in the criticisms contained in his second part. He calls his work The Fading Vision, and the contro- versies touched upon in this part will remain unsettled till

the heroic vision has utterly faded from human memory. Naturally, he begins with Sir Ian Hamilton himself. He admits that in nearly every respect Sir Ian was a born and practised leader of men :

" If ever it was a man's destiny, he writes, to win a campaign of exceptional moment to mankind—and a campaign in which he could passionately believe—that man was General Sir Ian Hamilton at the Dardanelles."

But he further says :

" The tragedy of Sir Ian Hamilton's command is that, being himself gifted with fine imaginative judgement., he failed to impose his will on these subordinate commanders."

The subordinate commanders, he justly says, inflexibly omitted to seize fortune's favours. As instances one may quote the words of General Kannengiesser, commanding with the Turks, who wrote, " During the whole of the eighth of

August the goddess of victory held the door of success,wi5le

open for Stopford, but he would not enter." It is generally admitted that this " inertia " (Sir Ian's word) when confronted _ _with the genius of Kemal Risha.(the Ghazi) was.the--eihm* of the Suvla failure. But much as I admire the vast work qt the Australian official history compiled by my friend Capta* C. E. W. Bean, I could not readily agree with his depreciati4 of General Birdwood, under-whops he was serving :

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" The vital objective, the actual crest of Chunuk Bair, was several days within Birdwood's reach, and for a few hours aetu

in his hands. An opportunity was presented to him by fighti4 which was never aurpapsed, for securing results perhaps- unattaiil• able in any other land battles of the War : that opportunity passeo, never to return." .

.

Captain Bean was wounded at the very beginning of thAt terrific struggle to scale the precipices of . Chun* Bair hsi night, up tortuous ravines, through tracks thickly covered with lofty bushei of prickly scrub, over. unexplored grourilk by men heavily armed and soon exhausted with fatigue aUd deadly thirst. Otherwise he might have made more allowsltif for. the frailty of human nature. It is my own opinion that the limit of human endurance, both at night and under the burning sun, with intolerable thirsts:wide:3, was the main cause of t* Anzac failure; and to some extent of the Suvla failure as welt,

To return to Sir Ian ; Mr. North later on repeats his m* picion of a fault : -'

611 " It is conceivable, he writes, that a' commander less sensitIVe to-the common imperfections of humanity,'-' and actuated only ,Sy a brutal determination to beat down .opposition to his dement**, might ultimately have succeeded where a compassionate and (03 exalted heart was to fail" It is, .indeed, quite possible that a man of swift decision and rapid action like Sir Ian could hardly imagine that one of lAt subordinates could remain inert at the very crisis of war, thilit he should have- made no attempt to obey Sir Ian's order seize Tekke Tepe, the-hill dominating Suvla, -at- IMee, or thrtt another should have yielded- to sulks because an officer nzigi slightly inferior rank had been set above him.

The two other, main problems discussed are the questia whether the ships alone could have succeeded in forcing tVe Straits, as Sir Roger Keyes so fervently pleaded, eveit after the army had failed ; and whether thefinal evacuation was justified. Admiral de Robeck's fear of losing even o1e of his beloved ships thwarted Sir Roger Keyes's plan, and the message from Mr. Churchill urging him. to make the attempt-71 marked " not sent." As to the evacuation one need o quote Sir Ian's own comment : " Tommy' Atkins, tramping through- the bazaars of Cairo" Benares, may not have been loved, but he was at least devo believed to be immovable. Now—since that tragic naidni flitting—India and Egypt know better ; they say, like Galileo, • He moves notwithstanding.' " z HENRY W. NEVINSONCI